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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. A-134
Columbus Board of Education et al.,)
Applicants,
V.

On Application for Stay.

Gary L. Penick et al.
[August 11, 1978]

MR.

JusTICE REHNQUIST.

The Columbus, Ohio, Board of Education and the Superintendent of the Columbus Public Schools request that I stay
execution of the judgment and the mandate of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this case pending consideration by this Court of their petition for certiorari. The judgment at issue affirmed findings of systemwide violations of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
on the part of the Columbus Board of Education. and upheld
an extensive school desegregation plan for the Columbus
school system. The remedy will require reassignment of
42,000 students, alteration of the grade organization of almost
every elementary school in the Columbus system, the closing
of 33 schools, reassignment of teachers, staff and administrators, and the transportation of over 37,000 students. The
1978- 1979 school year begins on September 7, and the applicants maintain that failure to stay immediately the judgment
and ma.n date of the Court of Appeals will cause immeasurable
and irreversible harm to the school system and the community. The respondents a.re individual plaintiffs and a plaintiff class consisting of all children attending Columbus public
schools, together with their parents and guardians.
This stay application comes to me after extensive and complicated litigation. On March 8, 1977, the District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio issued an opinion declaring the
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Columbus school system unconstitutionally segregated and
ordering the defendants to develop and submit proposals for
a systemwide remedy. That decision predated this Court's
opinions in three important school desegregation cases: Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 (1977);
Brennan v. Armstrong, 43B U. S. 672 (1977); and School District of Omaha v. United States, 433 U. S. 667 (1977). In the
lrad case, Dayton, t.his Court held that when fashioning a
remedy for constitutional violations by a school board. the
court "must determine how much incremental segregative
effrct these violations had on the racial distribution of the ...
school population as prf'sently constituted, when that distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence of
such constitutional violations. The remedy must be designed
to redress that difference. and only if there has been a systemwide impact may there be a systemwide ren10cly." 433 U. S ..
at 420. The defendants movecl that the District Court reconsider its violation findings and adjust its remf'dial order in
light of our Dayton opinion. Upon such reconsideration, the·
District Court concluded that Dayton simply restated tho established precept that the remerly must not exceed the scope
of the violation. Since it had found a systemwide violation,
the District Court clermed a systemwide remedy appropriate
"·ithout the specific findings mandated by Dayton on the
impact discrete segregative acts had on tho racial composition
of individual schools within tho syskm. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed. Penick v. Columbus Board of Education, Nos. 773365-3366, 3490-3491. and 3553 (July 14. 1978).
Prior to its submission to me, this application for stay was
denied. by MR. JusTICE STEWART. While I am naturally
reluctant to take action in this matter different from that
taken by him. this case has como to me in a special context.
Four days before the application for ~tay was filed in this
Court. tho Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in the Dayton
remand. Brinkman v. Gilligan (Dayton IV), No. 78-3060'
(July 27, 1978). Pursuant to this Court's opinion in Dayton,
the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio had held
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a new evidentiary hearing on the scope of any constitutional
violations by the Dayton school board and the appropriate
remedy with regard to those violations. It had concluded
that Dayton required a finding of segre~ative intent with respect to each violation and a remedy drawn to correct the
incremental segregative impact of each violation. On that
basis the District Court had found no constitutional violations
and had dismissed the complaint. The Sixth C'ircuit reversed,
characterizin~ as a "misunderstanding" the District Court's
readin~ of our Dayton opinion. Dayton IV, supra, slip. op.,
at 4. It reinstated the systemwide remedy that it had ori~i
nallv affirmed in Brinkman v. GilligGJn. (Dayton lll), 539 F.
2d 1084 (1976). vacated and remanded, 433 U. S. 406 (1977).
Dayton IV and the instant case clearly indicate to me that
the Sixth Circuit has misinterpreted the mandate of this
Court's Dayton opinion. During the Term of the C'ourt, I
would refer the appli.ra.tion for a stay in a case as significant
as this one to the full Court. But that is impossible here.
The opinions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals
total almost 200 pages of somP complexity. Tt would be impracticable for me to even informally circula.rize my collea~ues,
with an opportunity for meaningful analysis. within the time
necessary to act. if the applicants are to be afforded any relief
and the Columbus community's expectations adjusted for the
coming school year.
I am of the opinion that thr Sixth Circuit in this case
evinced an unduly grudging application of Dayton. Simply
the fact that throo Justices of this Court might agree with me
would not necessarily mea.n that the petition for certiorari
would be granted. But this case cannot be considered without
reference to the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Dayton IV. In
both cases the Court of Appeals employed legal presumptions
of intent to extrapolate systemwide violations from what was
described in the Columbus case as "isolated" instances.
Penick v. Columbus Board of Education, supra, slip op., at 36
(July 14, 1978). The Sixth Circuit is apparently of the
opinion that presumptions, in combination with such isolated

'.
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violations, can be used to justify a. system,vide remedy where
such a. remedy would not be warranted by the incremental
segregative affect of the identified violations. That is certainly not my reading of Dayton and appears inconsistent
with this Court's decision to vacate and remand the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in Dayton III. In my opinion, this questionable use of legal presumptions, combined with the fact
that the Dayton and Columbus cases involve transportation
of over 52,000 school children, would lead four Justices of this
Court to vote to grant certiorari in at least one case and hold
thf' other in abeyance until disposition of the first.
On the basis of the District Court's findings, some relief
may be justified in this case under the principles laid clown
in Dayton. Two instances where the school system set UP'
cliscontiguous attendance areas that resulted in white children
being transported past predominantly black schools ma.y be·
clear violations wananting relief. But the failure of the
District Court and the Court of Appeals to make any findings
on the incremental segrega.t ive effect of these viola.tions makeit impossible for me to tailor a stay to allow the applicants a~
more limited form of relief.
In their response, the plaintiffs/respondents also take an
"all or nothing" approach and do not offer any suggestions
as to how the mandate and judgment of the Court of Appeals
can be stayed only in part consistent with the a.pplicants'
legal contentions. I therefore have no recourse but to grant
or deny the stay of the mandate and judgment in its entirety.
The last inquiry in gauging the appropriateness of a stay
is the balance of equities. If the stay is granted the respondent-children's opportunity for a more integrated educational
experience is forestalled. How many children and how integrated an educational experience are impossible to discern because of the failure of the courts below to inquire how the
complexion of the school system was affected by specific
violations.
In contrast, the impact of the failure to grant a sta.y on the
applicants is quite concrete. Extensive prepa.r ations toward'
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implementation of the desegregation plan have taken place,
but an affidavit filed in this Court by the Superintendent of
the Columbus Public Schools indicates that major activities
remain for the four weeks before the new school term begins.
These activities include inventory, packing, and moving of
furniture, textbooks, equipment and supplies; completion of
pupil reassignments, bus routes and schedules, and staff and
administrative reassignments; construction of bus storage and
maintenance facilities; hiring and training of new bus drivers;
and notification to parents of pupil reassignments and bus
information. Such a-Ctivities cannot be easily reversed. Most
important, on September 7 there will occur the personal dislocations that accompany the actual reassignment of 42,000
students, 37,000 of which ·will be transported by bus.
The Columbus school system has severe financial difficulties.
It is estimated tha.t for calendar year 1978 the system will
have a cash deficit of $9.5 million , $7.3 million of which is
calculated to be desegregation expe11ses. Under Ohio law
school districts are not permitted to operate when cash balances fall to zero and it is now projected tha.t the Columbus
school system will be forced to close in mid-November of 1978.
Fina.ncial exigency is not an excuse for failure to comply with
a court order, but it is a relevant consideration in balancing
the equities of a temporary stay.
Given the severe burdens that the school desegregation order
will place on the Columbus school system and the Columbus
community in general, and the likelihood that four Justices
of this Court will vote to gra.n t certiorari in this case, I have
decided to grant the stay of the judgment and mandate of
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
As this Court noted in Dayton, "local autonomy of school
districts is a vital national tradition." 433 U. S., at 410.
School desegregation orders are among the most sensitive encroachments on that tradition, not only because they affect
the assignment of pupils and teachers, but also because they
often restructure the system of education. In this case the
desegregation order requires alteration of the grade organiza-

•,

,.

..
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tion of virtually every elementary school in Columbus. As
this Court emphasized in Dayton, judicial imposition on this
established province of the community is only proper in the
face of factual proof of constitutional violations and then only
to the extent necessary to remedy the effect of those violations.
It is therefore ordered that the application for a stay of
the judgments and mandates of the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit and the District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio be granted pending consideration of a timely petition
for certiorari. The stay is to remain in effect until disposition of the petition for certiorari. If the petition is granted ,
the stay shall remain in effect until further order of this Court.

i'upumt <qomi cf t~t ~lt i>tatt.s
~rullfingron. ~. QJ. 2ll.?JI.~
·
CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

August 25, 1978
·'

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Re:

A-134 Columbus Board of Education v. Penick

...

.

'

Several of the Brethren suggested that some kind of
"terminal" order be entered in this case. I deferred action
to allow ample time for everyone to respond. Since I am
taking off tomorrow until September 20 I did not act until
this mornin~having asked the Clerk to prepare an appropriate
order. That order was signed this forenoon.
At 3:46p.m., 4:13p.m. and 4:24p.m. I received memos
from John, Bill Brennan and Potter, respectively: John
voted to grant the petition for a Special Term, Bill asked
"that the order not be released until I have had an opportunity
to review its form," and Potter requested that the order not
include his name as an abstention or a dissenter. The memo
from his clerk states, " ... it is his belief that that will
not involve mentioning his name as a member of the majority.
He does vote, however, to deny the special term."
I see no occasion for any further action by me at
this time.

·.·
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

.,

No. A-212
Dayton Board of Education,
Applicant,

On Application for Stay

v.
Mark Brinkman, et al.

I August 28, 1978]
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, Circuit Justice.
The Dayton, Ohio Board of Education requests that I
stay execution of the judgment and mandate of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this case pending consideration
by the Court of its petition for certiorari. The judgment reversed the dismissal by the district court of the plaintiffs'
school desegregation suit, and ordered the extensive desegregation plan continued.
The applicant urges that this case be stayed because
it raises many of the issues presented by Columbus Board of
Education v. Penick. Mr. Justice Rehnquist stayed the mandate
of the Sixth Circuit in that case on August 11, 1978. A
crucial distinction between these cases leads me to believe
that this application should be denied. Columbus had never
been the subject of a school desegregation remedy; the Dayton
system, by contrast, will enter its third year under the current plan on September 7.
In Columbus the status quo was preserved by granting a stay; here it can be preserved only by
denying one. To avoid disrupting the school system during our
consideraton of the case, the stay should be denied. This disposition, of course, does not reflect any view on the merits
of the issues presented

'

.

The application for a stay of the judgment and mandate
of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is denied.

.

•

.:§u:puntt ~!l"Url .o-f f4t ~b .:§bUts.
Jfas~ ~.

Qj.

2.0~'!-~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

-.

August 28, 1978

Re:

A-134, Columbus Board of Education
v. Penick
·"'

Dear Chief,
This will confirm that I am opposed
to the calling of a Special Term to consider
the application of the respondent.
I have authorized my secretary, Mrs.
Carolyn Sand, to initial this note for me.
Sincerely yours,

?

5.

..,

c.s

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

., ...

.

'\.•

.·

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. A-134
Columbus Board of Education et al.,
Applicants,

v.

On Application for Stay.

Gary L. Penick et al.
[August 11, 1978]

MR.

JusTICE REHNQUIST.

The Columbus, Ohio, Board of Education and the Superintendent of the Columbus Public Schools request that I stay
execution of the judgment and the mandate of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this case pending consideration by this Court of their petition for certiorari. The judgment at issue affirmed findings of systemwide violations of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
on the part of the Columbus Board of Education, and upheld
an extensive school desegregation plan for the Columbus
school system. The remedy will require reassignment of
42,000 students, alteration of the grade organization of almost
every elementary school in the Columbus system. the closing
of 33 schools, reassignment of teachers, staff and administrators, and the transportation of over 37,000 students. The·
1978-1979 school year begins on September 7, and the applicants maintain that failure to stay immediately the judgment
and mandate of the Court of Appea.Is will cause immeasurable
and irreversible harm to the school system and the community. The respondents are individual plaintiffs and a plaintiff class consisting of all children attending Columbus public
schools, together with their parents and guardians.
This stay application comes to me after extensive and complicated litigation. On March 8, 1977, the District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio issued an opinion decla.ring the

2

COLUMBUS BOARD OF EDUCATION v. PENICK

Columbus school system unconstitutionally segregated and
ordering the defendants to develop and submit proposals for
a systemwide remedy. That decision predated this Court's
opinions in three important school desegregation cases: Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 ( 1977);
Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U. S. 672 (1977); and School District of Omaha v. United States, 433 U. S. 667 (1977). In the
lead case, Dayton, t.his Court held that when fashioning a
remedy for constitutional violations by a school board, the
court "must determine how much incremental segregative
effect these violations had on the racial distribution of the ...
school popula.tion as presently constituted, when that distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence of
snch constitutional violations. The remedy must be designed
to redress that difference, and only if there has been a systemwide impact may there be a systemwide remedy." 433 U. S.,
at 420. The defendants moved that the District Court reconsider its violation finding and adjust its remedial order in
light of our Dayton opinion. Upon such reconsideration, theDistrict Court concluded that Dayton simply restated the <'Stahlished precept that the remedy must not <:'xcced the scope
of the violation. Since it had found a systemwide violation,
the District Court deemed a systemwide remedy appropriate
'Yithout the specific findings mandated by Dayton on the
impact discrete segregative acts had on the racial composition
of individual schools within the system. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed. Penick v. Columbus Board of Education, Nos. 773365-3366, 3490-3491, and 3553 (July 14. Hl78).
Prior to its submission to me, this application for stay was
denied by MR. JusTICE STEWART. While I am naturally
reluctant to take action in this matter different from that
taken by him, this case has come to me in a special context.
Four days before the application for stay was filed in this
Court. the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in the Dayton
remand. Brinkman v. Gilligan (Dayton IV). No. 78-3060
(July 27, 1978). Pursuant to this Court's opinion in Dayton,
the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio had held

~
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a new evidentiary hearing on the scope of any constitutional
violations by the Dayton school board and the appropriate
remedy with regard to those violations. It had concluded
that Dayton required a finding of segregative intent with respect to each violation and a remedy drawn to correct the
incremental se~egative impact of each violation. On that
basis the District Court had found no constitutional violations
and had dismissed the complaint. The Sixth Circuit reversed,
characterizing as a "misunderstanding" the District Court's
reading of our Dayton opinion. Dayton IV, supra, slip. op.,
at 4. It reinstated the systemwirle remedy that it had originally affirmed in Brinkman v. Gilligam (Dayton III). 539 F.
2d 1084 (1976). vacated and remanded. 433 U. S. 406 (1977).
Dayton IV and the instant case clearly indicate to me that
the Sixth Circuit has misinterpreted the mandate of this
Court's Dayton opinion. During the Term of thf' C'ourt, I
would refer the application for a stay in a case as significant
as this one to the full Court. But that is impossible here.
The opinions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals
total almost 200 pages of some complexity. It would be impracticable for me to even informally circularize my colleagues,
with an opportunity for meaningful analysis, within the time
necessary to act if the applicants are to be afforded any relief
and the Columbus community's expectations adjusted for the
coming school year.
I am of the opinion that the Sixth Circuit in this case
evinced an unduly grudging application of Dayton. Simply
the fact that three Justices of this Court might agree with me
would not necessarily mean that the petition for certiorari
would be granted. But this case cannot be considered without
reference to the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Dayton IV. In
both cases the Court of Appeals employed legal presumptions
of intent to extrapolate systemwide violations from what was
described in the Columbus case as "isolated" instances.
Penick v. Columbus Board of Education, supra, slip op., at 36
(July 14, 1978). The Sixth Circuit is apparently of the
opinion that presumptions, in combination with such isolated

11
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violations, can be used to justify a systemwide remedy where
such a remedy n·ou1d not be warranted by the incremental
segregative Atrect of the identified violations. That is certainly not my rearling of Dayton and appears inconsistent
with this Court's decision to vacate and remand the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in Dayton III. In my opinion, this questionable use of legal presumptions, combined with the fact
that the Dayton and Columbus cases involve transportation
of over 52,000 school children, would lead four Justices of this
Court to vote to grant certiorari in at least one case and hold
the other in abeyance until disposition of the first.
On the basis of the District Court's findings, some relief
ma.y be justified in this case under the principles laid down
in Dayton. Two instances where the school system set up
discontiguous attendance areas tha.t resulted in white children
being transported past predominantly bla.ck schools may be
clear violations warranting relief. But the failure of the
District Court and the Court of Appeals to make any findings
on the incremental segregative effect of these violations make
it impossible for me to tailor a stay to allow the applicants a'
more limited form of relief.
In their response. the plaintiffs/ respondents also take an
"all or nothing" approach and do not offer any suggestions
as to how the mandate and judgment of the Court of Appeals
can be stayed only in part consistent with the applicants'·
legal contentions. I therefore have no recourse but to grant
or deny the stay of the mandate and judgment in its entirety.
The last inquiry in gauging the appropria.teness of a stay
is the balance of equitjes. If the stay is granted the respondent-children's opportunity for a more integrated educational
experience is forestalled. How many children and how integrated an educational experience are impossible to discern be-·
cause of the failure of the courts below to inquire how the
complexion of the school system was affected by specific
violations.
In contrast, the impact of the failure to grant a stay on the
applicants is quite concrete. Extensive prepa.rations toward
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implementation of the desegregation plan have taken place,
but an affidavit filed in this Court by the Superintendent of
the Columbus Public Schools indicates that major activities
remain for the four weeks before the new school term begins.
Those activities include inventory, packing, and moving of
furniture, textbooks, equipment and supplies; completion of
pupil reassignments, bus routes and schedules, and staff a.nd
administrative reassignments; construction of bus storage and
maintenance facilities; hiring and training of new bus drivers;
and notification to parents of pupil reassignments and bus
information. Such activities cannot be easily reversed. Most
important, on September 7 there will occur the personal dislocations that accompany the actual reassignment of 42,000
students, 37,000 of which will be transported by bus.
The Columbus school system has severe financial difficulties.
It is estimated that for calenda.r year 1978 the system will
have a cash deficit of $9.5 mi11ion, $7.3 million of which is
calculated to be desegregation expenses. Under Ohio law
school districts are not permitted to operate when cash balances fall to zero and it is now projected that the Columbus
school system will be forced to close in mid-November of 1978.
Financial exigency is not an excuse for failure to comply with
a court order, but it is a relevant consideration in balancing
the equities of a temporary stay.
Given the severe burdens that the school desegregation order
will place on the Columbus school system a.nd the Columbus
community in general, and the likelihood that four Justices
of this Court will vote to gra.n t certiorari in this case, I have
decided to grant the stay of the judgment and mandate of
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
As this Court noted in Dayton, "local autonomy of school
districts is a vital national tradition." 433 U. S., at 410.
School desegregation orders are among the most sensitive encroachments on that tradition , not only because they affect
the assignment of pupils and teachers, but also because they
often restructure the system of education. In this case the
desegregation order requires alteration of the grade organiza-
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tion of virtually every elementary school in Columbus. As
this Court emphasized in Dayton, judicial imposition on this
established province of the community is only proper in the
face of factual proof of constitutional violations and then only
to the extent necessary to remedy the effect of those violations.
It is therefore ordered that the application for a stay of
the judgments and mandates of the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit and the District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio be granted pending consideration of a timely petition
for certiorari. The stay is to remain in effect until disposition of the petition for certiorari. If the petition is granted,
the stay shall remain in effect until further order of this Court.

.§u.prtnu '!t01trt1tf tfrt ~tb .§tides

~aslpttgLm, ~.

"t·

20.?'1~

C HAM BER S OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

August 15, 1978
,.

Re:

No. A-134

Columbus Board of Education v. Penick

Dear Chief:
The application of the respondents in this case to set
aside or vacate the stay I entered last Friday of the Sixth Circuit's mandate appears to seek that relief from an individual
Justice or, if that is not determined to be within the authority
of an individual Justice (see app. p. 10), from a Special Term
of the full Court.

Potter told me yesterday evening that he had

just denied the application.

Since it is my stay order that is

challenged, I do not think it inappropriate for me to express
my views on these two alternative avenues for overturning my
order.
It is my understanding that no single Justice (even the Chief
Justice!) may vacate or set aside a stay granted by another
Justice, and that such action may be taken only by the full Court
either wheri it reconvenes for the October Term or in a Special

,,

- 2 -

Term.

This is the only way that the written "dialogue" between

Thurgood and Bill Douglas in the case where a stay was sought
of the District Court's order forbidding the Cambodia bombing,
which arose during the Summer of 1973
1326), makes any sense.

(reported at 414 U.S. 1304-

Thurgood originally refused to stay an

.

'

order of the CA 2 which had in turn stayed the order of the Distric-t,
Court.

The

applican~

who had prevailed in the District Court,

then went to Bill Douglas, who did stay the order of CA 2.

The

government then returned to Thurgood seeking from him a stay of
the order of the DC, which would obviously have the same effect
as a denial of the stay of the CA 2 order, but was nonetheless a
different request with regard to a different order.

-~

Thurgood

grqnted the government's request after telephonic consultation
with other members of the Court.

Bill then filed a dissenting

opinion saying that only the full Court had authority to set aside
his order, since he thought he had not only

st~yed

the order of

CA 2 but had affirmatively directed that the order of the District
court be carried out.
I have no doubt that this is the present and correct state
of the law with respect to the authority of an individual Justice
to vacate or set aside a stay granted by another individual
~.

,,

'

- 3 -

Justice.

An opposite conclusion would lead to a chaotic situation,

in which one Justice could grant a stay, a second Justice set his
stay aside, the first Justice then reinstate the stay, etc.

I

think this understanding of the authority of an individual Justice
to set aside a stay is quite consistent with what I understand to
be the authority of an individual Justice to grant a stay which
has been earlier denied by another individual Justice.

That, of

course, is what I did in this case, and it is my understanding
that an applicant for a stay may go from Justice to Justice, and
that even though he is turned down by eight of the nine Members
of the Court, the ninth member nonetheless has the authority to
grant it.

Obviously, for a ninth Justice to go in the teeth of

the recorded views of his eight Brethren would smack of arrogance,
but that goes to the question of the wisdom of the action rather
than the authority for it.
As ta the second question raised by the respondents• application -- the convening of a Special Term of the Court to consider
their motion to vacate my stay -- my recollection of the conference
discussion at the time of the Special Term called during the
Summer of 1972 to consider the Democratic National Committee cases
is that there was some difference of opinion among us as to who

- 4 has the authority to convene such a Term.

Assuming that the

views of a majority of the individual Justices of the Court are
relevant, if not controlling,

I am opposed to the calling of a

Special Term to consider this application.
I have dictated this letter by telephone and had it read
back to me, but since I am out of the City I have authorized
Bob Haar, one of my law clerks, to sign my initials to it.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

,,.

~
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

August 17, 1978

Re:

A-134 - Penick, et al. v. Columbus Board
of Education

Dear Bill:
-

I returned to Washington late last evening
and saw your memo of August 15.
Reading it I assume you were proceeding in the
belief that all of us had the papers received August 14
entitled "Motion to Vacate Stay by Single Justice,
etc."

'·'

,,

I find that Motion was not circulated but I
sought it from the Clerk and find that the face of the
Motion is not all that accurate in describing the
"Relief Requested" which appears on p.7 where petitioners
open stating:
"Plaintiffs respectfully ask the
Circuit Justice to circulate this Motion
and the attached papers to the full Court."
This is followed by extended discussion which hardly
clarified the situation. The confusion seems to have
arisen from the entitlement of the Motion on the face
and the expanded discussion beginning at page 7.
As I now read the whole document petitioners were
in fact asking only that the matter of a stay be referred
to the full Court in some way or that a Special Term be
called.
Potter apparently acted on the assumption that
the relief sought was to "VACATE [the] STAY" granted by
Bill Rehnquist and accordingly he denied it -- and I
think correctly. Justices cannot get involved in a continuing "ping pong game."

·.

- 2 -

In light of Bill's memo of August 15, I see
nothing to do at this s.tage.
It has not been necessary for me to resolve
whether the Chief Justice has power to convene a
Special Term or whether it can be done only by the
Court. There is no need to resolve that issue here
although I have no hesitation in expressing my view
that the Chief Justice has that authority. Having
said that I add that it might be futile unless the
"convenor" was reasonably sure five other Justices
would show up. However, since I would not undertake
to exercise the authority which I believe exists except
on a matter of significant national concern, I have
no doubt a quorum would respond. The circularity
of this approach will be apparent, but should there
be a different appraisal among the Justfues as to the
importance of the question presented, I suspect any
Chief Justice who felt strongly on the need for a
Special Term would be content to let the absent Brothers
justify their absence. I regard the matter as largely
academic and have consulted everyone in the situations
presented since June 1969.

,,

In short, I see no problem now but conceivably
one could be presented if a new motion is filed asking
me to present the petition to the full Court, or
alternatively, to convene a Special Term.
I would
readily comply with the former and deny the latter,
notwithstanding its pos ible importance in the area
affected.

gards,

0

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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Re:

August 22, 1978

A-134 Columbus Board of Education v. Penick

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
I first learned this noon of the filing of the application
supported by the Solicitor General to convene a Special Session
of the Court to review Bill Rehnquist's stay. I also learned
from my chambers that the Chief, Byron, Harry and Lewis have
circulated memos that each would deny the request. There has
been no official word from Potter, Thurgood, or John.
Since there are five votes to deny, I see no purpose in my
examining the papers and I will simply pass.
I have authorized my clerk, Merrick Garland, to initial
this memorandum for me.

Sincerely,

August 22, 1978

Dear Chief:
With respect to the application filed on August
21 to convene a Special Term to consider- the stay in
A-134, Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, I would deny
the request.

,

.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

'·

..

.

,-:

Dear Chief:
.·":

In my note yesterday, I expressed my opposition
to convening a Special Term of the Court, as requested by
respondents in the above case. I understand this is the
view of at least .a majority of the Brothers.

.....'

I intended to say also that I see no reason for
an opinion. But I do think it would be desirable, as a
means of advising the parties, to enter a brief order
denying the request.

Perhaps this already has
~ I understand you will be
Europe at the end of the week. I hope you and Vera
have a refreshing as well a~ an interesting

~

'.

Sincerely,

The Chief
lfp/ss
cc:

The
'.

•' .'

;\·'

...

,,.,.,;.

·...... J

No. 78-610

v.

1.

SUMMARY:

The issues in this case are

~

~~ r

i.tL G~ ~ /j41i,;__ . •

Bd. of Education v. Br ~an, No. 78-621'.

to those in Dayton

Petrs contend that the DC im-

posed a systemwide remedy without considering the incremental segregative
effect individual violations had on the school system.
~

They argue that

the courts below employed legal presumptions, in combination with evidence of discrete and isolated constitutional violations, to justify a

- 2 --

systemwide

~ tistical ;ac ~al

balance r : medyo

They also maintain that

the courts below inferred segregative intent from a neighborhood school
policy because the foreseeable effect of such assignment in the context
of segregated housing patterns is racially imbalanced schools.

Finally,

petrs object to the DC and CA's inference of segregative intent with
respect to actions that maintained racial imbalance without inquiry into
legitimate justifications for the actionso
2.

FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW:

The Columbus school system consists

-

of 170 schools and roughly 86,000 students.

On the basis of findings

of constitutional violations, the District Court has fashioned a system-

---....

wide remedy requiring each school in the system to be racially balanced

-

'------~------------~--~~---------------------------

-

within +or - 15% of the system's overall racial composition.
~

Petrs

claim that this remedy will require reassignment of 42,000 students,

-

....

alteration of the grade organization of almost every elementary school
in the system, the closing of 33 schools, reassignment of teachers,

staff and administrators, and the transportation of over 37,000 students.
This action was filed on June 21, 1973.

The suit was originally

premised on the theory that the school board had failed to exploit integrative opportunities in its school construction program.

In their

amended complaint, plaintiffs challenged the use of a neighborhood school
policy in the context of segregated housing patterns.

They also con-

tended that petrs had segregated the Columbus school system by use of
optional .attendan~e areas and assignment of teachers on the basis ·of race
The DC reviewed the pre-1954 history of the Columbus school system.

- 3 In 1881
____.the Columbus school board abolished separate schools for black
children.

The DC found that in the first half of the Twentieth Century,

schools were constructed in black areas and became almost exclusively
b1ack schools, and that all black teachers in the school system were
assigned to these schools.
ticularo

The court focuses on one incident in par-

When a mixed junior high school in a marginal area was con-

verted to an elementary school, an all black faculty was installed and th
school districts gerrymandered so that white children near the new elementary school could attend a predominantly white and more distant elementary school.

The DC found that the black character of five schools

was sustained by district gerrymandering and exclusive assignment of
--"·

b1ack teachers and administrators.

Although conceding that there was

some racial mixing in the Columbus school system, the DC concluded that
for all practical purposes the school system as of 1954 had to be characterized "dual."
.....,

'

The DC then gave an "overview" of the post-1954 experience.

It

found that between 1964 and 1973 the school board maintained its prior
practice of assigning black teachers to schools with substantially black

y

student populations, although there were exceptions.

The court dis-

cussed the post-67 policy of the school board to improve racial balance.
For example, in 1967 the columbus Board officially adopted a policy to

\

In the 1972-73 school year, 250 black elementary teachers (63.~/o
of all black elementary teachers in the system) were assigned to schools
in which the student body was 80-10~/o black. While in 34 elementary
schools where the student population was 80-10~/o white, there were no
black teacherso

- 4 take racial balance into consideration in drawing attendance zones.

It

also adopted a voluntary transfer program intended to improve racial
balance.

The thrust of the DC's discussion is that the announced policie

and feeble efforts to implement them had no discernible impact on racial

y

~alance

in the Columbus school system.

The DC prefaced its discussion of specific post-1954 actions by
observing:
Based upon the law as it is set out in
Part IV of this opinion, I am constrained,
from certain facts which I believe to be
proved, to draw t~ inference of segregative
~nt from t fie c OlUmb us d e f end ant s ' failures,
after netic~ to consider predictable racial
consequences of their acts and omissions when
alternatives were available which would have
eliminated or lessened racial imbalance.
(App. at 19-20o)
It then focused on the Columbus Board's school construction policies
The Columbus Board argued, and the DC agreed, that the Board has a neighborhood school policyo

But the DC observed that

the Board could reasonably foresee the probable racial composition of
schools to be constructed on any given site.

It discussed two elementary

schools (Gladstone and Sixth Avenue) where placement of the schools a
few blocks from where they were built would have had an integrative
effect.

For example with respect to Sixth Avenue the DC observed:
Even if the court were to find compelling nonsegregative reasons for the construction of this

----~17~--~~~-

~

During the 1975-76 school year, 70.4% of all students in the
Columbus Public Schools attended schools which were 80-100% populated
by either black or white students.

- 5 -

(

new school on its Sixth Avenue site, it is readily
obvious from the census maps that the objectives
of racial integration would have been better served,
without abandoning the neighborhood school policy,
by drawing the attendance zones east and west between High Street and the railroad tracks, rather
than north and south along Fourth Streeto The
Columbus defendants have of.fered no explanation
for the fashion in which Sixth Avenue was opened
and maintained during this periodo
(App. at 24o}
The DC then listed a number of other actions that it found probative
on the issue of liability:
1} The Near-Bexley Option:

An option whereby a small white enclave

(in '72 there were 25 elementary school students and 2 high school students in zone) were permitted to attend predominantly white schools to
the east rather than the closer, predominantly black schools to the
west.

The DC stated:
The court is not so concerned with the
numbers of students who exercised or could have
exercised this option, as it is with the light
that the creation and maintenance of the option
sheds upon the intent of the columbus Board
of Education.

(App. at 29.)
2} Highland, West Mound and West Broad Elementary Optional Zones
and Boundary Changes:

DC found that on the west side of Columbus oppor-

tunities existed for integrating four elementary schools:

predominantly

black Highland and predominantly white Burroughs, West Broad and West

'

Mound.

He found this opportunity squandered; option zones and boundary

changes

perpetu~ted

the racial characteristics of each schoolo

One

- 6 option zone was created to alleviate overcrowding and had that effect,
but the DC concluded other option zones could have been created which
would have had a more integrative effecto
3) Moler Elementary Discontiguous Attendance Area:

It appears 70

' '1 hite students were literally bussed past a neighboring predominantly
black schoolo
4} Heimandale Discontiguous Attendance Area:
3.

Situation similar to

Attendance area existed from 1957 to 1963.
5)

Innis-Cassady Alternatives:

These involved an area consolida·t ed

into the Columbus school system in 197lo

The northern sector was pre-

dominantly white, the southern sector black.

DC found a violation in

putting an elementary school in the center of each sector rather than
establishing one primary center and one intermediate school that would
serve the entire areao
J

T h e DC t h en set out

~o

,,

1 ega 1 standar
•
I
'
d s.
t h e appropr1ate
d ef1ne

It

stated that "intent embodies the expectations that are the natural and
probable consequences of one • s act or failure to act."

(App. at 45.)

The DC cited Oliver Vo Michigan State Bd. of Education, 508 F.2d 178_ 182
(6th Cir. 1974} as the applicable standard in the CA Go
A presumption of segregative purpose arises
when plaintiffs establish that the natural probable, and foreseeable result of public officials'
action or inaction was an increase or perpetuation
of public school segregation. The presumption
becomes proof unless defendants affirmatively establish that their action or inaction was a consistent and resolute application of racially
neutral policieso

- 7 The court held that it could consider as a factor in determining segregative intent that the columbus Bd. assigned students pursuant to a
neighborhood school policy with full knowledge of segregated housing
patterns and with full understanding of the foreseeable racial effects
of its

actions.~The

court observed that the ir.ference was

particula~ly

permissible here because the Columbus Bd. had repeatedly been put on
notice by civic organizations that it was not exploiting integrative
opportunitieso

It pointed specifically to curative suggestions by state

officials and university study groups.

The court found that the columbus

Bd. took some, "minimal" action with respect to these suggestions. But a
resolution was defeated by a majority of the Board which would have
created a site selection advisory board designed to provide a mechanism
for preventing the selection of construction sites which would result
in racially segregated schools.
it

The Board also defeated a motion that

. request the State Department of Education to develop and present

to the columbus Bdo plans for effectively desegregating the public

school ~

The Board also declined to apply for federal funds for desegregation.
The columbus Bd.'s emphasis was on integrative inducements - - essentially
magnet programs
not enough.

and voluntarism.

The DC found that that simply was

As for the Board's contention that the racial character
'

of Columbus schools is due principally to residential segregation, the
court found that actions of school authorities generally have a significant impact upon housing patterns and that it was simply impossible
to factor out the housing influence.

Nor did the court think it had to.

- 8 -

It was enough that the school authorities should have acted to counteract
the segregative influences of residential segregationo

The DC summarizec

its findings as follows:
(1) By pre-1954 actions four schools were "deliberately
segregated or racially imbalanced by acts of school officials.

During

the intervening years the imbalance has survived unattenuated by any act E
of defendants. "
(2)

·~ears

of the practice of racial considerations in the assign-

ment of teachers and administrators have negatively influenced the racia _
character of the schools.

Recent acts have lessened the sting of the

practice, but have not served to substantially remove the evil it helped
createo"
(3) "Defendants • evidence falls short of showing that the racial
character of the school system is the result of racially neutral social
dynamics or the result. of acts of others for which defendants owe no
responsibility."
(4) The Columbus school system was dual at the time of Brown I and
the Bd. never actively set out to dismantle it.
(5) Even in very recent times the Bd. has approved optional attenda r
zones, discontiguous attendance areas and boundary changes which have
maintained and enhanced racial imbalance.
(6) The Board has abjuredworkable suggestions for improving racial
balanceo
. (7) From the above it is reasonable to draw an inference of segregative intent.

- 9 JI

,,

The DC issued a supplemental memorandum after this court's opinion
in Dayton.

That memo stated that Dayton did not affect the substantive

law in the school desegregation area, but simply echoed the old precept
that the remedy must be no greater than the scope of the violation.
The DC distinguished the Dayton case as one where the court found three
specific violations.

This case, by contrast, "concerns a school board

which since 1954 has by its official acts intentionally aggravated,
~~--------

,

rather than alleviated, the racial imbalance of the public schools it

----------~--~~~~---~-

administers.,"

(App .. at 94 .. )

It noted again that at trial the defen-

dants had not shown that the systemwide imbalance was the result of
social dynamics or the acts of others.

Ultimately, a remedy was ac-

cepted by the DC that provides the relief outlined on p. 2 of this memo.

-

The

CA

-

affirmed, relying on the findings of the DC.

to this Court's Dayton opinion, the

CA

-

With an eye C/-lf.b

explained at great length the

. legal theory upon which the violation and remedy were premised.

.It is
in the exposition of this theory that striking parallels between the

I

CA 6's Dayton and Columbus opinions become apparent.
As in the Dayton opinion, the CA broke the evidence down into preand post-1954 conduct.

It reiterated the DC's finding that before 1954,

five schools were deliberately segregated or racially imbalanced by acts
of the Columbus Bd.,

Invoking the Keyes presumption, the

CA

held that

this violation with respect to a substantial portion of the school system
was a "legal predicate" for the DC's finding of a dual school system.
The consequence of this finding of a dual school system was that the

- 10 Columbus Bd. "has been under constitutional duty to desegregate its
schools for 24 years .. "

(App .. 'at 160)

TheCA then examined post-1954 conduct.
that during the 1975-76 school year over

7~/o

It cited the DC's finding
of the students in the

Columbus school system attended schools which were either over
or over 80% black.

8~/o

white

Since the Columbus Bdo has been under a constitu-

tional duty for 24 years to desegregate its school system, the CA held
that this racial imbalance itself was sufficient to affirm the DC's
finding of present unconstitutional segregation.

(App. at 165.)

TheCA

then went on to look at the specific post-1954 conduct relied on by
the DC.

It quoted at length the DC's finding regarding school con-

struction.

Seep. 4-5 supra.

analysis of the evidence,

The CA stated that it accepted the De's

"adding only two comments."

"First, the summary of the gross statistics as
found by the District Judge shows that of 103
schools constructed between 1950 and 1975, 87
opened racially identifiable and that as of the
time of trial, 71 of the 87 remained racially
identifiable.
In our view, this requires a very
strong inference of intentional segregation.
Second, this record actually requires no reliance
upon inference, since, as indicated above, it
contains repeated instances where the Columbus
Board was warned of the segregative effect of
proposed site choices, and was urged to consider
alternatives which could have had an integrative
effect. In these instances, the columbus Board
chose the segregative sites. In this situation
the District Judge was justified in relying in
part on the history of the Columbus Board's site
choices and construction program in finding deliberate and unconstitutional systemwide segregation .. "
(App. at 17 3. )

TheCA also noted the DC's finding on post-1954 assign-

c

- 11 ment of black teacherso

See Po 3 suprao

As far as the 1975-1976 school

-----

years were concerned, it agreed with the DC that the number of black
teachers in each

~chool

is comparable to the ratio of black to white

teachers in the entire school systemo
duct of a consent agreement between the
Rights Commission.

It found that condition the proColumbu~

Bdo and the Ohio Civil

Finally, theCA restated the DC's findings on gerry-

mandering, pupil options, and discontiguous pupil assignment areas.

It

conceded that "[t]hese instances can properly be classified as isolated

in the sense that they do not form any systemwide patterno

They are

significant, however, in indicating that the Columbus Bd's "neighborhood
school concept" was not applied when application of the neighborhood
(

-

concept would tend to progtote integration rather than segregation."
(App. at 175o)
In Part VI of its opinion, the CA considered the question of insegrega~ive

cremental

effecto

It concluded, without analysis, that the

following violations had a systemwide impact warranting a systemwide
remedy:

(1) the pre-1954 creation of an enclave of five schools for

black students;

(2) the post-1954 failure to desegregate the school

system in spite of many requests and demands to do so;
Bd's school siting policies;
able schools;

(3) the Columbus

(4) the large number of racially identifi-

(5) the practice, until 1974, of assigning the large

majority of black teachers and administrators to black schools.
concluded:
"If the detailed findings in this paragraph
tracking the language of the Dayton case cannot
appropriately be implied from the District

It

12 Judge's post-Dayton op1n1on (and we think they
can and should be), we now enter these findings
as the findings of this Court, based upon the
6,600 pages of evidence in the record made
before the District courto II
(App. at 199.)
On August 11, 1970, Mr. Justice Rehnquist stayed implementation of
the desegregation order pending this Court's consideration of the petn
for certo
3o

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs contend that racial imbalance in the Columbus

school system is the product of a neighborhood school policy.

In 1970,

71% of all blacks resided within 23 contiguous census tracks in the east
central area of Columbus.
~

Because the Columbus Bd. has made efforts

towards integration, the school population is substantially more integrated than the city itself.

Petrs argue that in this case the CA and

DC approved a systemwide statistical racial balance remedy which went
far beyond the correction of any possible current effect of the limited
violations that were found.

Neither of the courts made the incremental

segregative effect findings required by Dayton.

While conceding that

segregated housing was a substantial factor in racial imbalance in Colurnb u
schools, the DC explicitly held that it was not compelled to isolate
the influence of segregated housing patternso

•

:Petrs maintain that there is inconsistency between the DC's refusal
to make incremental segregative effect findings because the violation
was "systemwide" and this Court's remands in Brennan v. Armstrong, 433

u.s.

672 (1977) and School District of Omaha Vo United States, 433

u.s.

- 13 667 (1977).

In both cases theCA's had affirmed findings of systemwide

violations, yet this Court remanded for Dayton incremental segregative
effect findingso

The CA 6 attempted to patch up the defect in the insta r

case by simply stating that "school board policies of systemwide application necessarily have systemwide impact."

Petrs argue that the lower courts simply presumed a causal connectic
between remote and isolated acts and the current racial imbalance in
the school system.

They substituted legal presumptions for a detailed

factual inquiry into cause and effect, thus permitting the imposition of
a systemwide racial balance remedy without any inquiry into what impact
actual violations had on the character of the system.

The DC based its

liability findings on actions by predecessor boards dating back to 1871,

which the DC found to have created an enclave of five predominantly blac:
schools on the near east side of the city by 1943.

The DC made no

effor ~

to show some link between these actions and the current makeup of the
Columbus school systemo

Yet it was precisely this "fruit of the poison-

ous tree" theory that this Court rejected in Dayton, 433 U.So at 417.
And while the DC considered some isolated post-1954 violations, it made
no effort to discern the effects of those violations.
Petrs contend that the statistical racial balance remedy in this
case is inconsistent with Swanno
Finally petrs contend that the decision here illustrates a conflict
among the circuits on the proper test for discerning discriminatory
intent or purpose.

.

They claim that the courts below inferred segregativ

- 14 intent from the mere continuance of the neighborhood school system,
although that system had been in effect since the turn of the century.
This Court in Keyes specifically reserved the question whether a neighborhood school policy in the presence of housing segregation could constitute a constitutional violationo

Since that time, however, opinions

of this Court have asnwered that question in the negativeo

Petrs cite

Washington v. Davis, 426 u.s. 229 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 u.so 252 (1977); and
Dayton, suprao

Petrs also argue that the adoption of a foreseeable

effects standard of liability is in conflict with Washington v. Davis.
The effect of adopting such a standard is to relieve the plaintiffs of

t_

any burden of proof on intent.

In the instant case that was done in

two ways.
"First, if the school board took a specific action
with knowledge or reason to know that a collateral
effect of the action (whether desired or not) was
to maintain or increase racial imbalance, the court
drew an inference of segregative intent. Unde r
this approach, the Columbus Board's neighborhood
school policy was per se unconstitutional.
Second, whenever the Board was presented
with two alternative courses of action, one with
an integrative effect and one with the effect
of maintaining or increasing racial imbalance,
the failure to choose the integrative alternative,
regardless of the preponderance of other factors
weighing in the favor of the less integrative
alternative, was taken as evidence of segregative
intento Thus, a decision not to alter the grade
structures and to pair two elementary schools,
regardless of non ·racial justifications, was condemned as segregative because it did not improve
racial balance o"

. ~

- 15 {Petn. at 30.)

Petr contends that this is actually an "effect" standard

for discriminatory intent.

That is, if the action had a disproportionate

impact it is presumed to be the product of a segregative intent.

In

Austin, this Court vacated and remanded a lower court decision which
had employed a "foreseea:,le effect" test for reconsideration in light
of Washington Vo Davis.

Justice Powell's concurring opinion noted that

the Fifth Circuit had erred by imputing segregative intent to school officials by drawing an inference from the foreseeable effect of official
actiono

In Village of Arlington Heights, this Court held that a plaintiff

claiming that government action was discriminatory had the burden of
proving that discrimination was a "motivating factor."

Impact alone

was insufficient unless the action was so stark that the decision could
not be explained except on ground of race.
made.

Here no such inquiry was

In fact, when the courts identified disproportionate impact, they

simply shifted the burden to defendants to prove their actions were not
discriminatorily motivatedo

Petrs argue this shifting of the burden is

inconsistent with Washington Vo Davis, Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy
City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429

u.s.

274 {1977).

Petrs contend

that there is a split in the circuits on the propriety of a foreseeability
test.

The Second, Fifth and Eighth Circuits endorse such a test.

The

Ninth Circuit has rejected it.
A brief in support of petrs has been filed by the Ohio State Board
of Education and the Superintendent of Public Instruction.

They main-

tain that the reasoning of the courts below means that judicial recon-

- 16 -
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struction of school districts can be expected as a matter of course.
Here the courts found segregative acts before 1954.

Invoking the Keyes

presumption, they concluded that the school system was therefore dual
in 1954.

Since it was dual, there was an affirmative duty to desegre-

gate, and failure to exploit integrative opportunities was a constitutional violationo

The DC only found eight instances of discrete segre-

gation subsequent to 1954, and the CA characterized those instances as
"properly •

o

o

classified as isolated in the sense that they do not

form any systemwide patterno"

So it is effectively the failure to exploi_.

integrative opportunities that is the basis of the systemwide remedy
here.

'Whatever may be the inferences which Keyes allows to make a prima

facie case of violation, Dayton requires district courts to carry the
factual inquiry further before issuing remedial orders concerning pupil
reassignment and transportation."

..

in original)).

(Ohio State Brief at 6 (emphasis

Yet the DC failed to make any determinations of incre-

mental segregative effect.

They argue that Keyes was not a remedy

case, yet its presumptions have been extended by the courts here to the
remedy areao
Resps retort that the trial court's findings as to violation and
the appropriate scope of the remedy are clearly supported by the evidence
To overcome the systemwide impact of the systemwide violation, a systemwide remedy was approved below after the petrs were given every oppor./ •

tunity to show how a more limited plan would overcome the effects of the

"-''

violation demonstrated at the liability hearing.

They argue that the

- 17 post-1954 "isolated" instances relied on by the court of Appeals and the
DC were not the whole case against the Columbus Board, but instances of
blatant, selective, manipulation of geographic zoning practices that
indicated that the columbus Board chose to adhere to or depart from the
neighborhood school concept whenever such

adher~nce

segregation of the Columbus public schoolso

or departure promoted

They argue that the other

evidence of intentional systemwide segregation was the racial assignment
of faculty and staff, the intentional perpetuation of a de jure dual
school system inherited in 1954, and segregative construction and siting
of new schools and additions.

They object to Justice Rehnquist's

suggestion in his stay opinion that Dayton mandated specific findings on
'

the impact discrete segregative acts had on the racial composition of
schools within the systemo

This "school-by-school" approach was specifialso
ca1ly rejected in Keyes, 413 U.So at 200. They/ contend that to factor
out of the school desegregation relief in this case the level of current
residential segregation in columbus would indicate "that the rights
declared in Brown are to be so limited that there is, in reality, no
remedy at all."
4.

(Respo at 19-20o)

DISCUSSION:

The issues regarding the use of presumptions and

the proper allocation of burdens of proof, the affirmative duty to desegregate, and what if any incremental segregative effect findings are
necessary when a Court finds a systemwide violation are discussed in
the Dayton memo.
Issues that are raised by Dayton but appear more prominantly in the

- 18 instant case are the extent to which school siting and neighborhood
school policies can be the basis for findings of segregative intent and
effect, and the extent to which courts should consider segregated residential housing patterns as an independent justification for racial imbalance in schoolso
courts,

~

In Columbus specific violations found by the lower

p. 5-6 supra, were corroborative on intent, but, as conceded

by the CA, their impact was limited, and therefore it appears that the
school

~ iting
w-

policy was

central

~

systemwide violation.

to the finding of a

The case thus implicates concerns expressed by

Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Austin, 429 U.S. at 991.
Because it maintained a dual school system in 1954, the Columbus Bd .
according to the courts below, was required to exploit integrative oppor tunitieso

Because many schools were racially identifiable when they

opened, the Bdo was found to have failed on a systemwide basis on this
count.

The DC only discusses two instances in detail, and it is unclear

from that discussion if the DCrelied on anything more than the fact
schools would have had a more integrative impact if put elsewhere.

That

is, are specific justifications for choosing a site (land prices, natura _
obstacles, access etc.) cognizable, and if so who has the burden of
proof?

The DC's discussion is ambiguouso

See pp. 4-5, suprao

It seems

clear though that if the DC thought these considerations were relevant a '
all, the burden was on the School Board given the existence of a dual
system at the time of Brown.
sideration:s played no part in

In Dayton the DC found that racial con-

- 19 -
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site selection.
effect:

The CA reversed, finding both segregative intent and

intent insofar as it could be inferred from racial assignment

of teachers and effect in that school sitings were not used to dismantle
the dual system.
In the same vein, the DC in columbus found that a factor in determining segregative intent was use of a neighborhood school policy with
full awareness of segregated housing patterns.
The DC held that given the interaction between school policies and

- ......
--

housing, it could not -- and would not attempt to -- factor out the
influences of residential segregation.
,_., .....
;;;,
z:w;: ,..-..

It would appear that a necessary

implication of this holding is that a court cannot and should not factor

c-

out the effects of housing segregation in ascertaining the incremental
segregative effect of a School Board violationo
In both the Dayton and Columbus cases, petrs challenge the use of
a foreseeability test for segregative intent.

There has been some con-

fusion in the lower courts on the propriety of that test in the wake of
this Court's remand of theCA S's Austin opinion in light of Washington
v. Daviso

A strict foreseeability test undermines the de facto/de jure

distinction, because school board action or inaction which does not
alleviate

~alance

of necessity maintains

a~d

perpetuates it.

The

"foreseeability" tests announced by the Dayton and Columbus courts afford
defendants an opportunity to rebut the inference of segregative intent by
~,

proving their actions were motivated by nonracial considerations.

As

noted, the problem in the Columbus case is that in the discussion of schoc

..
-

(

20 -

siting it is not clear the Bdo was afforded that opportunity.

In Dayton

the De's allocation of the burdens meant that the Dayton Bd. was notrequired to

produc~

such evidence, suggesting that if the CA's intent test

and allocation of burdens was correct, a remand was in order.

Finally,

it should be noted that the CA in Austin also permitted such rebuttal.
There is a responseo
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NOLAN ESTES ET AL v. METRO PO LIT AN BRANCHES
OF DALLAS NAACP ET AL.; DONALD E. CURRY
ET AL. v. METROPOLITAN BRANCHES OF THE
DALLAS NAACP ET AL.; and RALPH F ,
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BRANCHES OF THE DALLAS
NAACP ET AL.
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ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 78-253, 78-282, and 78-283. Decided January -, 1978

MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
The petitioners are the Board of Trustees of the Dallas
Independent School District (the Board), the school superintendent, and several intervening parents groups. Respondents
include the original plaintiffs (children suing by their parents
as next friends) and various branches of the NAACP, which
appeared as intervenors. The School District, which does not
coincide entirely with the city of Dallas, has been in desegregation litigation since 1955. The present action was filed in
1970, and is not a continuation of the original suit. The
District Court's first decree in the present action was appealed
to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which remanded for the
formulation of a new desegregation plan. Tasby v. Estes,
517 F. 2d 92, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 939 (1975) .

'

1..

I
On this remand, the District Court considered in detail six
plans submitted by the various parties and a court-appointed
expert. The District Court heard testimony from nearly 50
witnesses, including numerous experts, and produced a trial
transcript of some 4,000 pages. With careful attention to the
characteristics and history of the Dallas Independent School
District, the District Court adopted a new plan of desegrega~

,.
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tion, described in the court's 20-page opinion and detailed in
its final order. Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1192. 1212
(1976), aff'd in pa.rt, rev'd in part. and remanded, 572 F. 2d
1010 (CA5 1978). Few school desegregation cases reaching
this Court have received more careful attention from a concerned community (including the Educational Task Force of
the Dallas Alliance, a triracial. nonpartisan task force) and
from a District Court thoroughly familiar with the school
system.
This metropolitan school district, the eighth la.rgest in the
United States, embra.ces 351 squa.re miles, with its boundaries
at their farthest points being some 35 miles apart. When this
case was first tried in 1971 , the School District enrolled 163,353
students. Sixty-nine percent of the total student enrollment
was Anglo, with the remaining 31% divided between Negro
and Mexican-American students. By the time the case was·
reconsidered on remand in March 1976, enrollment was only
about 140,000 and the Anglo students had become the
minority, totaling 41.5 %, with 44.5% Negro, 13.47o MexicanAmerican , and 1% "other" racial backgrounds. 412 F. Supp.,
at 1197.
The various plans considered by the District Court and the·
plan adopted by it need not be described in detail here. In
summary, the court relied primarily on the plan proposed by
the Educational Task Force of the Dal1as Alliance, a plan with
a number of progressive educational features. It addresses·
many aspects of the School District's operations, including
personnel policies, school siting, and student transporta.tion
policies. For purposes of student assignment, the plan divides
the School District into six subdistricts. Present student
assignments in each subdistrict are retained, wherever possible, in areas that in fact ha.ve become integrated. In other
areas, children in grades K-3 remain in their neighborhood·
schools ; those in grades 4-8 are assigned to central schools in
each subdistrict ; and high school students will be assigned to
schools in their own subdistricts on the basis of geographical
~tt~ndance 2<.ones. A major feature is. th.e establishment of a~

,-
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number of "magnet high schools" 1 serving the entire district.
The pupil assignment plan is supplemented by majority-tominority transfers upon request. 2
Each of the six plans considered by the District Court
provided for substantial busing. 3 The court made no estimate
of the number of pupils likely to be bused under the plan it
adopted, although the Alliance plan-largely followed by the
court-anticipated the busing of some 20,000. The District
Court concluded tha.t the racial composition of the student
population in each subdistrict "will approximate the racial
makeup of the [district] as a whole with the exception of
[East] Oak Cliff.'' 412 F. Supp., at 1204. With respect to
that subdistrict. the court found that the "practicalities of
time and distance" prevent the elimination of "predominantly
black" schools. lbid.4
II
The Court of Appeals ga.ve short shrift to the District
Court's carefully structured plan. It focused almost exclusively on the fact that a "large number of one race schools"
The magnet high schools will be centrally located high schools designed
"to attract students from throughout the School District to special career
and vocational programs. The order of the District Court requires that
the number of students of each of the three racial and ethnic groups
enrolled in each magnet high school be in proportion, plus or minus 10%,
to the percentage of each group in the grades g-1Z populatjon of the·
School District. The Di;;trict Court's plan requires the School District
to have eight magnet high schools in operation withil1 four years. These
would constitute about one-quarter of the high ~:;chools presently operated
by the School District.
2 The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the District Court's
plan is deficient in not providing transportation at public expense for
children exercising this option.
8 The estimates of the number of students proposed to be bused under·
these plans ranged from 14,000 (the Board's plan) to 69,000 (the plaintiffs' Plan A). 412 F. Supp., at 1199-1203.
• In its opinion, the District Court called' for the creation of five subdistricts. 412 F. Supp., at 1203-1204. In its final order it approved the
creation of a sixth subdistrict, Seagoville, with a predominately Ang_lo,
iAi!l{Ult po.p ulatum .. ld:.. a.t. 12.1.2.-1213:..
1
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will remain under the plan. 572 F. 2d, at 1012. Two subdistricts, each geographically isolated from the remainder of
the district, will have student bodies composed predominately
of one ethnic group. ·East Oak Cliff, bounded by the Trinity
River bottom on one side and by _Interstate 35 on the other,
will be predominantly Negro, and Seagoville, in· the distant
southeast corner of the School District, will be ·predominately
Anglo. In the other four subdistricts, there will be seven
one-race high schools." - 572 F. 2d, at 1014 n. '14. · The Court
of Appeals stated:
"We cannot properly review any student assignment plan
that leaves many schools in a system one race without
specific findings by the district court as to the feasibility
of these techniques . . . . · There are no adequate time
and distance studies in the record in this case. Consequently, we have no means of determining whether the
natural boundaries and traffic considerations preclude
either the pairing and clustering of schools or the use of
transportation to eliminate the large number of one race
schools still existing." 572 F. 2d, at 1014.
The Court of Appeals- remanded "the case to the 'District
Court for the formulation of a new student assignment plan
and for findings to justify · the maintenance of any one-race
schools that may be part of that plan." 'ld., at 1018, empha,.
sis added. If this mandate is implemented it could result,
according to estimates, in the busing of some 40,000 to 69,000
children. 412 F. Supp., at 1199-1203.

III
The Adequacy of the District Court's Plan
Beginning with its decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
349 U. S. 294, 299 (1955) , the Court has recognized that

A.

5 In view of the size and geography of the School District, an assign-ment plan adequate to produce significant racial balance in all of tlleschools in these two subdistricts would have required extensive "cross;
town " busing, pos~ibly involving as many as 69,000 students. 412 F ..
-SU(l(l -, at 12.00, 1204, and Dt>fendants' Exhibit 21.
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the district courts must play the central role in shaping
equitable relief for constitutional violations in the administration of the public schools. Particularly significant in the
present case is the statement of THE CHIEF JusTICE, writing
for a unanimous Court in Davis v. School Comm'rs of Mobile
County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971), that "[t]he measure of any
desegregation plan is its effectiveness." 6 The District Court
in this case exercised its remedial powers to fashion a plan
that would be effective in eliminating any remaining traces
of a dual system in the School District/
0 The Court, in Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 439
(1968), stressed the duty of the district courts to search for an effective
remedy when they consider the relief to be ordered in school desegregation
cases.
"The obligation of the district courts, as it always has been, is to assess
the effectiveness of a proposed plan in achieving desegregation. There is no
universal answer to complex problems of desegregation; there is obviously
no one plan that will do the job in every case. The matter must be
assessed in light of the circumstances present and the options available in
each instance. It is incumbent upon the school board to establish that its
proposed plan promises meaningful and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation. It is incumbent upon the district
court to weigh that claim in light. of tl1e facts at hand and in lig11t of any
alternatives which may be shown as feasible and more promising in their
effectiveness. Where the court finds the board to be acting in good faith
and the proposed plan to have real prospects for dismantling the stateimposed dual system 'at the earliest practicable date,' then the plan may
be said to provide effectjve relief."
7 Effrctivenes~, of course, i:> not the sole measure of the acceptability of
a district court 's order. The district. courts must. remain ~en~itive to the
" limitation~ repratedly exprE's::;ed by thi::; Court. that the extent of an
eqllltable remedy is determinrd b~· and may not properly exceed thr effect
of the constitutional violatwn ." Austin Independent School Disttict v.
United Stateo·, 429 U. S. 990, 995 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring). The
D1strict Court. gavf' littlr nttentwn to the~e limitations in the prrsent.
case. Neither 1t nor the Court. of Appeal~ ha:s rver clearly idPntified
the ba::;Js for t11eir conclu~ion that a~ of thr filing of this action, the
chararteri:stic:-; or operation of thP School Di:strict violated the plaintiffs'
right~ to equal protection of the lawH. 'I'asby ". Estes. 342 F. Supp,
945 (ED Tex. 1971) , aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, and remanded, 517 F,
2d 92 (CAS), cert. deniedJ 423 U. S. 939 {19.75) on remand, 412 F. Suw,

ti
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After years of experience with this litigation, the District
Court was convinced in 1976 of the good faith of the Board in
seeking to establish a unitary school system.
"The DISD has acted in good faith since this Court's
order in 1971 [the first order in this litigation] and has
1192 (1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 572 F. 2d 1010
(1978). Instead, both courts havr relied primarily on the continued
existence of one-race schools in thr School District as demonstrating a constitutional violation. This undocumented conclusioh appear~ to be inconsistent with the assertion by the petitioners in their Brief in No. 78-282,
p. 4, uncontradicted by the re~pondents, that "fnJo child pre~;ently in the
twelve grades of the Dallas Indeprndent School District has ever attended
a school except by assignment approved by the United States courts."
Moreover, the residential patterns that t hi' District Court sought to
accommodate 111 its plan sugge~t that the our-race schools resulted from
demographic and economic influences rather than discriminatory actions
by school authorities . Sec 412 F. Supp., at i205; Tr. of Record in the
District Court, vol. XIV, at 77-78, and Drfrndants' Exhibit 2.
Probably brcause neither of the courts below identified the constitutional
vwlation with precision, neither ha::; considered whether a remedy so
sweeping al:i that ordered by the Di~trict Court is justified. It is settled
doctrine that "the nature of the dl'i:)egregation remedy is to be determined
by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation," Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 280 (1977), and that a coures decree "must be
designed as nearly as possible 'to re~tore the victims of discriminatory
conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such
conduct.'" !d., quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,738 (1974).
See Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419-420 (1D77).
Here, the District Court made no effort to determine to what degree, if
any, the onr-race schools were thr product of discriminatory action and
to what degree they resulted simply from causes-present in every large
c1ty m this country-over which school authorities have no control whatever. As a consequence, it is likely that the transportation ordered by
the District Court will "require [a] much greater degree of forced school
mtegrntion than would have re~ulted from purely natural and neutral nonstate rau:;es." Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 249 (1973).
The Board has not objected to the~e errors. Rather, along with the
Alliance, it cooperated with thr Di~tnct Court and the other parties in
develo]Jmg a plan that it hoped would end the yeart> of litigation with
benefit to all concerned. The Court of Appeals, already adrift because of
tt~ failuro to recognize the rule that a desegregation remedy must be tailored
'to the llatuxe nud scope of an tdcntJfied COnl!titutional violation, rejected!
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made reasonable efforts to fulfill the obligations imposed
by that order. The DISD has further taken good faith
steps to eradicate inequality in educational opportunity
which has previously existed in the DISD." 412 F.
Supp., at 1207.
See also id., at 1197-1198. The District Court found as well
that the resegregation that had occurred between 1971 and
1976 had not resulted from any actions taken by the School
Board, id., at 1205. See Pasadena City Bd. of Education v.
Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 435-436 (1976). The court concluded correctly that its duty was to "adopt a plan which
promises to be effective" in the face of the demographic
changes in the School District. I bid. (emphasis in original).
The plan it chose contains numerous elements in addition
to the magnet schools. They include assurances of faculty
and staff desegregation, and provide for majority-to-minority
transfers, transporta.tion policies, school construction policies,
and student assignments. In short, whether or not required
by unidentified discriminatory purpose or action, the plan
detailed in the District Court's final order plainly reflects a
serious and comprehensive effort to deal fairly, effectively, and
constructively with the infinitely complex problem of structuring a public school system in the eighth largest school
district in the United States. This exercise of equitable discretion, by a judge intimately familiar with the problems and
alternatives, came to the appellate court in this case with a
strong presumption of validity.

B.

The Preoccupation with One-Race Schools
Without rejecting any of the findings of the District Court,
the Court of Appeals reman,ded the case for "the formulation
of a new student assignmenrt plan a!!d for findings [based on

'
that plan because of the likely contmued existence of one-race schools.
In so doing, it remanded, in language that can only be read as requiring
additional bu~ing, a plan that already may have exceeded in scope any
constitutional requirement. It is thE' ba~i~ for the remand by the Court
.of Ap,pea1~ that is before the Court on the present petitions for review~
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time and distance studies] to justify the maintenance of any
one-race schools ...." 572 F. 2d, at 1018. But the District
Court made findings with respect to the one-race schools that
should have satisfied th~ Court of Appeals, especially in view
of the District Court's duty to adopt a plan that would be
"effective" rather than one that would accelerE:tte the movement to resegregation. Accepting the reality of demographic
conditions and tret~ds that it foun·d not to have been caused
by segregative actions of the ' Board, 412 F. ·supp., at 1205,
1207, the District Court declined to require student assignments to achieve racial balance in all schools. The court
made explicit findings with respect to the East Oak Cliff
subdistrict, where most of the predominantly black schools
would be located:
"Due to the geographic layout of the [district], and the
factors of time and distance, this [East] Oak Cliff area
. was left predominantly black in every plan proposed to
the Court, with the exception of Plaintiff's Plan A, which
proposed to establish an exact racial balance in every
school and which would have necessitated the transportation of 1,.9,000 [sic; 69,000, see Def.'s Ex. 21 and 412 F.
Supp., at 1200] students. ·The Court is of the opinion
that, given the practicalities of time and distance, and the
fact that the DISD is minority Anglo, this subdistrict
must necessarily remain predominantly minority or black."
I d., at 1204, emphasis added.
It bears emphasizing that of the six plans considered, all but
the plaintiffs' Plan A would have leit this subdistrict "predominantly black." One should also note that the District
Court did consider "time and distance." 8 In view of these
8 Thr Court of Appeals, in ordering a new a:;signment plan ~SUpported
by time and distance studies, seems to haVJe thought it necessary for the
District Court to include with respect to each bus rout.e a finding as to
" how far" and "how much time" would be involved. No decision of this
Court requires l:iUCh finding:; by a district court. The findings here wrre
made in light of t>ubstantial t•estimony and exhibits rdlecting the geography
of the School District, the di~po:sition of :studrnt::;, the location of 1J1e

..
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factors, the court found that busing on an even larger scale
than that which it ordered would have been an ineffective-as·
well as disruptive-remedy.
In dealing with the high schools, the District Court adopted
a method recommended by experienced educators that it found
would be more effective in mitigating the demographic and
economic barriers to desegregation than wholesa.Ie busing, a
remedy already tried on a less drastic scale and found to be
largely ineffective :
"Moreover, this Court must adopt a plan which promises to be effective 1in eliminating the vestiges of a dual
system. The Court is convinced that the magnet school
concept on the 9-12 grade level will be more effective
than the assignment of students to achieve a certain
percentage of each race in each high school. The Court
tried this method of student assignment in 1971, and it
has. not proven wholly successful in achieving the goal of
eliminating the vestiges of a dual system in these grades.
The evidence shows that of approximately 1,000 Anglos
ordered to be transported to formerly all-black high
schools under this Court's 1971 student assignment plan,
fewer than 50 Anglo students attend those schools today.
Whatever the cause might be for the non-attendance of
Anglos in those schools today, this Court finds tha.t it can
in no way be attributed to official actions on the part
8chools, and otlwr relevant data. The record' a 1:;o include~ the estimated·
number of pupils to be bused under each plan :;ubmitted to the District
Court. Defendants' Exhibit 21. The onh· plan that would have established racial balnnce in the Eal:it Oak Cliff :;ubdistrict, plaintiffs' Plan A,
would have nrces:;itated· the transportation of a:; many as 69,000 students.
412 F. Supp., at 1200, and Defendants'· Exhibit 21. It i:; :::elf-evident that
both transportation t1me and distance would be :;ubstantial under such
t~ plan
I would not have thought it appropriate for an appellate court to insist
on scring the mathematical computations that must have been made in
estimating the number of students to be bused, estimates not challenged.
Nor do I think these computations possibly could be determirrative. as til8
t.he validit:r of the- District Court's .vlan ..
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of school authorities." 412 F. Supp., at 1205, footno·te
omitted.
The foregoing findings are particularly significant. Actual
experience in the Dallas School District with busing to achieve
racial balance in the high schools had proved that remedy
conspicuously unsuccessful. , Accordingly, the court ordered a
different -remedy: the establishment of a network of magnet
high schools providing special educational opportunities, and
with transportation provided for all students who elect to
attend them.
The findings of the District Court upon which it based its
decision to lea.ve undisturbed a number of one-race schools
were not questioned by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, my
preliminary review of the record indicates that those findings
were based upon substantial evidence. In my view the Court
of Appeals erred in treating them as if they were irrelevant
and in insisting upon statistics as to time and distance with
respect to bus routes as a pos8ible predicate to more extensive
busing.

C. The Misconception Regarding Racial Balance
There continues to be a misconception as to what our
decisions have said and intended with respect to racial balance
in desegregation cases. This misconception, evidenced in this
case by the preoccupa.tion with one-race schools, seems to havederived from the oft-repeated language in Green v. County
School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 442 ( 1968), that desegregation
must result in a "system without a 'white school' [or] a 'black
school.'" This language was suitable to the small rural county
before the Court in that case, where there were only two
schools and 1,300 school children of both races scattered
throughout the county. But it rriakes no sense to apply it in
the context of the Dallas School District or any other majormetropolitan area school district, for in such situations segregated residential patterns, resulting largely from neutral causes,.
are the principal cause of segregatiOJi in the schools. E. g.,
Pasadena. C·ity Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424,.

..
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435-437 (1976); see Keyes v. School District No.1, 413 U.S.
189, 222-223 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring). In cases since
Green, the Court has stated explicitly that the existence of
"predominantly white or predominantly black" schools, without more, does not "offend the Constitution." Dayton Bd. of
Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 417 (1977); Milliken
v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U. S. 267, 280 n. 14 (1977);
see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); Swann v.
Bd. of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 26 (1971). 9 And certainly the
Constitution does not require "racial balance" in the public
schools. Milliken I, supra, at 740-741,1°
The facts in this case demonstrate that since this suit
commenced in 1970, schools of a single race or ethnic group
have become as inevitable in the Dallas School District as
9 Some federal courts continue to read Swann as requiring extensive
transportation because of its language endorsing busing as one means "to
achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation." 402 U. S.,
at 26. It IS more accurate to view Swann as having laid down a broad,
generalized rule of reason -under w'hich desegregation remedies must remain
flexible and due consideration must be given to other values and interests.
The Court recognized that special difficulties arise when extensive busing
is used in metropolitan areas "with dense and shifting population[s],
numerous scl10ols, [and] congested and complex traffic patterns." ld.,
at !4> Although use of pupil transportation was approved as one remedial
dev1ce, transportation orders were said to be suspect "when the time or
distance of travel is so great. as to either risk the health of the children or
significantly 1mpinge on the education process." ld., at 30-31. Whatever
doubt may have existed, as to what Swann meant with respect to racial
balance and busing to achieve it, has been dispelled by this Court's more
recent cases. In this regard, one should note that the Court of Appeals in
this ca~;e failed to mention Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717
(1974), Dayton, or Milliken ll.
10 The inference that may be drawn from the argument that there must
be no school composed solely or predominantly of a single race is alien to
our soCiety. Certainly, no school should be limited to one race by the
actions of school authorities. But it is invidious and denigrating to imply,
by ins1stence that there be no one-race schools, that a school is inferior
because by dint. of neutral causes such as resident.ial patterns its student
population happen~; to be all or predominantly of one race. See Austin
lndep. School Dist. v. United States, 4291 U .. S. 990, 992 n. 2 (1976i);
(PowELL, J ., concurring).
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they are i11 the District of Columbia, Fargo, N. D., or Brownsville, Tex. The record documents the massive demographic
changes occurring in Dallas that make futile any effort to halt
their effects on the schools by a larger dose of a remedy that
already has failed. 11 ',The futilityt of reverting to '~time and
distance studies" with a view toward busing thousands of
additional students is demonstrated by the loss of some 40,000
Anglo students in the first five years after the institution of
this suit, and the continuation of that distressing trend as
reflected by the following:
Percentage of Anglo Students
in DISD 12

Year
1971

69%

1975
1978
1080

41.1%
35.38%

13

26% (estimated 14 )

A desegregation remedy that does not take account of the
unmanageable social consequences of extensive student transportation cannot be either fair or effective. The District
Court's plan is properly sensitive to both existing demographic
facts and the likely consequences of more extensive student
transportation. The Court of Appeals seriously erred when
It remanded this case with a mandate that seems certain to
accelerate the trend toward resegregation.

IV
The time has come for a rethinking of the role of the
federal judiciary in public education. There have been two
full school generations of children in the quarter of a century
since Brown I. Vast changes have occurred in many aspects
of American life, but none more marked than the increased
11 See Tr. of Record in tlw Distrcit Court, vol. XIV, at 76-78, and
Defendant:;' Exhibits 1 a.nd 2.
12
See 412 F Supp., at 1197, 120R
' a PetJtwn '7.
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concentration of lower-income citizens, particularly those of
minority races, in urban areas and the corresponding tendency
of middle- and upper-income citizens to avoid inner-city problems by moving to the suburbs. These regrettable population
shifts seriously exacerbate the problems. But in a free
society, population tnovetnents are largely beyond the power
of government to control. During the decades of these
unprecedented demographic changes, federal courts in many
of these cities have e:xercised varying degrees of supervision
over the school systems in pursuit of the commendable goal of
assuring equal educational opportunity. The Constitution
guarantees no less. But "[n ]othing in our Constitution commauds or encourages" "large-scale or long-distance transportation of students in our metropolitan school districts."
Keyes v. School District No.1, supra, at 238 (POWELL, J., concurring). Not does the Constitution compel the adoption and
persistent pursuit of equitable remedies without regard to the
scope of any state-imposed discrimination or to the actual
effect of the remedy adopted. In addition, courts-as I view
it-all too frequently have continued unnecessarily to exercise
jurisdiction over school management and operation years after
the initial desegregation decree.
The situation in the Dallas School District is a sobering
example. The district has been in a state of more or less
continuous litigation and resulting legal turmoil since 1955.
Since the institution of the present suit in 1970, the enrollment of Anglo students in the district's schools has decreased
to half of its previous level. Some of the parties and their
witnesses disagreed as to the principal contributing causes for
this exodus. The District Court found, however, that the
refusal of Anglo students to remain in the formerly all-black
h1gh schools under the court's 1971 student assignment plan
was "in no way [attributable] to official actions." 412 F.
Supp., at 1205. Neither can one conclude fairly that the
basic cause was the unwillingness either of children to attend
or parents to support unitary schools.
Parents of all .races are desirous that their children attend

...

·.
'.
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schools that will provide the best available education. Parents also resist, for understandable reasons, having their children bused to distant locations when schools, often thought to
be better ones, are located in their neighborhoods. There is,
in addition, a widely prevalent belief that schools subject to
continuing court oversight are inferior to schools operated
independently by professional educators and school boa.rds
responsible to the citizens of a community. This is especially
true where court decrees provide for intrusive supervision and
where the litigation is reactivated periodically, resulting more
often than not in additional busing and other disruptive
changes. There is little wonder, then, that parents with
school-a.ge children tend to take steps to provide educational
opportunities perceived to be better and also free from the
resented transportation of their children away from convenient neighborhood schools. Dallas, like other school districts
subjected to protracted school litigation, has lost some of its
students to private schools. The more important cause of the
rapidly shrinking white student population, however, would
appear to be the decisions of families to relocate-or of families newly arrived in the area to locate-in suburban school
systems that are free from litigation and unprofessional
operation.
If public education is not to suffer further, we must "return
to a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests of
our society in achieving desegregation with other educational
and societal interests a community may legitimately assert."
Keyes v. School District No.1, supra, at 253 (PowELL, J., concurring). The ultimate constitutional goal is to attain a
school system in which racial discrimination is neither practiced nor tolerated. In accomplishing this goal, it has been
thought that ethnic diversity in the classroom is a desirable
component of education. This thought, as well as the language in Green, has provided much of the impetus for the
inclusion in desegrega.tion decrees of remedies such as busing
that are designed to mix the races. Experience in recent
years, however, has cast doubt upon the validity of the

.~.

'•

..
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a!5sumption, widely held initially, that the educational benefits
are attained as effectively when the classroom diversity is
compelled by an extensive busing decree as when it results
from natural and neutral cases. I continue to believe in the
merit of diversity, certainly where it results voluntarily or
from the normal professional decisions of a well-run school
system. But after the experience of a decade since Green, the
record in city after city, though not always free from ambiguity, indicates that where the compulsion includes the
uprooting of children from neighborhoods and extensive transportation to distant schools, the educational benefits of ethnic
diversity are less evident.
Whatever uncertain ties may attend the conclusions to be
drawn from recent experience with extensive busing, one fact
is indisputable: many desegregation decrees, especially those
in the larger school districts, have set in motion or accelerated
forces that assure a large measure of resegregation. The mandating of extensive busing away from neighborhoods to distant schools, accompanied by intrusive and persistent judicial
oversight, tends to frustrate rather than achieve the benefits
of children of ali races voluntarily attending schools together.
The Dallas School District is a classic, if perhaps extreme,
example of this process. Unless the trends revealed by this
record are reversed, there will soon be too few Anglo students
to offer the remaining students in the district the benefits of
attending interracial schools. And while it can be said that
equal educational opportunities have been created, there will
rcma.in a grave question as to whether the opportunity is
not for a poorer quality of education than would have been
available in the absence of court-ordered remedies neither
required by the Constitution nor acceptable to large numbers
of parents.
In sum, I would reverse summarily the Court of Appeals
and reinstate the District Court's order as a final judgment,
terminating this tortuous and self-defeating litigation. At
least, we should grant the petition and give this case the plenal:y consideration that 11he subiect now S<Il urgently demands.
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Mr. Justice Powell

Paul
Columbus Board of Ed. v. Penick, No. 78-610
Dayton Board of Ed. v. Br1nkman, No. 78-627
April 24, 1979
These complex and difficult cases pose questions of

social policy that perhaps ought not to be left to courts at
all.

The fact that Brown v. Board of Education was both a

landmark case and a school case has colored most subsequent
school cases, lending a sense of legitimacy to massive judicial
intervention that would not be acceptable in almost any other

2.

area.

As Jay Wilkinson has noted time and again, this Court has

not always met its obligation to lay down clear ground rules for
regulating the process of dismantling dual school systems.

The

result has been a welter of confusion, in the midst of which
some courts have acted with hair-trigger eagerness to take
control of public school systems.

The court below represents an

extreme example of this tendency.
In spite of the extreme complexity of these cases, I
believe there are some fundamental, if not simple, legal
principles that go a long way toward resolving the issues
presented.

In particular, I think the key concept to focus on

here is the distinction between the burden of production and the
burden of persuasion.

This distinction, I believe, goes along

way toward explaining the Court's opinion in Keyes and providing
a principled basis on which to reverse both decisions of the
court below.
The argument is made in the Ohio State Board of
Education's Dayton brief, and I will only summarize it.
"Presumption," as we are learning in the criminal context, is a
term with many meanings.

Often (although not exclusively) it is

used to describe a shift in the burden of proof, but rarely do
courts specify whether it is the burden of production or the
burden of persuasion that is shifted.

Keyes is such a case:

Passages in the opinion of the Court can be read as supporting
either meaning.

The Sixth Circuit, and the district court in

Columbus, relied expressly on a reading of Keyes that shifts the

3.
burden of persuasion to the school to rebut a prima facie case
of intentional discrimination.

For reasons discussed below, I

---------

believe Keyes shifts only the burden of production.

If this

understanding is correct, then the District Court in Dayton must
be affirmed in its dismissal of the case, and all of the crucial
findings of fact in the Columbus case must be reversed as
resting on erroneous assumptions of law.
The critical language in Keyes is at 413 U.S. 189, 210:
"Thus, be it a statutory dual system or an
allegedly unitary system where a meaningful
portion of the system is found to be intentionally
segregated, the existence of subsequent or other
segregated schooling within the same system
justifies a rule imposing on the school
authorities the burden of proving that this
segregated schooling is not also the result of
intentionally segregative acts."
In the posture of that case, where the court below was
being reversed, it was unnecessary to decide whether the
"burden" born by the school authorities was that of
production or that of persuasion.

I submit, however, that

burdening the authorities with anything more than the duty
to submit some evidence explaining the other "segregation"
(a word used in that opinion as meaning racial imbalance,
not unconstitutional discrimination) would be a gross
departure from accepted practice.
First, it is a truism in the law that a plaintiff
has the burden of persuasion as to all the elements of his

..__

-

claim.

The burden of production is used to avoid

disputation as to issues not normally in the case, but it

4.

does not relieve a plaintiff of his ultimate obligation to
establish all the grounds on which judicial relief is
predicated.

I am not aware of any other instance in the

law where partial proof of a constitutional violation
shifted to the defendant the burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence the absence of the remaining
elements.
In particular, shifting of the persuasion burden
here would be manifestly inconsistent with Washington v.
Davis and Village of Arlington Heights.

The Court there

did not hold that proof of discriminatory effect made out a
prima facie case of a constitutional violation, with
absence of intent being an affirmative defense.

Rather, it

made clear that both effect and intent are necessary
elements of a constitutional violation, both of which must
ultimately be proved by the plaintiff alleging
discrimination.

Only when all the elements of

unconstitutional discrimination have been established does
the burden shift to the defendant to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the same result would
have occurred even if no constitutional violation had
occurred.

Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270-

271, n. 21.
Furthermore, shifting anything more than the
production burden would be inconsistent with this Court's
statutory discrimination cases.

A prima facie Title VII

5.
violation is made out by proof of discriminatory effect.
If the defendant does not produce any evidence justifying
his conduct under the terms of the act, he is liable.

But

once the burden of production is met, the plaintiff still
must prove that the conduct was unjustified (i.e., not jobrelated).

The burden of persuasion as to arbitrariness or

lack of justification (which is equivalent to intent)
remains with the plaintiff throughout.

I would think it a

remarkable interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment which
made it easier to establish a constitutional violation than
a statutory one.
/

A fair reading of Keyes (and the only one, I
believe, that can be reconciled with

J

Day~on)

is that in a

case where a variety of school board actions can be shown
to have a segregative impact, in the sense that they do not
promote racial balance, and some of those actions have been
shown to be intentionally segregative, the authorities must
produce some evidence showing that their other actions
having a segregative impact were based on racially neutral
considerations.

Once that evidence has been produced,

however, the burden of persuading the trier of fact by a
preponderance of the evidence that the segregative acts
were intentional remains with the party seeking relief.
Here, for example, the Columbus district court was
faced with proof of some pre-1954 discrimination by the
school board plus the fact that the schools were not

6.
racially balanced.

By requiring the school board to

establish than all of the pre-1954 segregation was not the
product of its intentional actions, the court was able to
make a finding that all of the segregation was intentional,
which in turn supported a finding that in 1954 Columbus had
a dual system.

The finding that a dual system existed in

turn led to a finding that the board was under an
affirmative duty to dismantle that system.

Subsequent to

1954 some intentionally segregative conduct did occur (at
least we must assume so for the purposes of this case), and
many actions were undertaken which had the effect of not
dismantling this supposed dual system.

These facts, in

light of the district court's burden-shifting rules, in
turn supported a finding that the board's failure to
dismantle constituted intentional segregation.

As a

result, through a series of presumptions, each bootstrapped
on to the other, the district court was able to find that
the school intended to cause, and was responsible for,
every bit of racial disparity present in the system's
attendance patterns.
(

The Sixth Circuit followed exactly

this analysis in affirming Columbus and reversing

Dayt~n.

Aside from the strange logic of this analysis, the
result seems wrong as a matter of policy.

Stating it in

simplest terms, the Sixth Circuit's approach permits a
district court to take over the control of a school system,

'---

and to implement an affirmative policy of racial mixing, as

7.
soon as an substantial evidence establishes that any of the
board's decisions are suspect.

In other words, the school

board, and the neighborhood schools policy it seeks to
serve, is replaced as soon as the first mistake is made.
Given the political realities, one must assume that most
school boards in urban areas are going to engage in some
intentionally segregative conduct, simply because the
pressure from the constituency to segregate is so great.
This pressure justifies some intervention by the federal
courts;

it does not justify the wholesale retailoring of

urban school systems by institutions that have no political
accountability to the populations being served.

<I

The Sixth Circuit's approach is completely
~

inconsistent with Dayton.

t.

Under i~, there really is no

such thing as an incremental segregative effect.
quickly becomes an all-or-nothing proposition:

It
once any

discrimination is proven, all of the racial imbalance in
the schools must be eliminated.

Of course, according to

this approach a school still remains free to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that not all of the imbalance
is its fault.

But given the difficulty of proving matters

of this sort (witness the debate whether segregated
schooling results in segregated residential patterns:

who

can "prove" either side is correct?), and especially taking
into consideration the eagerness of many lower federal
courts to involve themselves in these matters, this
opportunity is not very meaningful.

~

8.
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit's approach is
inconsistent with the approach this Court has taken in
other areas involving racial discrimination.

There is no

principled way of cabining this mode of analysis:

it leads

directly to a general rule that a governmental body is
responsible for all discriminatory effects of this actions,
once some intentional discrimination is shown.

In my

Massachusetts veteran's preference case, for example, any
evidence that Massachusetts intentionally discriminated
against women in hiring, no matter how unrelated to the
veteran's preference law, would lead to the presumption
that Massachusetts in enacting this statute intended to
discriminate against women.

The present disposition of the

Court, however, is to the contrary.
/

If I am correct that Keyes should be read only as

/ shifting a production burden, then both decisions of the
court below must be reversed.

Without reviewing the

evidence involved, it is pretty clear that both school
boards met their burden of producing some evidence that
most, if not all, of their actions were not intentionally
segregative.

Plaintiffs in neither of these cases have met

their persuasion burdens to the contrary.

The district

court in Dayton should be affirmed and this dreadful
litigation finally put to an end.

The Columbus case should

be sent back to the district court for a remedy limited to
correcting those unconstitutional acts proved by
plaintiffs.

9.
Ultimately, I think, this all comes back to Brown.
That case, in its command that state-enforced segregation
come to an end, represents a watershed in American history.
It does not detract from the importance or significance of
that decision that on the facts of that case-desegregation--

school

the issues have turned out to be subtle

and, in many respect, beyond the power of courts to
resolve.

Unfortunately, too many federal courts, and the

Sixth Circuit in particular, have been led down the road of
judicial intervention and, as the success of these efforts
has come into doubt, have taken an increasingly rigid
stand.

To some extent it is the obligation of this Court

to relieve the lower courts of this pressure, and to give
them a graceful way of removing themselves from the
business of school administration.
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Paul
Columbus Board of Ed. v. Penick, No. 78-610
Dayton Board of Ed. v. Brinkman, No. 78-627
April 26, 1979
These are complex and difficult cases.

It does not

detract from the seriousness of the issues involved, however, to
state that there are some fundamental, and perhaps simple, legal
principles that go a long way toward resolving the issues
presented.

In particular, I think the key concept to focus on

here is the distinction between the burden of production and the
burden of persuasion.

This distinction, I believe, goes along

way toward explaining the Court's opinion in Keyes and providing
a principled basis on which to reverse both decisions of the
court below.
Here the Columbus district court was faced with proof
of some pre-1954 discrimination by the school board plus the
fact that the schools were not racially balanced.

By requiring

the school board to establish th ah all of the pre-1954
segregation was not the product of its intentional actions, the
court was able to make a finding that all of the segregation was
intentional, which in turn supported a finding that in 1954
Columbus had a dual system.

The finding that a dual system

2.

existed in turn led to a finding that the board was under an
affirmative duty to dismantle that system.

Subsequent to 1954

some intentionally segregative conduct did occur (at least we
must assume so for the purposes of this case), and many actions
were undertaken which had the effect of not dismantling this
supposed dual system.

These facts, in light of the district

court's burden-shifting rules, in turn supported a finding that
the board's failure to dismantle constituted intentional
segregation.

As a result, through a series of presumptions that

shifted the burden of persuasion to the school board, each
bootstrapped on to the other, the district court was able to
find that the board intended to cause, and was responsible for,
every bit of racial disparity present in the system's attendance
patterns.

The Sixth Circuit followed exactly this analysis in

affirming Columbus and reversing Dayton.
In a case where a variety of school board actions can
be shown to have a segregative impact, in the sense that they do
not promote racial balance, and some of those actions have been
shown to be intentionally segregative, the authorities must
produce some evidence showing that their other actions having a
segregative impact were based on racially neutral
considerations.

Once that evidence has been produced, however,

the burden of persuading the trier of fact by a preponderance of
the evidence that the segregative acts were intentional remains
with the party seeking relief.
Only this approach is consistent with the principle

3.
that a plaintiff has the burden of persuasion as to all the
elements of his claim.

It is the approach taken in Village of

Arlington Heights, and is the only way of making sense out of
Dayton.

The approach of the court below also is inconsistent

with the Court's discrimination cases outside the school area,
including most recently Feeney, the Massachusetts veteran's
preferance case.

.,

,.\f
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tion of Transportation entered by this
court on July 11, 1972, be and hereby is
reinstated but modified as follows :
1. The Detroit School Board, defendants, shall acquire by purchase, lease or
other contractual arrangements 150, 66passenger yellow school buses meeting
the requirements of Michigan Law, to be
used 'in the Detroit Desegregation Plan
to be implemented by order of the court.
Such purchase, lease or other contractual
arrangements shall be consummated no
later than July 3, 1975.
2. The State defendants shall bear
the costs of this acquisition to the extent
of 75% thereof1, and the State defendants shall take all necessary steps utilizing existing funds already allocated, or
to be allocated and by re-allocating existing or new funds, to pay or reimburse
the State's share of such transportation
acquisition.

school district boundaries in Northern
states (which like Michigan, had never
had school segregation laws) with a constitutional significance which neither
federal nor state law had ever accorded
them.
This court's opinion in Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F .2d 215, 217 (6th Cir. 1973),
had accepted a finding by the District
Judge that a desegregation plan limited
to Detroit "would result in an all black
school system immediately surrounded
by practically all white suburban school
systems, with an overwhelmingly white
majority population in the total metropolitan area." The Supreme Court did
not overturn that finding.

•'

The key sentence in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court reads: "The
constitutional right of the Negro respondents residing in Detroit is to attend a
unitary school system in that district."
Presumably this means that if and when
the Detroit school district becomes 95%
or more black, immediately surrounded
by suburban school districts 95% or more
white, no problem of federal constitutional significance arises.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge (concurring).
I join my colleagues in the drafting
and issuance of today's order because
any final decision of the United States
Supreme Court is the law of the land.
But conscience compels me to record how
Unless the thrust of this sentence is
deeply I disagree with the decision which
) we are enforcing. In Milliken v. Brad- altered by further Supreme Court interley, 418 U.S. 717, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 41 pretation or overruling--or by action in
L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974), the Supreme Court the area of racial integration by Conoverruled this court and the United gress or the Presidency-it can come to
States District Court in Detroit by re- represent a formula for American aparversing a carefully documented finding theid.
of fact that racial desegregation in the
Since the Supreme Court decision is
schools of Detroit could not be accom- based in part upon the fact that (like all
plished within the boundaries of the De- Northern states) Michigan never had
troit school district where the school pop- school segregation by state statute, the
ulation was found to be approximately case creates one law for the North and
64% black, with a predicted 72% black another for the South.
school population by 1975-76 and 80.7% (;--...,-,..--n-o__w_o..,....-n-o--d;-e-c.,..is..,.io-n-m--a'd~e--;-b-y-:;thi"""e:---.......,
by 1980- 81. The decision also imbued Supreme Court of the United States 7
1. In Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S . 717, 726, 94
S.Ct. 3112, 3118, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974), the
Supreme Court said:
"The District Court also found that the
State of Michigan had committed several
constitutional violations with respect to the
exercise of its general responsibility for, and
supervision of, public education. [Footnote
omitted.] The State, for example, was found

,•
"

·,'

to have failed, until the 1971 Session of the
Michigan Legislature, to provide authorization or funds for the transportation of pupils
within Detroit regardless of their poverty or
distance from the school to which they were
assigned; during this same period the State
provided many neighboring, mostly white,
suburban districts the full range of statesupported transportation."

...•,

,-

.

CITY OF HIGHLAND PARI{ v. TRAIN
Cite us 519 F.:!<l 681 (1975)

since the Dred Scott decision (Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 15 L.Ed.
691 (1857)) which is so fraught with disaster for this country.

The CITY OF IDGHLAND PARK.
Illinois, etc., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

Russell E. TRAIN, etc., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
The CITY OF IDGHLAND PARK.
Illinois, etc., et al., Petitioners,

681

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Bernard M. Decker, J., dismissed the action, 374 F.Supp.
758, and plaintiffs appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Tone, Circuit Judge, held
that where regulations by the Administrator exempted indirect sources on
which construction was commenced before January 1, 1975, the exemption provision was an integral part of the regulations, which, like any other part, could
be reviewed only by petition for review.
Plaintiffs, who had not given a 60-day
notice required by the Clean Air Amendments, could not properly commence action against the Administrator concerning his alleged failure to promulgate certain regulations. The National Environmental Policy Act's requirement for environmental impact statement did not
apply.
Affirmed in the one case; petition
for review dismissed as inappropriate.

v.

Russell E. TRAIN, as Administrator of
the United States Environmental Protection Agency, and United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondents.
Nos. 74-1271, 75-1006.
United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
Argued Feb. 21, 1975.
Decided June 10, 1975.
As Amended on Denial of Rehearing
July 24, 1975.

1. Health and Environment <S=28
Where plaintiff sought not only promulgation of regulations under Clean
Air Amendments but also injunction
against construction of shopping center
until proper regulations had been promulgated, and where developer defendants and tenant defendants were necessary parties in claim for injunction, case
was not rendered moot as to them by
promulgation of regulations. Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, § 110(c)(2)(C, D),
42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-5(c)(2)(C, D); Fed.
Rules App.Proc. rule 28(a)(5), 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Health and Environment <S=28

Plaintiffs sought to block construction of a shopping center and compel the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to proml.Iigate certain
regulations which they hoped would preclude the construction of the shopping
center and road expansion, and to enjoin
the road expansion until filing of an environmental impact statement. Plaintiff
also claimed denial of equal protection
by the adoption of a zoning ordinance
permitting the construction of the shopping center. The United States District
519 F 2d-43V>

Where regulations by Administrator
of Enviro·nmental Protection Agency exempted indirect sources on which construction was commenced before January
1, 1975, exemption provision was integral
part of the regulations, which, like any
other part, could be reviewed only by
petition for review, and it could not be
reviewed by an action filed in the district court. Clean Air Amendments of
1970, §§ 110, llO(c), 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.
C.A. §§ 1857c-5, 1857c- 5(c), 1857h5(b}(1).
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78-610 Columbus Bd. of Education v. Penick
The· Chief Justice

c/lf

Mr. Justice Brennan

Mr. Justice Stewart

Con£. 4/27/79

Mr. Justice White

Mr. Justice Marshall

Mr. Justice Blackmun

,

I

Mr. Justice Powell
)

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

_j

.·

Mr. Justice Stevens
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CHAMBERS 0,.-

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

April 30, 1979

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Re:

78-610

Columbus Board of Education v. Penick

I will vote to affirm in this case.
Regards,
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May 16, 1979

Re:

No. 78-610 - Columbus Board of Education v.
Gary L . Penick

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice White
cc:

The Conference

,juprtutt

<!fltttri of tlrt ~.tb ~taf.eg

...ag £ringhn4

~. <!f. 2ll,;t~~

C HAMBERS O F

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

....

May 16, 1979

Re:

No. 78-610 - Columbus Board of Education v. Penick;
and No. 78-627 - Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman

Dear Chief:
You have asked me to write a dissent in the Dayton case,
in which you, Potter, Lewis, and I voted to reverse. Lewis
and I voted to reverse in the Columbus case, while you and
Potter, as I recall, voted to affirm. Byron has now circulated
a proposed opinion for the Court in Columbus, and Bill
Brennan has also assigned him the opinion for the Court in
Dayton. On the basis of my Conference discussion, and reading
Byron's proposed Court opinion, I do not believe that I could
write a dissent in Dayton which would be consistent with
Byron's opinion affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in Columbus.
I wonder, therefore, whether
perhaps either you or Potter should undertake the dissent in
Dayton; I anticipate writing in both case in dissent, Lewis
having asked me to do so in the Columbus case on behalf of
himself and me.

...

·;.

..

··.

Sincerely, /
~~

The Chief

Ju~tice

,I

t,....

Copies to the Conference

·.

.Sttptmtt Qfcurl cf f!rt~b ~tateg
:.~UJringtctt. ~. C!J. ZOpJ!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w ... .

RE:

/

May 16, 1979

J . BRENNAN, JR.

No. 78-610 Columbus Board of Education v.
Penick

Dear Byron:
I agree.
Sincerely,
~-

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference

--~·::-..:.

..Su:vrtm:t <!):ottrl o-f tqt ~ttittb .$\htftg
·~ihulfhtgto-n. ~. ~· 20.?~~
CHAMBERS

o~

May 28, 1979

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

/
Re:

No. 78-610 - Columbus Bd. of Education v. Penick

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference

lfp/ss
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Paul

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

May 30, 1979

Columbus and Dayton
Fortunately, Justice Rehnquist is writing dissents
- possibly a single dissent - in these cases.
Although I probably will not write, I would like to
know - with respect to each of these cases - what the record
shows as to following points:
1.

Were ratios (or ranges of ratios) prescribed in

both cases, and what were they?
2.

Do the ratios apply indiscriminately to all

schools in the system?
3.

Exactly what was ordered in each of these cases

with respect to busing, and what does the record show as to
the number of students bused, the percentage of total,
whether elementary kids also are bused, the maximum distance
of busing, and any other facts relevant to busing.

It is likely that Mr. Justice Rehnquist and his
clerk already have obtained this information.
you might check with his clerk.

I suggest that

If they have the

information, we can simply wait until we see Justice
Rehnquist's opinions and then decide whether I should write a
paragraph or two concurring in the dissent.

In that event, I

2.

want to use the answers to the foregoing questions.
If the Rehnquist Chambers does not have this

',.

information, I would like for you or one of
to get it together within the next ten days or so.

'·

··.

·~

I

•

··'

:.

:...

LFP/lab

6/7/~,
..........,;;

To:

Paul

Date:

From:

L.F.P., Jr.

June 7, 1979

Columbus and Dayton School Cases

I

would like to try a dissent not so much to what

the Court decides in these two cases, but to address the
'·

fabric of myths and fictions upon which the body of
desegregation law rests.
dissent, and

I

I

expect to join Rehnquist's basic

know that it is late in the day to write all

that one could say about the intellectually and legally
bankrupt path the federal courts started down with good
reason, but have not had the good sense to abandon.

But

let's give it a try, in rather summary form.
Most of the general views that I have entertained

' '·

for some time (wearing my "school board" hat in addition to
my "judge's" robe) have been stated in Dr. Coleman's lecture
that he gave at Chicago in April, 1978.

We have a copy of

this, but I understand - through the library some months ago
- that the lecture never has been published.

(I pause here

to suggest that you have our library check with the Library
of Congress to see what, if anything, of Dr. Coleman's views
on school desegregation has been published either in book or
periodical form within the past two or three years.)
I haven't had an opportunity to put my thoughts

i.,~~

....
'

l;,,

.. . "

.

"'"

2.

together enough even enough to give you a skeleton outline.
Accordingly, what I am now dictating does not purport to be
more than identification of random thoughts and ideas that I
hope you can weave into some sort of a draft opinion.
only sources you really need refer to are

The

(i) my opinion in

Keyes, and particularly from Part III C to the end: (ii) my
opinion in

Austin~

..

what Bruce and I wrote in Dallas: and

(iii) Dr. Coleman's lecture.

Of course, at least some

reference will be made to the more relevant decisions of this
Court (e.g., Dayton I, Milliken! and

!!r etc.).

Dr. Coleman identifies correctly the principal
constitutional and educational fictions and misapprehensions
that have brouqht us to the present sad state of affairs well
illustrated by the situation in Dallas.

Perhaps we should

commence with an identification of the fictions and
fallacious assumptions relied upon by this Court and
reaffirmed by its decisions in Columbus and Dayton.

In

essence, I suppose these are pretty much the same as those
identified by Coleman, but they should be expressed - where
appropriate -in the terminology used by the Court itself.
In over-simplified terms, the general rationale of
Justice White's opinions runs along the following lines:
since Brown (1954) there has been an affirmative duty to

•',

3.

desegregate schools (even though nobody knew about the
affirmative part of this duty until late 1968 when Green was
decided): a segregated school is one that is predominantly
black (as Coleman points out this is presumed to be
inherently bad whereas a predominantly white school is not
bad unless it helps further the maintaining of predominantly
black schools)1 if there are identifiable black schools
(predominantly black) within a school district, the
affirmative duty to convert them to some sort of racial
balance has been on the school board since 1954 and the
burden of proof is therefore upon it to establish that its
segregative intent did not cause the continued existence of
one or more predominantly black schools: as proving this
negative in a way acceptable to many district courts is a
virtual impossibility (e.g., Columbus), the next step is for
the district court to conclude that there has been a systemwide violation of the affirmative duty to desegregate; having
leaped to this conclusion (wholly without regard to the
actual facts), the court then decrees a system-wide remedy;
the system remedy must be coersive enough to assure the
elimination of racially identified schools "root and branch",
so that there is no "black" and "white" school remaining;
ambiguous language in Swann, adopted today as the law of the

'

<

4.

land, is that decreeing racial balance in each and every
school is appropriate where there has been a system-wide
violation, and the now accepted way of accomplishing this is
to prescribe a ratio bearing some relation to the percentage
of blacks to the total

population~

finally, in order to

implement what the Constitution has been found to require,
system-wide busing is decreed.
Althouqh I have perhaps exaqgerated to some extent,
and used adjectives that one might not use in a Court
opinion, I think the foregoing comes close to being precisely
the of prevailing sequence of "reasoninq" in Supreme Court
doctrine.

It makes no sense, and I believe that this type of

reasoning will be ridiculed when a detached history of
desegregation decisions is written.
I would particularly like to emphasize near the
outset the fallaciousness of the assumption, made with
respect to cities of the size of Columbus and Dayton and
larger, that there has been a system-wide violation of
constitutional rights in the sense that but for such
violation there would be no predominantly black schools in
the school district.

No rational human being could believe

this to be true in such cities.

..

'

Coleman refers to this

assumption (not identified precisely in my terms) as fiction

5.

and as romanticizing.

He states:

"Any knowledge of urban areas, and of the
residential segregation that develops in
urban areas along ethnic, income, and racial
lines l~ads immediately to the recognition
that most segregation, whether ethnic, or
class, or. race, in urban areas is due to
residential patterns." (Emphasis in original.)
Coleman, o. 1.
This sort of segregation results from neutral causes (and not
to unconstitutional action or inaction by school authorities)
and is not necessarily bad in the ethnic and pluralistic
society that prevails in our country and particularly in the
great cities.
In my view, and I say this only in legalistic
terms, I doubt that any federal judge really believes what
many of them still accept as proven fact.

That is, even if

the school boards in Columbus and Dayton have been guilty of
some intentional neglect of their duty to desegregate, no one
can believe that the number and degree of racially identified
schools in these two cities have resulted from failure of
duty by the board.
In short, our decisions make a mockery of the very
language repetitively used to the effect that the remedy
should not exceed the scope of the violation.

I am sure

..
·.

.'
...
.

;

'

6.
<
\.

Rehnquist will make this point, but I would like to emphasize
it.
Also, as Dr. Coleman makes clear, desegregation law

'.

.

'·

as enforced by the federal courts has failed to accomplish
its basic objectives:

(i) as parents are free both to move
,·,

to the suburbs or to choose private schools, those who can do
so tend to leave court-run schools with the result that they
are resegregated (e.g., Dallas and countless other cities);
(ii) the schools from which this "flight" takes place, tend

.,
.•

..

~~.

·,
..

'·

not only to be resegregated, but also to offer a poorer
quality of education - at least this is the perception of

..:·...
'•

parents and the judgment of many educators (see Coleman).
In summary, what perhaps could be Part I of a
dissent would identify the fictions and false assumptions
upon which the present "legal fabric" of our decisions is
based, and indicate briefly the failure of the application of
these fallacious views by court ordered racial balance and
busing to achieve it.

We have pursued what we call
'•

constitutional principles (never imagined until we carne upon
the slippery slope of Green and Swann) with results now
,.

widely recognized as ranging from disappointing to

j•

disasterous.
Part II of the dissent should be affirmative and on

"....;.

..

7.

the upbeat.

As you know, I believe in the advantages of

diversity in the public schools as well as in higher
education.

I am totally persuaded that, despite profound

differences and difficulties, the white and black people of
this country must learn to live together, be educated
together, work together, and stop calling each other
"racists".

But forced integration (the Court euphemistically

continues to refer to it as desegregation) is neither
required by the constitution nor is it efficacious.

As

Coleman points out, black parents are even more anxious about
good education for their children than white parents (on the
average) and given the opportunity they will send their
children to church schools or elsewhere to avoid
deteriorating court run public schools.
In sum, the solution we should seek should be
essentially voluntary, but there must be state legislation
that provides the
incentives.

frarnewor~

and perhaps support and

I have thought for some time that something

along the lines recommended by Coleman may be the answer (pp.
12 et. seq.).

His quite summary description of the Wisconsin

plan is something we should examine.

In essence, as

described by Coleman (pp. 10, 13) it provides, but does not
require, for children within a city school district to

8.

transfer on a voluntary basis to schools within the entire
metropolitan area.

There would, of course, be certain

prescribed conditions: state funds wouln follow the child,
transportation at public expense would have to be provided,
the city school district would retain control over education
within the city, the schools to which city pupils could
transfer would have the right to limit the number of students

. •.
~

coming in based on capacity, but could not reject students
because of race.

I suppose, also, that one could nrovide

that transfers should not increase existing racial imbalance
in a particular school.
State legislation would have to orovine for this,
as Milliken I would preuent a federal court from so ordering
in the absence of an interdistrict violation.

But where the

state provided the framework for a voluntary transfer system,
this would avoid most of the disadvantages of federal court

'~

•:\'.

coercion.

The plan also could provide for specialized or

magnet schools within the city, to which metropolitan kids
could transfer.

See the description of these, and the

voluntary transfer program, provided in the innovative Dallas
plan, with which Bruce is familiar.
'
''

L.F.P., Jr.

~

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice
Mr. Just.i.ce
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
V'Mr. Just :Lee Powell
Mr. Justice R.Jhnqui st
Mr. J ustice Stevens

~~:1£ (J.

From: Mr. Justice White
Circulated: ___________

1st DRAFT

Recirculated: _____________

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 78-610
Columbus Board of Education
. ofC ertwran
.
. toMCA&:/s
0 n W nt
tdle
et al., Petitioners,
United States Court of Ap- ~ ~
v.
peals for the Sixth Circuit. ~ ~
.,
Gary L. Penick et al.
[May -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The public schools of Columbus, Ohio, are highly segregated
by race. In 1976, over 32% of the 96,000 students in the system were black. About 70% of all students attended schools
that were at least 807o black or 80% white. 429 F. Supp. 229,
240 (SD Ohio 1977). Half of the 172 schools were 90%
black or 90% white. 583 F. 2d 787, 800 (CA6 1978). Fourteen named students in the Columbus school system brought
this case on June 21, 1973, against the Columbus Board of
Education, the State Board of Education, and the appropriate
local and state officials. 1 The second amended complaint,
filed on October 24, 1974, charged that the Columbus defendants had pursued a.nd were pursuing a course of conduct having the purpose and effect of causing and Ifi/Petuating the
segregation in the public scpools, contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment. A declaratory judgment to this effect and
appropriate injunctive relief were prayed. Trial of the case
began a yea.r later, consumed 36 trial days, produced a record
containing over 600 exhibits and a transcript in excess of 6.600
pages, and was completed in June 1976. Final arguments
1 A similar group of plaintiffs was allowed to interwne, and the original
plaintiffs were allowed to file an amendt>d complaint that was ct>rtified as a
class action. 429 F . Supp. 229, 233-234 (SD Ohio 1977).
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COLUMBUS BOARD OF EDUCATION v. PENICK

were heard in September, and in March 1977 the District
Court filed an opinion and order containing its findings of
fact and conclusions of law. 429 F. Supp. 229.
The trial court summarized its findings :
"From the evidence adduced at trial, the Court has
found earlier in this opinion that the Columbus Public
Schools were openly and intentionally segregated on the
basis of race when Brown [v. Board of Education (!),.
347 U. S. 483] was decided in 1954. The Court has
found that the Columbus Board of Education never actively set out to dismantle this dual system. The Court
has found that until legal action was initiated by the
Columbus Area Civil Rights Council, the Columbus
Board did not assign teachers and administrators to Columbus schools at random, without regard for the racial
composition of the student enrollment at those schools.
The Columbus Board even in very recent times has approved optional attendance zones, discontiguous attendance areas and boundary changes which have maintained
and enhanced racial imbalance in the Columbus Public
Schools. The Board, even in very recent times and after
promising to do otherwise, has abjured workable suggestions for improving the racial balance of city schools.
"Viewed in the context of segregative optional attendance zones, segregative faculty and administrative hiring
and assignments, and other such actions and decisions of
the Columbus Board of Ed.ucation in recent and remote
history, it is fair and reasonable to draw an inference of
segregative intent from the Board's actions and omission
discussed in this opinion." I d., at 260-261.
The District Court's ultimate conclusion was that at the
time of trial the racial segregation in the Columbus school
system "directly resulted from [the Board's] intentional segregative acts and omissions," id., at 259, in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ac-

78-610-0PINION
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cordingly, judgment was entered against the local and state
defendants enjoining them from continuing to discriminate on
the basis of race in operating the Columbus public schools and
ordering the submission of a systemwide desegregation plan.
Following decision by this Court in Dayton Board of Edu~
tion v. Brinkman (I), 433 U. S. 406, in June 1977, and in
response to a motion by the Columbus Board, the District
Court rejected the argument that Dayton I required or permitted any modification of its findings or judgment. It reiterated its conch.lsion that the District's " 'liability in this case
concerns the Columbus School District as a whole,' " Pet. App.
94, quoting 429 F. Supp., at 266, asserting that. although it
had "no real interest in any remedy plan which is more sweeping than necessary to correct the constitutional wrongs plaintiffs have suffered," neither would it accept auy plan "which
fails to take into account the systemwide nature of the liability of the defendants." Pet. App. 95. The Board subsequently presented a plan that complied with the District
Court's guidelines and that was embodied in a judgment entered on October 7. The plan was stayed pending appeal to
the Court of Appeals.
Based on its own examination of the extensive record, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments entered against the
local defendants. 2 583 F. 2d 787. The Court of Appeals
could not find the District Court's findings of fact clearly
erroneous. I d., at 789. Indeed, the Court of Appeals examined in detail each set of findings by the District Court and
found strong support for them in the record. I d., at 798, 804,
805, 814. The Court of Appeals also discussed in detail and
found unexceptionable the District Court's understanding and
application of the Fourteenth Amendment and the cases construing it.
% Tlw Court of Appeals varated thr judgmrnt against thr state drfendants and remanded for fmthC'l' proceedings with rrspert to those parties.
583 F. 2d 787, 815-818 (CA6 1978) . No issue with rri'prct to thr state
defendants is before us now . .

78-610-0PINION
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We granted the Board's petition for certiorari, U. S.
(1979); implementation of the pending desegregation
plan was stayed pending our review, U. S. (1978)
(REHNQUIST, J.); and we now affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
II

~

The Board earnestly contends that when this case was
brought and at the time of trial its operation of a segregated
school system was not done with any general or specific
racially discriminatory purpose, and tha.t whatever unconstitutional conduct it may have been guilty of in the past such
conduct at no time had systemwide segregative impact and
surely no remaining systemwide impact at the time of trial.
A syste~ remedy was therefore contrary to the teachings of
the cases, such as Dayton I, that the scope of the constitutional violation measures the scope of the remedy. 3
We have discovered no reason, however, to disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals, based on the findings and conclusions of the District Court, that the Board's conduct at
the time of trial and before not only was animated by an unco~l, ~egregative pure ose, but also had current segregative impactthat WB;§. suffi.£iently systemwide to warrant the
re~ed by the District Court.
These ultimate conclusions were rooted in a series of constitutional violations that the District Court found the Board
to have commited and that together dictated its judgment and
decree. In each instance, the Court of Appeals found the
District Court's conclusions to be factually and legally sound.
3 Petitioners also argue that the District Court erred in requiring that
every school in the system be brought roughly within proportionate racial
balance. We see no misuse of the mathematical ratios under otlr decision
in Swann v. Boal'(f-;;'f EiiuC'iition,4o2 U.""S. 1,~-25 ( 1971), especially in
light of the Board's failure to justify the continued existence of "some
schools that are all or predominant~ of one race ...." !d., at 26; see . )
Pet. App. 102. Petitioners do not otherwise question the remedy if a ·
systemwide violation was properly found . .

78-610-0PINION
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A

First, although at least since 1888 there had been no statutory requirement or authorization to operate se~regated
schools/ the District Court found that in 1954, when Brown I
was decided, the Columbus Board was not operating a racially
neutral, unitary school system, but was conducting "an enclave of separate, black schools on the near east side of Columbus," and that "the then-existing racial separation was the
direct result of cognitive acts or omissions of those school
board members and administrators who had originally intentionally caused and later perpetuated the racial isolation .... "
429 F. Supp., at 236. Such separateness could not "be sa.id to
have been the result of racially neutral official acts." Ibid.
Based on its own examination of the record, the Court of
Appeals agreed with the District Court in this respect, observing that~.."[w]hile the Columbus school system's dual black•
I
wh1te character was not mandated by state law {lS of 1954... the
record certainly show~ in~utionq! segregation by the Columbus Board. As of 1954 the Columbus School Board 'had
carried out a. systematic program of segregation a.ffecting a

1

In 1871, pursuant to the requirements of state law, Columbus maintained a complete separation of the races in the public schools. 429 F.
Supp., at 234-235. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled in 1888 that ~tate law
no longer required or permitted the segregation of school children. Board
of Education v. State, 45 Ohio St. 555. Even prior to that, in 1881, the
Columbus Board abolished its separate schools for black and white students,
but by the end of the first decade of this ceqtury it had returned to a
segregated school policy. Champion Avenue School was built in 1909 in a
predominantly black area and was completely staffed with black teachers.
Other black schools were established as the black population grew. The
Board gerrymandered attendance 2;ones so that white students who lived
near these schools were assigned to or could attend white schools, which
often were further from their homes. By 1943 a total of five schools had .._)
almost exclusively black student bodies, and each was assigned ~
all-black faculty, often through all-white to all-black faculty transfers that
occurred each time the Board came to con~ider a particular school as a
black school. ld., at 234-236.
4
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substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers and facili~
ties within the school system.' " 583 F. 2d, at 798-799, quot~
ing Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189, 201-202 (1973).
The Board insists that, since segregated schooling was not
commanded by state law and since not all schools were wholly
black or wholly white in 1954, the District Court was not wa.r~
ranted in finding a dual system. But the District Court found
that the "Columbus Public Schoo1s were offi(,'ially segregated
by race in 1954," Pet. App. 94 (emphasis adcfect) ; and in any
event, there is no reason to question the finding that as the
"direct result of cognitive acts or omissions'' the Board m&in~
tained "an enclave of separate, black schools on the near
east side of Columbus." 429 F. Supp., at 236. Purposefully
and effectively maintaining a system of separate black schools
in a substantial part of the system itself suffices to make out
pr}pa1a_Sie~)!:QOf of a uaJ school system and Sl.Jpports a find~
ing to thiSeffect absent sufficient contrary proof by the Board,
which was not forthcoming in this case. Keyes, 413 U. S.,
at 203. 5
B

a

Second, both courts below declared that since the decision
in Brown v. Board of Education (II), 349 U. S. 294 (1955),
the Columbus Board has been under a continuous constitu-

-------~------------~-

It is argued that Dayton Boa1"d of Education v. Brinkman (I), 433
U. S. 406 (1977), implicitly overruled or limited those portions of Keyes
and Swann approving, in certain circumstances, inferences of general, systemwide purpose and current, systemwide impact from evidence of discriminatory purpose that has resulted in substantial current segregation,
and approving a systemwide remedy absent a showing by the defendant
of what part of the current imbalance was not caused by the constitutional
breach. Dayton I does not purport to disturb any aspect ' Keyes and
Swann; indeed, it cites both cases with approval. On the facts of that
case as it came to us at that time, there was no history of a dual system
and only isolated instances of intentional segregation, which were insufficient to give rise to an inference of systemwide institutional purpose and
which .did not add up to a facially substantial systemwide impact.
5

'
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tional obligation to disestablish its dual school system and
fa1tea"ttCriSCnarge this duty. Pet. App. 94; 583
tliat
F. 2d, ai, - . Under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
cases that have construed it, the Board's duty to dismantle its
dual system cannot be gainsaid.
Where a racially discriminatory school system has been
found to exist, Brown II imposes the duty on local school
boards to "effectuate a transition to a racially non-discriminatory school system." 349 U. S., at 301. "Brown II was a call
for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems," and
school boards operating such systems were "clearly charged
with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." Green v.
County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-438 (1968) . ..]:~
instance of a failure or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty
c~nues bre IQlation of tfie Fourteenth Aiuendinent. Dayton I, 43 U. S., at 413-414; Wrig t v. ounct of Emporia,
407 u. s. 451 , 460 (1972) .
The Green case itself was decided 13 ye11rs after Brown I I.
The core of the holding was that the school board involved
had not done enough to eradicate the lingering consequences
of the dual school system that it had been operating at the
time Brown was decided. Even though a freedom 'Of choice
plan had been adopted, the school system remained essentially
a segregated system, with many all-black and many all-white
schools. The board's continuing obligation, which had not
been satisfied, was " 'to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work . . . now . . . until it is clear that stateimposed segregation has been completely removed.' ,; Swann
v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971) , quoting Green,
supra, at 439 (emphasis in original) .
As THE CHIEF JusTICE's opinion for a unanimous Court
in Swann recognized, Brown and Green imposed an affirmative
duty to desegregate. "If school authorities fail in their affirm-

itnas

7??

I

?
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a.tive obligations under those holdings, .iudicial authority may
be invoked. . . . In default by the school authorities of their
obligation to proffer acceptable remedies. a district court has
broad power to fashioH a remedy that will assure a unitary
school system." 402 U.S., at 15- 16. In Swann, it should be
recalled, an initial segregation plan had been entered in 1965
and had been affirmed on appeal. But the case was reopened,
and in 1969 the school board was required to come forth with
a more effective plan. The judgment adopting the ultimate
plan was affirmed here in 1971, 16 years after Brown II.
In determining whether a dual school systrm has been disestablished, .§._wq:a,n also mandates that matters aside from
student assignments must be considered:
"[W] here it is possible to identify a 1white school' or a
1
Negro school' simply by reference to the racial composition of teachers and staff, the quality of school buildings
and equipment, or the organization of sports activities, a
prima facie case of vio1ation of substantive constitutional
rights under the Equal Protection Clause is shown." 402
U.S., at 18.
Further. Swann stated that in devising remedies for legally
imposed segregation the responsibility of the local authorities
and district courts is to ensure that future school construction
and abandonment are not used and do not serve to perpetuate
or re-establish the dual school system. ld., at 20-21. As for
student assignments, the Court said:
"No per se rule can adequately embrace all the difficulties of reconciling the competing interests involved; but
in a system with a history of segregation the need for
remedial criteria of sufficient specificity to assure a school
authority's compliance with its constitutional duty warrants a presumption against schools that are substantially
disproportionate in their racial composition. Where the
school authority's proposed plan for conversion from a
dual to a unitary system contemplates the continued

7
•

I

'.
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existence of some schools that are all or predominantly
of one race, they have the burden of showing that such
school assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory."
Id., at 26.
The Board's continuing duty to desegregate its school sys..
tern is therefore beyond question, and it has pointed to nothing in the record persuading us that at the time of trial the
dual school system and its effects had been disestablished.
The Board does not appear to ch~llenge the finding of the
District Court that at the time of trial most blacks were still
going to black schools and most whites to white schools.
Whatever the Board's current purpose with respect to racially
separate educa.tion might be, it knowingly continued its failure to eliminate the consequences of its past intentionally
segregative policies. The Board "never actively set out to dismantle this dual system." 429 F . Supp., at 260.

c
Third, the District Court not only found that the Board had
breached its co~1stitutional duty by failing effectively to eliminate the continuing consequences of its intentional systemwide
segregation in 1954, but also found that in the intervening
years there had been a series of Board actions and practices
that could not "reasonably be explained without reference
to racial concerns," id., at 241 , and th~:tt "intentionally agteHt is tH.eFefore- 'be~'mH:I q ~o~estion, tutd #tat "inteniieRaUy Q~ •
gravated, rather than alleviated," racial separation in the
schools. Pet. App. 94. These matters included the general
practice of assigning black teachers only to those schools with
substantial black student population, a practice that was terminated only in 1974 as the result of a conciliation agreement
with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission; the intentionally
segregative use of optional attendance zones,r. discontiguous

....)

6 Despite petitioners' avowrdly strong prrfrrmce
for nrighborhood
:;;chools, in tim<'~ of residential raria.l transition the Board crrated optional
.~··.
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attendance areas/ and boundary changes; 8 and the selection
of sites for new school construction that had the foreseeable
and anticipated effect of maintaining the racial separation of
the schools." The court generally noted that between 1954
attendance zones to allow white students to avoid predominantly black
schools, which were often clo~er to the home" of the white pupils. For
example, until well nfter the time the complaint wa~ filed, petitioners
allowed studentR "in a smnll white enclnve on Columbu~' predominnntly
black neareast side .. . to escape attendancr at black" schook 429 F.
Supp., at 244. The court rould perceive no racially-neutral rrasons for
this optional zone. !d., at 245. "Quite frankly, the Near-Bexley Option
appears to this Court to br a classic examplr of a segregativr device designed to permit white ~tudents to escape attendanre at predommantly
black schools." Ibid.
7 Thi~ technique wao: applied when neighborhood schools would have
tended to drsegrrgate the involved schools. From 1966 to 1968 a group of
white students were bu::;ed past their neighborhood school to a ''whiter"
school. ld., at 247 ~ From 1957 until 1963 students hving in a predominantly white arra nrar Heimandale elemrntary school attended a
more remote, but identifiably white, school. Id., at 247-248.
8 Gerrymandering of boundar~· lines also continued after 1954.
The
District Court found, for instance, that for one arra on the west side of
tlw city containmg three white schools and one black ~cbool the Board had
altered the lines so that white residential areas were removrd from the
black school's zone and black :students were contamcd w1thin that zone.
Id., at 245-247.
Another example involvrd thr former Miffiin district thai had bren
absorbed into the Columbus di::;trict. The Board staff presrnted two alternative means of drawing necessary attendance zones: our that was desegregative and one that was segrrgative. The Board chose the ::;rgregative
option, and the District Court wa~ unpersuadrd that it had any legitimate
educatioru reasons for doing so. !d., at 248-250.
9 The Di::;trict Court found tha tJ,~o f thr 103 ~choo]R built by thr Board
between 1950 and 1975, 87 oprned WJth racially identifiable student bod1rs
and 71 remained that way at the time of trial. TI11R re;;ult was reasonably
foresrrable under thr circumstances in light of thr s1trs ;;elected, and the
Board was often specifically warnrd that 1t was, without apparent justification, choosing ::;itrs that would mamtain or further srgrrgation. ld., at
241-243. As thr Court of Apprals notrd :
'' (T]his record actually requires no rehance upon inferrncr, since, as indi-

.

•
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and the time of trial the Board was frequently put on notice
of the consequences of its actions, yet failed to heed its duty
to alleviate racial separation in the schools/ 0

III
Against this background, we cannot fault the conclusion of
the District Court and the Court of Appeals that at the time
of trial there was systemwide segregation in the Columbus
schools which was the result of recent and remote intentionany segregative actions of the Columbus Board. While appearing not to challenge most of the subsidiary findings of
historical fact, Tr. of Oral Arg., at 7, petitioners dispute many
of the factual inferences drawn from these facts by the two
cated above, it contains repeated instances wherP the Columbus Board was
warned of the segregative effect of proposed site choices, and was urged to
consider alternatives which could have had an integrative effect. In these
instances the Columbus Board chose the segregative sites. In this situation the District Judge was justified in relying in part on the history of
the Columbus Board's site choices and con~truction program in finding·
deliberate and unconstitutional systemwide segregation." 583 F. 2d, at
894.
10 Local community and civil rights groups, the "Ohio Statr UniVPrsity
Advisory Commission on Problems Facing the Columbus Public Schools,
and officials of the Ohio State Board of Education all called attention to
the problem [of segregation l and made certain curative instructions." 429
F. Supp., at 255. This was particularly important because the Columbus
system grew rapidly in terms of geography and number of students, creating many crossroads where the Board could either turn toward sE•gregation or away from it. Specifically, for example, the University Commission in 1968 made certain recommendations that it thought not only would
assist desegregation of the schools but would encourage integrated residential patterns. !d., at 256. The Board itself came to similar conclusions
about what could be done, but it still took no action. ibid. Additionally,
the Board refused to create a site selectwn advisory group to assist in
avoiding sites with a segregative effect, refused to ask state education officials to present plans for desegregating the Columbus public !:ichools, and
refused to apply for federal de!:iegregation-assistance funds. !d., at 257';
see id., at 239.

'··
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courts below. On this record, however, there is no apparent
reason to disturb the factual findings and conclusions entered
by the District Court and strongly affirmed by the Court of
Appeals after its own examinationtQf the record. ~
Nor do we discern that the judgments entered below rested
on any misapprehension of the controlling law. It is urged
that the courts below failed to heed the requirements of Keyes,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), and Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U. S. 252 ( 1977), that a plaintiff seeking to make out an equal
protection violation on the basis of racial discrimination must
show purpose. Both courts, it is argued, considered the requirement satisfied if it were shown that disparate impact
would be the natural and foreseeable consequence of the
practices and policies of the Board, which, it is said, is nothing
more than equating impact with intent, contrary to the controlling precedent.
The District Court, however, was amply cognizant of the
controlling cases. It is understood that to prevail the plaintiffs were required to "'prove not only that segregated school11 Petitioner~ have indicated that a frw of thr rrcent violations specifically discus~ed b,v the District Court involvrd HO few :;tudents and lasted
for such a short timP that tlwy are unlikely to have any currrnt impact.
But that contention say~ littlr or nothing about thP incrPmrntal impact of
systemwidr practices extending over many ypars. Petitionrrs also argue
that because many of the involved schoolR were in areas that had becomr
prcdommantly black residential arras by the timr of trial thr racial ~epara
tion in the schools would havr occurred evrn without thr unlawful conduct
of petitioners. But, as the District Court found, prtitioner~' rvidrncc in
tins respPct was msufficient to countPr rc~pondrnts' proof. SPP ViLlage of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252,
271 n. 21 (1977) ; Mt. Healthy School Dist. Bd. of Education Y. Doyle, 429
U S. 274, 2R7 (1977). And the phenomenon described by petitioners
seems only to confirm, not disprove, the evHlPBC<' accepted b~· the D1st riel
Court that :school HE'gregation is a contributmg cau~e of homnng srgr<'gation. 429 F. Supp., at 259; Keyes, 0 l3 ll S., at 202-20:3, Swann, 402
U. S., at 20-21.
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ing exists but also that it was brought about or mai11tained by
intentional state action,'" 429 F. Supp., at 251, quoting Keyes,
supra, at 198-that is, that the school officials had "intended
to segregate.'' 429 F. Supp., at 254. The District Court also
recognized that under those cases disparate impact and foresee~
able consequences, without more, do not establish a constitutional violation. See, e. g., id., at 251. Nevertheless, the
District Court correctly noted that actions having foreseeable
and anticipated disparate impact are relevant evidence to
prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose: Those cases do not
forbid "the foreseeable effects standard from being utilized as
one of the several kinds of proofs from which an inference of
segregative intent may be properly drawn." !d., at 255. Adherence to a particular policy or practice, "with full knowledge of the predictable effects of such adherence upon racial
imbalance in a school system is one factor ~tmong many others
which may be considered by a court in determining whether
an inference of segregative intent should be drawn." Ibid.
The District Court thus stayed well within the requiremeHts of
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights. See Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,- U . S . - , 11 . 25 (1979) .
It is also urged that the District Court and the Court of
Appeals failed to observe the requirements of our recent decision in Dayton 1, which reiterated the accepted rule that the
remedy imposed by a court of equity should be commensurate
with the violation ascertained, and held that the remedy for
the violations that had then been established in that case
should be aimed at rectifying the "incremental segregative
effect'' of the discriminatory acts identified. In Dayton I,
only a few apparently isolated discriminatory practices had
been found; yet a systemwide remedy had been imposed without proof of a systemwide impact. Here, however, the District Court repeatedly emphasized that it had found purposefully segregative practices with current, system,.....wide im-

-
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pact. 429 F. Rupp., at 252, 259-260, 264, 266; Pet. App. 95Y
And the Court of Appeals, responding to similar arguments.
aid :
" School board policies of systemwid<' application necessarily have systemwide impact: 1) The pre-1954 policy
of creating an enclave of five schools intentionally deigned for black students and known as 'black' schools. as
found by the District Judge, clearly had a 'substantial'indeed, a systemwide-impact. 2) The post-1954 failure
of tlw Columbus Board to desegregate the school system
in spite of many requests and dernancls to do so. of course,
had systemwid<' impact. 3) So. too. did the Columbus
Board's segregative school construction and sitting policy
as we have detailed it above. 4) So. too, did its student
assignment policy which, as shown above, produced the
large majority of racially identifiable schools as of the
school year 1975-1976. 5) The practice of assigning
black teachers and administrators only or in large majority to black schools likewise represented a systemwide
policy of segregation. This policy served until July 1974
to deprive black students of opportunities for contact
with and learning from white teachers, and conversely to
deprive white students of similar opportunities to meet,
know and learn from black teachers. It also served
12

"For E>xampl<', thrrr i:-; littlE> diHput€' that Champion, Friton, Mt. Vrrnon, P1lgrun and Ga rfirld wrrr dE> jure srgrE>gai rd h~~ dirE>ct net~ of the
Colnmbn:< drfendantH' ]lreclec·E>ssors. They WE'rP almo~t complrtrl~· Rrgregatrd in 195-!, 196-!, Hli4 and today. Nothing has orrurrE'd to ~ubHtan
tially alleviatr that continuity of di::;rrimin~~tion of thousands of black
studE>nts over thr intE>rvE>nii)g dE>cadrs." 429 F. Supp., at 260.
<'The rvidrncr in thi~ ra~c and the factual detE>rmination~ mndE> rarliE>r in
this opimon ::support ihr finding that thosE' rlemC'niary, junior nnd senior
high s chool~ in thr Columbu~ Hchool district which prC'sE>ntl~~ havr a prC'dominantly black studrnt rnrollmE>nt havr bren ~ub;;tant ially and dirC'etl:v
affected by the intrntional acts and omi~:;iom; of lhr dE>fendant ]oral nnd
.;;tate :;chooJ hoards." lit., at 266.

18-fHO-OPINlON
COLUMBUS BOARD OF EDUCATION v. PENICK

15

as discriminatory, systemwide racial identification of
schools." 583 F. 2d, at 814.
Nor do we perceive any misuse of K eyes, where we held that
purposeful discrimination in a substantial part of a school
system furnishes a sufficient basis for an inferential finding of
a systemwide discriminatory intent unless otherwise rebutted,
and that given the purpose to operate a dual school system
one could infer a connection between such a purpose and racial
separation in other parts of the school system. There was no
undue reliance here on the inferences permitted by Keyes, or
upon those recognized by Swann. Furthermore, the Board
was given ample opportunity to counter the evidence of segregative purpose with current systemwide impact, and the findings of the courts below were against it in both respects. 429·
F. Supp., at 260; Pet. App. 95. 102, 105.
Because the District Court and the Court of Appeals committed no prejudicial errors of fact or law, the judgment appealed from must be affirmed.
So ordered.
I
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To:

Paul

From:

L.F.P., Jr.

Date:

June 7,

Columbus and Dayton School Cases

I would like to try a dissent not so much to what
the Court decides in these two cases, but to address the
fabric of myths and fictions upon which the body of
desegregation law rests.

I expect to join Rehnquist's basic

dissent, and I know that it is late in the day to write all
that one could say about the intellectually and legally
bankrupt path the federal courts started down with good
reason, but have not had the good sense to abandon.

But

let's give it a try, in rather summary form.
Most of the general views that I have entertained
for some time (wearing my "school board" hat in addition to
my "judge's" robe) have been stated in Dr. Coleman's lecture
that he gave at Chicago in April, 1978.

We have a copy of

this, but I understand - through the library some months ago
- that the lecture never has been published.

(I pause here

to suggest that you have our library check with the Library
of Congress to see what, if anything, of Dr. Coleman's views
on school desegregation has been published either in book or
periodical form within the past two or three years.)
I haven't had an opportunity to put my thoughts

2.

together enough even enough to give you a skeleton outline.
Accordingly, what I am now dictating does not purport to be
more than identification of random thoughts and ideas that I
hope you can weave into some sort of a draft opinion.
only sources you really need refer to are

'•.

The

(i) my opinion in

Keyes, and particularly from Part III C to the end; (ii) my
opinion in Austin; what Bruce and I wrote in Dallas; and
(iii) Dr. Coleman's lecture.

Of course, at least some

reference will be made to the more relevant decisions of this
Court (e.g., Dayton I, Milliken land!!, etc.).
Dr. Coleman identifies correctly the principal

..

constitutional and educational fictions and misapprehensions

'•

that have brought us to the present sad state of affairs well

l

illustrated by the situation in Dallas.

Perhaps we should

commence with an identification of the fictions and
fallacious assumptions relied upon by this Court and
reaffirmed by its decisions in Columbus and Dayton.

In

essence, I suppose these are pretty much the same as those
identified by Coleman, but they should be expressed - where
appropriate -in the terminology used by the Court itself.
In over-simplified terms, the general rationale of
Justice White's opinions runs along the following lines:
since Brown (1954) there has been an affirmative duty to

..
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desegregate schools (even though nobody knew about the
affirmative part of this duty until late 1968 when Green was
decided); a segregated school is one that is predominantly
black (as Coleman points out this is presumed to be
inherently bad whereas a predominantly white school is not
bad unless it helps further the maintaining of predominantly
black schools); if there are identifiable black schools
{predominantly black) within a school district, the
affirmative duty to convert them to some sort of racial
balance has been on the school board since 1954 and the
burden of proof is therefore upon it to establish that its
segregative intent did not cause the continued existence of
one or more predominantly black schools; as proving this
negative in a way acceptable to many district courts is a
virtual impossibility (e.g., Columbus), the next step is for
the district court to conclude that there has been a systemwide violation of the affirmative duty to desegregate; having
leaped to this conclusion (wholly without regard to the
actual facts), the court then decrees a system-wide remedy;
the system remedy must be coersive enough to assure the
elimination of racially identified schools "root and branch",
L

so that there is no "black" and "white" school remaining;
ambiguous language in Swann, adopted today as the law of the

.. "

~:

4.

land, is that decreeing racial balance in each and every
school is appropriate where there has been a system-wide
violation, and the now accepted way of accomplishing this is
to prescribe a ratio bearing some relation to the percentage
of blacks to the total population; finally, in order to
implement what the Constitution has been found to require,
system-wide busing is decreed.
Although I have perhaps exaggerated to some extent,
and used adjectives that one might not use in a Court
opinion, I think the foregoing comes close to being precisely
the Q6 prevailing sequence of "reasoning" in Supreme Court
doctrine.

It makes no sense, and I believe that this type of

reasoning will be ridiculed when a detached history of
desegregation decisions is written.
I would particularly like to emphasize near the
outset the fallaciousness of the assumption, made with
respect to cities of the size of Columbus and Dayton and
larger, that there has been a system-wide violation of
constitutional rights in the sense that but for such
violation there would be no predominantly black schools in
the school district.

No rational human being could believe

this to be true in such cities.

Coleman refers to this

assumption (not identified precisely in my terms) as fiction

,-
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and as romanticizing.

He states:

"Any knowledge of urban areas, and of the
residential segregation that develops in
urban areas along ethnic, income, and racial
lines leads immediately to the recognition
that most segregation, whether ethnic, or
class~ race, in urban areas is due to
residential patterns."
(Emphasis in original.)
Coleman, p. 1.
This sort of segregation results from neutral causes (and not
L~
~ unconstitutional

action or inaction by school authorities)

and is not necessarily bad in the ethnic and pluralistic
society that prevails in our country and particularly in the
great cities.
In my view, and I say this only in legalistic
terms, I doubt that any federal judge really believes what
many of them still accept as proven fact.

That is, even if

the school boards in Columbus and Dayton have been guilty of
some intentional neglect of their duty to desegregate, no one
can believe that the number and degree of racially identified
schools in these two cities have resulted from failure of
duty by the board.
In short, our decisions make a mockery of the very
language repetitively used to the effect that the remedy
should not exceed the scope of the violation.

I am sure

6.

Rehnquist will make this point, but I would like to emphasize
it.
Also, as Dr. Coleman makes clear, desegregation law
as enforced by the federal courts has failed to accomplish
its basic objectives:

(i) as parents are free both to move

to the suburbs or to choose private schools, those who can do
so tend to leave court-run schools with the result that they
are resegregated (e.g., Dallas and countless other cities);
(ii) the schools from which this "flight" takes place, tend
not only to be resegregated, but also to offer a poorer
quality of education - at least this is the perception of
parents and the judgment of many educators (see Coleman).
In summary, what perhaps could be Part I of a
dissent would identify the fictions and false assumptions
upon which the present "legal fabric" of our decisions is
based, and indicate briefly the failure of the application of
these fallacious views by court ordered racial balance and
busing to achieve it.

We have pursued what we call

constitutional principles (never imagined until we came upon
the slippery slope of Green and Swann) with results now
widely recognized as ranging from disappointing to
disasterous.
Part II of the dissent should be affirmative and on

'•
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the upbeat.

As you know, I believe in the advantages of

diversity in the public schools as well as in higher
education.

I am totally persuaded that, despite profound

differences and difficulties, the white and black people of
this country must learn to live together, be educated
together, work together, and stop calling each other
"racists".

But forced integration (the Court euphemistically

continues to refer to it as desegregation) is neither
required by the constitution nor is it efficacious.

As

Coleman points out, black parents are even more anxious about
good education for their children than white parents (on the
average) and given the opportunity they will send their
children to church schools or elsewhere to avoid
deteriorating court run public schools.
In sum, the solution we should seek should be
essentially voluntary, but there must be state legislation
that provides the framework and perhaps support and
incentives.

I have thought for some time that something

along the lines recommended by Coleman may be the answer {pp.
12 et. seq.).

His quite summary description of the Wisconsin

plan is something we should examine.

In essence, as

described by Coleman {pp. 10, 13) it provides, but does not
require, for children within a city school district to

8.

transfer on a voluntary basis to schools within the entire
metropolitan area.

There would, of course, be certain

prescribed conditions: state funds would follow the child,
transportation at public expense would have to be provided,
the city school district would retain control over education
within the city, the schools to which city pupils could
transfer would have the right to limit the number of students
coming in based on capacity, but could not reject students
because of race.

I suppose, also, that one could provide

that transfers should not increase existing racial imbalance
in a particular school.
State legislation would have to provide for this,
as Milliken I would prevent a federal court from so ordering
in the absence of an interdistrict violation.

But where the

state provided the framework for a voluntary transfer system,
this would avoid most of the disadvantages of federal court
coercion.

The plan also could provide for specialized or

magnet schools within the city, to which metropolitan kids
could transfer.

See the description of these, and the

voluntary transfer program, provided in the innovative Dallas
plan, with which Bruce is familiar.

~,1.~

L.F.P., Jr.
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CHAM!!ERS OF'

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 7, 1979

Re:

/

78-610 - Columbus Bd. of Education v. Penick
·,

78-627 - Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman
Dear Byron:
I will await the other writings in both of
these cases.

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

.•,

June

F. Powell, Jr.
School Cases
Although I probably will "hold my fire"
Dallas case next fall, I am anxious to have
~·

,.:

··.

thinking along the lines we have discussed. '
At the

t~me

)

the library obtained the Chicago speech

of Dr. Coleman, it had not been published.

......

I recently asked

Bruce to check to see whether the library has anything
Coleman has published on this subject within
two.
In addition to following up on this, I suggest that
you spend a couple of hours at the Library of Congress to see

.,

whether anything worthwhile has been published on school
busing, and particularly its consequences in the past couple
of years.

,11/

I know from the press that a number of "studies"

have been made as to the effect of school desegregation on
public education.

These, with varied results.

It is

possible that some recent scholarly work on the entire
may be helpful.

My primary concern, however, is on the

effect of busing to achieve racial balance where a court has
ordered "system wide" remedies.

I would think there also may

be some scholarly support for Dr. Coleman's view that most of
the school segregation in large cities results from . social

'

.' .. .

:.:Ji;

'

"
'
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and economic causes rather than any intentional

'

<

discrimination by the school board or other government
agencies.
I will try to remember to bring Jay's book to the
Court.

I believe it has a bibliography.

It might save you a

little time if you called Jay and asked him if he had
discovered any good sources on the above questions.
I will give you with this memorandum the story in

..

Sunday's Post about the effect of busing (resulting in
resegregation) in Los Angeles' disastrous plan - that
apparently involved busing of up to four hours per day for
some children.
There also was an ops ed column in the Post one day
last week written by the Chairman of the District of Columbia
School Board.
a copy.

The library upstairs should be able to provide

The only relevant portion of this column is the

statement by the Board Chairman of the astonishingly broad
responsibility that public schools now assume for kids in
large cities.
activity.

Education seems to be almost a peripheral

The impression I gained from the article is that

the schools now are responsible for providing food, medicine,
health facilities, all sorts of guidance that normally came
from the family, and even clothing.

In the District at least

..
~

..

'

3.

....

'

they seem to be social service agencies.

All of this

~'o;

emphasizes the incompetence of federal judges to operate
school systems.

L.F.P., Jr.
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MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring in the result in No. 78-610 and
dissenting in No. 78-627.

~
taft~

My views in these cas e s differ iu signifi c ant respects f rom
those of the Court, leading me to concur only in the result in the
Columbu s case, and to dissent from the Court's judgme nt in the
D~_~on

case.
It seems to me that the Court of Appe als in both of th e s e

cases ignored the crucial role of the federal district courts in
school desegregation litigationl/ -- a role repeatedly emphasized
by this Court throughout the cour s e of school desegregation
controversies, from Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S.
294,~/ to Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman I, 433

406.1/

u.s.

The dev e lopment of the law concerning school segregation

has not reduced the need for sound f actfinding by the district

,-

-2-

courts, nor lessened the appropriateness of deference to their
findings of fact.

To the contrary, the elimination of the more

conspicuous forms of governmentally ordained racial segregation over
the last 25 years counsels undiminished deference to the factual
adjudications of the federal trial judges in cases such as these,
uniquely situated as those judges are to appraise the societal
forces at work in the communities where

t~ey

sit.

Whether actions that produce racial separation are
intentional within the meaning of Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229; and Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
is an issue that can present very difficult and subtle factual
questions.

Similarly intricate may be factual inquiries into the

breadth of any constitutional violation, and hence of any
permissible remedy.

See Milliken v. Bradley I, 418

Board of Education v. Brinkman I, 433 U.S. 406.
difficult enough for a trial judge.

u.s.

717; Dayton

Those tasks are

The coldness and impersonality

-3-

of a printed record, containing the only evidence available to an
appellate court in any case, can hardly make the answers any
clearer.

I doubt neither the diligence nor the perservance of the

judges of the Courts of Appeals, or of my Brethren, but I suspect
that it is impossible for a reviewing court factually to know a case
from a 6,600 page printed record as well as the trial
it.

j~dge

knew

In assessing the facts in lawsuits iike these, therefore, I

think appellate courts should accept even more readily than in most
cases the factual findings of the courts of first instance.
My second disagreement with the Court in these cases stems
from my belief that the Court has attached far too much importance
in each case to the question whether there existed a ''dual school
system" in 1954.

As I understand the Court's opinions in these

~

cases, if such an officially authorized segregated school
be found to have existed in 1954, then any current racial separati
in the schools will be presumed to have been caused by acts in
violation of the Constitution.

Even if, as the Court says, this

-4presumption is rebuttable, the burden is on the school board to
rebut it.

-

And, when the factual issues are as elusive as these, who

----

bears the burden of proof can easily determine who prevails in the
litigation.

Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26.

I agree that a school district in violation of the
Constitution in 1954 was under a duty to remedy that violation.
was a school district violating the

Constit~tion

one violating the Constitution today.

So

in 1964, and so is

But this duty does not

justify a complete shift of the normal burden of proof.!/

----------------------~-------~------------------Presumptions are sometimes justified because in common
experience some facts are likely to follow from others.
Court of Ulster County v. Allen,
Montana,

u.s.

u.s.

See County

Sandstrom v.

A constitutional violation in 1954 might be

presumed to make the existence of a constitutional violation twenty
years later more likely than not in one of two ways.

First, because

the school board then had an invidious intent, the continuing
existence of that collective state of mind might be presumed in the

-5-

absence of proof to the contrary.

Second, quite apart from the

current intent of the school board, an unconstitutionally
discriminatory school system in 1954 might be presumed still to have
major effects on the contemporary system.

Neither of these

possibilities seems to me likely enough to support a valid

-----------

presumption .

....___..---Much has changed in 25 years, in the nation at large and in

Dayton and Columbus in particular.
to racial relationships.
changed.

Minds have changed with respect

Perhaps more importantly, generations have

The prejudices of the school boards of 1954 (and earlier)

cannot realistically be assumed to haunt the school boards of
today.

Similarly, while two full generations of students have

progressed from kindergarten through high school, school systems
have changed.

Dayton and Columbus ar€ both examples of the dramatic

growth and change in urban school districts.2/

It is unrealistic

to assume that the hand of 1954 plays any major part in shaping the
current school systems in either city.

For these reasons, I simply

cannot accept the shift in the litigative burden of proof adopted by

-6-

the Court.
Because of these basic disagreements with the Court's
approach, these two cases look quite different to me from the way
they look to the Court.

In both cases there is no doubt that many

of the districts' children are in schools almost solely with members
of their own race.

These racial lJ distinct areas make up

-------

----------~

substantial parts of both districts.

The question remains, however,

whether the plaintiffs showed that this racial separation was the
~ result

of intentional system-wide discrimination.
The Dayton case
After further hearings following the remand by this Court

in the first Dayton case, the District Court dismissed this
lawsuit.

It found that the plaintiffs had not proved a

discriminatory purpose behind many of the actions challenged.

It

found further that the plaintiffs had not proved that any
significant segregative effect had resulted from those few practices
that the school board had previously undertaken with an invalid

-7intent.

The Court of Appeals held these findings to be clearly

erroneous.

I cannot ag r ee.

As to several claimed acts of post-1954

discrimination, the Court of Appeals seems simply to have differed
with the trial court's factual assessments, without offering a
reasoned explanation of how the trial court's findings fell
short.~/

The Court of Appeals may have been correct in its

assessment of the facts, but that is not demonstrated by its
opinion.

I would accept the trial judge's findings of fact.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the

proposition that the Dayton School District was a "dual system" in
1954, and today this Court places great stress on the same
foundation.

In several instances the Court of Appeals overturned

the District Court's findings of fact because of the trial court's
failure to shift the burden of proof.1/

Because I think this

shifting of the burden is wholly unjustified, it seems to me a
serious mistake to upset the District Court's findings on any such
basis.

If one accepts the facts as found · by the District Judge,

-8-

there is almost no basis for finding any constitutional violations
after 1954.

Nor is there any substantial evidence of the continuing

impact of pre-1954 discrimination.

Only if the defendant school

board is saddled with the burdens of proving that it acted out of
proper motives after 1954 and that factors other than pre-1954
policies led to racial separation in the district's schools, could
these plaintiffs pQssibly prevail.
For the reasons I have expressed, I must dissent from the
opinion and judgment of the Court.
The Columbus case
In contrast, the Court of Appeals d!d not upset the
District Court's findings of fact in this case.

In a long and

careful opinion, the District Judge discussed numerous examples of
overt racial discrimination continuing into the 1970's.~/

Just as

I would defer to the findings of fact made by the District Court in
the Dayton case, I would accept the trial court's findings in this
case.

-9-

The Court of Appeals did rely in part on its finding that
the Columbus board operated a dual school system in 1954, as does
this Court.

But evidence of recent discriminatory intent, so

lacking in the Dayton case, was relatively strong in this case.

The

particular illustrations recounted by the District Court may not
have affected a large portion of the school district, but they

---------~----------------------demonstrated that the district was not being operated in a racially
neutral manner.

The District Court found that the Columbus board

had intentionally discriminated against Negro students in some
schools, and that there was substantial racial separation throughout
the district.

The question in my judgment is whether the District

Court's conclusion that there had been a system-wide constitutional
violation can be upheld on the basis of those findings, without
reference to· an affirmative duty stemming from the situation in 1954.
I think the Court's decision in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189, provides the answer:

-10-

"We hold that a finding of intentionally segregative school
board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system,
as in this case, creates a presumption that other
segregated schooling within the system is not
adventitious. It establishes, in other words, a prima
facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of
school autho r ities, and shifts to those authorities the
burden of proving that other segregated schools within the
system are not also the result of intentionally segregative
actions." 413 U.S., at 208.
The plaintiffs in the Columbus case, unlike those in the Dayton
case, proved what the Court in Keyes defined as a prima facie
case.~/

The District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly

found that the school board did not rebut this presumption.

It is

on this basis that I agree with the District Court and the Court of
Appeals in concluding that the Columbus school district was operated
in violation of the Constitution.
The petitioners in the Columbus case also challenge the
remedy imposed by the District Court.

·Just two Terms ago we set out

the test for determining the appropriate scope of a remedy in a case
such as this:
"If such violations are
first instance, subject
must determine how much
these violations had on

found, the District Court in the
to review by the Court of Appeals,
incremental segregative effect
the racial distribution of the . . .

-11-

school population as presently constituted, when that
distribution is compared to what it would have been in the
absence of such constitutional violations. The remedy must
be designed to redress that difference, and only if there
has been a systemwide impact may there be a systemwide
remedy." Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman I, 433 U.S.
406, 420.

In the context in which the Columbus case has reached us, I cannot
say .that the remedy imposed by the District Court was impermissible
under this test.

For the reasons discussed above, the District

Courtis conclusion that there was a system-wide constitutional
violation was soundly based.

And because the scope of the remedy is

tied to the scope of the violation, a remedy encompassing the entire
school district was presumptively appropriate.

In litigating the

question of remedy, however, I think the defendants in a case such
as this should always be permitted to show that certain schools or
areas were not affected by the constitutional violation.
The District Court in this case did allow the defendants to
show just that.

The school board proposed several remedies, but it

put forward only one plan that was limited by the allegedly limited
effects of the violation.

That plan would have remedied racial

~

~

~12-

imbalance only in the schools mentioned in the District Court's
opinion.

Another remedy proposed by the school board would have

resulted in a rough racial balance in all but 22 "all-white"
schools.

But the board did not assert that those schools had been

unaffected by the violations.

Instead, it justified that plan on

the ground that it would bring the predominately Negro schools into
balance with no need to involve the 22 all-white schools on the
periphery of the district.

The District Court rejected this plan,

finding that it would not offer effective desegregation since it
would leave those 22 schools available foi "white flight."

The plan

ultimately adopted by the District Court used the Negro school
population of Columbus as a benchmark, and decreed that all the
public schools should be 32% minority, plus or minus 15%.
Although, as the Court stressed in Green v. County School
Board, 391 U.S. 430, a remedy is to be judged by its effectiveness,
effectiveness alone is not a reason fqr extending a remedy to all
schools in a district.

An easily visible correlation between school

-13segregation and residential segregation cannot by itself justify the
blanket extension of a r e me dy throughout a district.

As Dayton I

made clear, unless a school was affected by the violations, it

----------------~'--------------------------------------should not be included in the remedy.

I suspect the defendants in

Columbus might have been able to show that at least some schools in
the district were not affected by the proven violations.

Schools in

the far eastern or northern portions of the district were so far
removed from the centers of Negro population that the
unconstitutional actions of the board may not have affected them at
all.

But the defendants did not carry the burden necessary to

exclude those schools.
The remedy adopted by the District Court used numerical

---

guidelines, but it was not for that reason invalid.

As this Court

said in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,

402

U.S.

1,

"Awareness of the racial compositiori of the whole school
system is likely to be a useful starting point in shaping a
remedy to correct past constitutional violations. In sum,
the very limited use made of mathematical ratios was within
the equitable remedial discretion of the Dist r ict Court."
413 u.s., at 25.

-14On this record, therefore, I cannot say that the remedy was improper.
For these reasons, I concur in the result in Columbus Board
of Education v. Penick, and dissent in Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman.

Columbus & Dayton,
# 78-610, #78-627
footnotes

!/

Rule 52(a), F.R.Civ.P., reflects the general deference that

is to be paid to the findings of a district court.

"Findings of

fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
credibility of the witnesses."

See United States v. United States

Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95.
~/

"School authorities have the primary responsibility for
elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts
will have to consider whether the action of school
authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the
governing constitutional principles. Because of their
proximity to local conditions and the possible need for
further hearings, the courts which originally heard these
cases can best perform this judicial appraisal." Brown v.
Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294, 299.

ll

"Indeed, the importance of the judicial administration
aspects of the case are heightened by the presence of the
substantive issues on which it turns. The proper
observance of the division of functions between the federal
trial courts and the federal appellate courts is important
in every case. It is especially important in a case such
as this where the District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio was not simply asked to render judgment in
accordance with the law of Ohio in favor of one private
party against another; it was asked by the plaintiffs,
students in the public school system of a large city, to
restructure the administration of that system." Dayton
Board of Education v. Brinkman (I), 433 U.S. 406, 409-10.

fn.2

!/

In Keyes the Court did .discuss the affirmative duty of a

school board to des e g r egate the school district, but limited its
discussion to cases "where a dual system was compelled or authorized
by statute at the time of our decision in Brown v. Board of
Education .

II

413 U.S., at 200.

It is undisputed that Ohio

has forbidden its school boards racially to segregate the public
schools since at least 1888.

See Dayton I, 433 U.S., at 410 n.

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3313.48 (1972)
Ohio St. 555, 16 N.E.

373~

~

4~

Board of Education v. State, 45

Clemons v. Board of Education, · 228 F.2d

853, 858.

~/

The Columbus school district grew quickly in the years

after 1954.

In 1950-51 the district had 46,352 students.

1960-61, over 83,000 students were enrolled.

In

Attendance peaked in

1971-72 at just over 110,000 students, before sinking to 95,000 at
the time of trial.

Between 1950 and 1970, an average of over 100

classrooms a year were added to the district.

fn.3
Although the Dayton district grew less dramatically, the
student population inc re ased from 35,000 in 1950-51, of whom
approximately 6,600 were Negro, to 45,000 at the time of trial, of
whom about 22,000 were Negro.

Twenty-four new schools were opened

in Dayton between 1954 and the time of trial.

~/

For example, the District Court concluded that faculty

segregation in the Dayton district ceased by 1963.

The Court of

Appeals reversed, saying:
"In Brinkman I, supra, 503 F.2d at 697-98, this court found
that defendants 'effectively continued in practice the
racial assignme nt of faculty through the 1970-71 school
year.' This finding is supported by substantial evidence on
the record. The finding of the district court to the
contrary is clearly erroneous." [footnotes omittedl. 583
F.2d 243, at 253.

11

Thus, in considering certain optional attendance zones that

the District Court found had not been instituted with a
discriminatory intent, the Court of Appeals wrote:
"In reaching these clearly erroneous findings of fact, the
district court once again failed to recognize the optional
zones as a perpetuation, rather than an elimination, of the
existing dual system; failed to afford plaintiffs the

fn.4

burden-shifting benefits of their prima facie case; and
failed to evaluate the evidence in light of tests for
segregative intent enunciated by the Supreme Court, this
court and other circuits in decisions cited in this
opinion." 583 F.2d 243, 255.
The Court of Appeals opinion relied upon the same theory in
overturning the factual conclusions of the District Court that
school construction and site selection had not been undertaken with
a discriminatory purpose in Dayton.-

Thus, it is impossible to

separate the conclusions of law made by the Court of Appeals from
its rulings that the District Court made clearly erroneous findings
of fact.

!!/

The two clearest cases of discrimination involved

attendance zones.

The near-Bexley optional zone operated from the

1959-60 school year through the 1974-75 school year.

This zone

encompassed a small area of Columbus between Alum Creek and the town
of Bexley.

The area west of the creek was predominately Negro; the

area covered by the option was predominately white.

Students living

in that zone were given the option of being bused entirely through

fn.S
the City of Bexley to "white" Columbus schools on its eastern
border.

The District Court concluded that:
"Nothing pre s ented by the Columbus defendants at
trial, at closing arguments, or in their briefs convinces
the Court that the Near-B e xley Option was created or
maintain e d for ra cially ne utral r e asons. The Court finds
that the option was not created and maintained because of
overcrowding or geographical barriers.
Quite frankly, the Near-Bexley Option appears to this
Court to be a classic example of a segregative device
designed to permit white students to escape attendance at
predominately black schools." 429 F.Supp. 229, 245.
The Moler discontiguous zone affected two elementary

~schools

in the southeastern portion of the school district.

A

majority of the students in the Alum Crest Elementary School were,
at all relevant times, Negro.

Through 1969, no more than 8.7% of

the students at the other school, Moler Elementary, were Negro.

The

District Court found:
"Between September, 1966 and June, · 1968, about 70
students, most of them white, were bused daily past Alum
Crest Elementary from the discontiguous atte ndance area to
Moler Elementary. The then-princip a l of Alum Crest watched
the bus drive past the Alum Crest building on its way to
and from Moler. At the time, the Columbus Board of
Education was leasing 11 classrooms at Alum Crest to
Franklin County. There was enough classroom space at Alum
Crest to accommodate the students who were transported to
Moler. When the principal inquired of a Columbus school
administrator why this situation existed, he was given no
reasonable explanation.

fn.6
"The Court can discern no other explanation than
a racial on e for the existence of the Moler discontiguous
attendance ar ea for the period 1963 through 1969." 429
F.Supp. 229, 247.
~/

The Denver school district at the time of the trial in

Keyes had 96,000 students, almost exactly the number of students in
the Columbus system at the time of this trial.

The Park Hill region

of Denver had been the scene of the intentional discrimination that
the Court believed justified a presumption of system-wide
violation.

That region contained six elementary schools and one

junior high school, educating a small portion of the school
district's students, but a large number of the district's Negro
students.
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Re:

(78-610 - Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick
(

(78-627

Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman

Dear Potter:
I join your opinion covering both these cases.

.'

·,
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Copies to the Conference

',.

•'

...,..

l'v. 'I' he

Chief Justtce

Mr Justice Br~omnan
Mr. Justtce St"'wart
Mr.
lir .
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
~

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justtc:e

White
Marshall
Black.mun
Powell
Stevens

L:t-~1
~
t,.,(Jf

ruill. Mr . Justice Rehnquisize~

r; i rr.; ula t <Jci ;

_ i -~ _ JlW .!.SlS._ ~

····,Jl.~tod:

~

~~ ~t:...u ,..~,4.<-L.>

Re:

No. 78-610

Columbus Board of Education v. Penick

The school desegregation remedy imposed on the

A:_~
school system by this Court's affirmance of the Court of

Appeals ~

a--£-c..JL
is as complete and dramatic a displacement of
local authority by the federal judiciary as is possible

federal system.

~~

j~ur~

Pursuant to the District court's order

. ~~/
.
s;
There is like reassignment of teachers, staff and adm1n1strators,

~·

reorganization of the grade structure of virtually every elemen-

- 1 A -

tary school in the system, the closing of 33 schools,

and the

additional transportation of 37,000 studentso

It is difficult to conceive of a more serious supplantation

because, as this Court recognized in

347

U.s.

483, 493 (1954)

(Brown I),

~rown

v. Board of Education,

"education is perhaps the most

important function of state and local government"~ indeed, it is

- 2 -

a V1"t a 1 na t 1ona 1 tradition."
0

II

Dayton Board of Education v.

Brinkman, 433 U.s. 406, 410 (1977)

(Dayton I)~ see Milliken

v. Bradley, 418 u.s. 717, 741-742 (1974); Wright v. Council
of the City of Emporia, 407 u.s. 451, 469 {1972).

That "local

autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance
of community concern and support for pUblic schools and to
quality of the educational process," Milliken, supra, does not,
of course, place the school system beyond the authority of
federal courts as guardians of federal constitutional rights.
But the practical and historical importance of the tradition
does require that the existence of violations of constitutional
rights be carefully and clearly defined before a federal court
invades the traditional ambit of local control, and that the
subsequent displacement of local authority be limited to that
necessary to correct the identified violations.

,.
•,'!.:!I' - -

"It is for

- 3 -

this reason that the case for displacement of the local
authorities by a federal court in a school desegregation case
must be satisfactorily established by factual proof and justified by a reasoned statement of legal principles."

Dayton I,

supra, at 410.
I think the District Court and court of Appeals in this
case did not heed this admonition.

One can search their

opinions in vain for any concrete notion of what a "systemwide
violation" consists of or how a trial judge is to go about
determining whether such a violation exists or has existed.
What logic is evident emasculates the key determinants set dawn
in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413.U.S. 189 (1973), for
proving

the existence and scope of a violation warranting

federal court intervention:

discriminatory purpose and a causal

relationship between acts motivated by such a purpose and a

•·l

- 4 -

current condition of segregation in the school system.

The

lower courts• methodology would all but eliminate the distinction

between de facto and de jure segregation and render all school
systems captives of a remote and ambiguous past.

~~

~('""'--_ _ _ _ _ _..:,__~
__)

Today the court affirms the Court of Appeals for the

sixth circuit in this case and Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman (Dayton II), No. 78-627, in opinions so D~l~ that

lower courts will be hard pressed to fathom their implications

for school desegregation litigation.

gestions.

I can only offer two sug-

The first is that the Court, possibly chastened by the

complexity and emotion that accompanies school desegregation

cases, wishes to relegate the determination of a violation of the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in any plan

of pupil assignment, and the formulation of a remedy for its

violation, to the judgment of a single District Judge.

ment should be sUbject to review under

That judg-

- 5 -

the "clearly erroneous" standard by the appropriate Court of
Appeals, in much the same way that actions for an accounting
between private partners in a retail shoe business or claimants
in an equitable receivership of a failing commercial enterprise
are handled.

"Discriminatory purpose" and "systemwide violation"

are to be treated as

-

talism~ic Ehra~es

which once invoked,

warrant only the most superficial scrutiny by appellate courts.
Such an approach is, however, obviously inconsistent with
the Dayton I admonition and disparages both this court's oft-expressed concern for the important role of local autonomy in educational matters and the significance of the constitutional rights
involved.

It also holds out the disturbing prospect of very dif-

ferent remedies being imposed on similar school systems because of

-----------------

the predilections of individual judges and their good-faith but
incongruent efforts to make sense of this Court's confused

-

y
pronouncements today.

Concepts such as "discriminatory purpose"

and "systemwide violation"
and factQ

6 -

I

present
highly mixed questions of law

If District Court discretion is not channelized by a

clearly articulated analytical approach, the entire federal court
system will experience the disaffection which accompanies violation of cicero's maxim not to "lay down one rule in Athens
and another rule in Rome."
Yet the only alternative reading of today's opinions, i.e.,
a literal reading, is even more disquieting.

Such a reading

would require embracing a novel analytical approach to school
segregation in systems without a history of statutorily mandated
separation of the races -- an approach that would have dramatic
consequences for urban school systems in this country.
the adjective "analytical" is out of place,

Perhaps

- 7 -

since the Court•s opinions furnish only the most superficial
methodology, a framework which if it were to be adopted ought
to be examined in a far more thorough and critical manner than
is done by the Court's "lick and a promise" opinions today.
Given the similar approaches employed by the Court in this case
end Dayton II,

· this case suffices·

for articulating

both
what I think are the glaring deficiencies/in the Court's new
framework and in its decision to subject the Columbus school
system to the District Court•s sweeping racial balance remedy.
I

T.he Court suggests a radical new approach to desegregation cases in systems without a history of statutorily
mandated separation of the races:

if a district court concludes --

employing what in honesty must be characterized as an irrebuttable
presumption -- that there was a "dual

....

~~;

11

school system at the

- 8 -

time of

Brown I, ·

347

u.s.

483 (1954)

it must find post-1954 constitutional violations in a school
board•s failure to take every affirmative step to integrate
the system.

Put differently, racial imbalance at the time the

complaint is filed is sufficient to support a systemwide, racial
balance school busing remedy if the district court can find
some evidence of discriminatory purpose prior to 1954 ,·

without

any inquiry into the causal relationship between those pre-1954
violations and current segregation:·.in the school system.
This logic permeates the findings of the District court
and Court of Appeals, and the latter put it most blunt!y.
"[T]he District Judge on review of pre-19.54
history found that the Columbus schools were
de jure segregated in 1954 and, hence, the
Board had a continuing constitutional duty
to desegregate the Columbus schools. The
pupil assignment figures for 1975-76 demonstrate the District Judge's conclusion that
this burden has not· been carried. On this
basis alone (if there were no other proofs),
we believe we would be required to affirm
the District Judge•s finding of present unconstitutional segregationo.. Penick v.
Columbus Board of Education, 583 Fo2d 787,
800 (1978).

I
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In Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243, 256 (1978), also affirmed
today, this post-1954 "affirmative· duty" is characterized a

-

duty "to diffuse black and white students" throughout the

----system.

The Court in this case apparently endorses that view.

--

For

:_;_________________________________

the Court finds that "[e) ach instance of a failure or refusal

/,7 J

to fulfill this affirmative duty continues the violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment," ante, at 7, and the mere fact that
at the time of suit "most blacks were going to black schools
and most whites to white schools" establishes current effect.
Ante, at 9.

the Court's opinion thus implies, and its lack of any principled

--

basis, a brief historical review is necessary.

_n

~

In 1954 this Court

- 10 -

announced Brown I and struck down on equal protection grounds
laws requiring or permitting school assignment of children on
the basis of race.
(1954).

u.s.

See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347

497

The question of remedy was reserved for a new round

of briefing, and the following Term

this Court remanded to

the district courts in the five consolidated cases

11

to take

such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent
with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to

public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all

---

deliberate speed
.....______ the parties to these cases."
of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 {1955)

Brown v. Board

(Brown II).

The majority concedes that this case does not involve
racial assignment of students mandated by state

law~

Ohio

abandoned any "statutory requirement or authorization to operate
segregated schools 11 by 1888o

~.

at 5.

Yet it was precisely

- 11 -

this type of segregation -- segregation expressly mandated or
permitted by state statute or constitution -- that was addressed
by Brown and the mandate of the Brown cases was that

11

[a]ll

provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield 11 to

11

the fundamental

principal that racial discrimination in public education is
unconstitutional .. 11

349

U.s., at 298.

The message of Brown

was simple and resonant because the violation was simple and
pervasive.

There were, however, some issues upon which the Brown
Court was vague.

It did not define what it meant by

11

effectuat[ingJ

a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system,"
id., at 301, and therefore the next 17 years focused on the
question of the appropriate remedy where racial separation had
been maintained by operation of state law.

- 12 The earliest post-Brown school cases in this Court only
intimated that "a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory

--

school system" required adoption of a policy of ro.nd.iscriminatory

y
admission.

It was not until the 1967 Term that this Court

~------

indicated that school systems with a history of statutorily
or constitutionally mandated separation of the races would have
to do more than simply permit black students to attend wh'ite
schools and vice versa.

In that Term the Court had before it

"freedom-of-choice" plans put forward as desegregation remedies.
The factual context of the lead case, Green

Vo

county School

Board, 391 UoSo 430 (1968), is a far cry from the complicated
urban metropolitan system we confront today.

The New Kent

county school system consisted of two schools - one black and
one white --with a total enrollment of 1,300 pupils.

At the

time of suit a black student had never attended the white school

..,

- 13 or a white student the black schoolo

The District C0urtap-

proved a "freedom-of-choice 11 plan for the desegregation of the
New Kent county schools.
Noting that the

11

This Court found that plan inadequate.

pattern of separate 'white' and 'Negro' schools

in the New Kent County school system established under compulsion
of state laws is precisely the pattern of segregation to which
Brown I and Brown II were particularly addressed, .. this court
observed that Brown II

charged

11

[s] chool boards such as the

respondent then operating state-compelled dual systems • • •
with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be

necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."
437-438.

Id., at

In the three years following court approval of the

freedom of choice plan in New Kent County, not a single white

- 14 -

child had chosen to attend the black school and 85% of the
county's black children still attended the black schoolo

The

Green Court concluded that a freedom of choice plan, in a school
system such as this and in the absence of other efforts at
desegregation, was not sufficient to provide the remedy mandated
by Brown

II.

The court suggested zoning, i.e., some variation

of a neighborhood school policy, as a possible alternative

y
remedyo
That brings the history of school desegregation litigation
in this Court to the Chief Justice's opinion in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, 402

th

u.s.

1 (1971}, upon which

. .
y
e maJor1ty and respondents heavily rely.

Swann also addressed

school systems with a history of statutorily or constitutionally
mandated separation of the races; "[t]hat was what Brown v.

- 15 -

Board of Education was all about."
attempt to

define

Id., at 6.

Swann was an

"in more precise terms" the appropriate

scope of the remedy in cases of that nature.

It simply did

not attempt to articulate the manner by which courts were to
determine the existence of a violation in school systems without a history of segregation unposed by statute or the state
constitution.

Y'

Certainly school systems with such a history

were charged by Brown II to "effectuate a transition to a
racially nondiscriminatory school system."

But SWann did not

speak of the failure to conform to this duty as a "continuing
violation."

The specific references to an affirmative duty in

Swann were to the duty of a school board found to have overseen a school system with state-imposed segregation to put
forward a plan to remedy that situation.

It was in this context

that the Court observed that "default by the school authorities

;

- 16 of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district
court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a

§/
unitary school system."

Id., at 16.

This understanding of the "affirmative duty" was acknowledged
in the first case confronting a school system without a history
of state-mandated racial assignment, Keyes v. School District
No.1, 413

u.s. 189 (1973).

There the court observed:

"[W]e have held that where plaintiffs prove
that a current condition of segregated schooling
exists within a school district where a dual
system was compelled or authorized by statute
at the time of our decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I),
the State automatically assumes an affirmative
duty •to effectuate a transition to a racially
nondiscriminatory school system,' Brown v.
Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)
(Brown II), see also Green v. County School
Board, 391 U.S. 430, 437-438 {1968), that
is, to eliminate from the pUblic schools
within their school system 'all vestiges of
state-imposed segregation.' Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 u.s. 1, 15 (1971)
0

This is not a case, however, where a
statutory dual system has ever existed."
Id., at 200-201.

- 17 -

It was at this juncture that the Court articulated the proposition
that has become associated with Keyes.
"Nevertheless, where plaintiffs prove that
the school authorities have carried out a
systematic program of segregation affecting
a substantial portion of the students,
schools, teachers, and facilities within
the school system, it is only common sense
to conclude that there exists a predicate
for a finding of the existence of a dual
school system." Id., at 201.
The notion of an "affirmative duty" as acknowledged in
Keyes is a remedial concept defining the obligation on the
~

school board to come forward with an effective desegregation
plan after a finding of a dual system.

This could not be clearer

in Keyes itself.

"[P]roof of a state-imposed segregation in
a substantial portion of the district will
suffice to support a finding by the trial
court of the existence of a dual system. Of
course, where that finding is made, as in
cases involving statutory dual systems, the ~
school authorities have an affirmative duty
'to effectuate a transition to a racially
nondiscriminatory school system.• Brown II,
supra, at 301." Id., at 189 • .1/

- 18 -

Indeed, Keyes did not discuss the complexion of the Denver school

~------------------------------------

'

I '1 ~-t.f
~

system in 1954 or in any other way intimate the analysis adopt~
by the Court today.

Rather it emphasized that the relevance

of past actions was determined by their causal relationship
to current segregative conditions.

Even so brief a history of our school desegregation jurisprudence sheds light on more than one point.

As a matter of

history, case law # or logic there is nothing to support the novel
proposition that the primary inquiry in school desegregation
cases involving systems without a history of statutorily mandated
racial assignment is what happened in those systems before 1954.
As a matter of history, 1954 makes no more sense as a benchmark -indeed it makes less sense -- than 1968, 1971 or 1973.

Perhaps

-~t

the

~ year

has the most to commend it, if one insists on a

(..A.A..

- 19 benchmark, because in Keyes this court first confronted the problem of school segregation in the context of systems without a
history of statutorily mandated separation of the races.
As a matter of logic, the majority's decision to turn
the year 1954 into a constitutional Rubicon also fails.

The

analytical underpinnings of the concept of discriminatory purpose have received their still incomplete articulation in the 1970s.

11 ~
~

It is sophistry to suggest that a school

board in Columbus in 1954 could have read Brown and gleaned

-

from it a constitutional duty "to diffuse black students throughout
the system" or take whatever other action the Court today
thinks it should have takeno

And not only was the school

board to anticipate the state of the law 20 years hence, but
also to have a full appreciation for discrete acts or omissions
of school boards 20 to 50 years earlier •

2/

.,.

Jru.._

j'
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Of course, there are always instances where constitutional
standards evolve and parties are charged with conforming to
the new standards.

But

I

am unaware of a case where the

failure to anticipate a change in the law and take remedial
steps is labeled an independent constitutional violation.
difference is not simply one of characterization:

The

the Court•s

~

decision today enunciates, without analysis or explanation,

~

'1(

a new mode of analysis that dramatically departs from Keyes

~

by relieving school desegregation plaintiffs from any showing
of a causal nexus between intentional segregative actions and
the conditions they seek to remedy.
causality plays a central role in Keyes as it does in
all equal protection analysis.

The Keyes court held that

before the burden of production shifts to the school board,
the plaintiffs must prove

11

that the school authorities have

- 21 carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a
substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers and
facilities within the school systemo"

413 U.S., at 201 (emphasis

/

added).

The Court recognized that a trial court might find

"that a lesser degree of segregated schooling • • • would not
have resulted even if the Board had not acted as it did," and
"that at some point in time the relationship between past segregative acts and present segregation may become so attenuated
as to be incapable of supporting a finding of de jure segregation
warranting judicial intervention."

Id.

1

at 211.

The relevance

depend
of past acts of the school board was to I on whether "segregation
resulting from those actions continues to exist."

!Q/
210.

Id.

I

at

the court 'today.
That inquiry is not central under the approach appr~ved by/

apparently
Henceforth, the question is/whether pre-1954 acts contributed

- 22 ' -

in some unspecified manner to segregated conditions that existed
in 1954.

If the answer is yes, then the only question is

whether the school board has exploited all integrative opportunities that presented themselves in the sUbsequent 25 years.
If not, a systemwide remedy is in order, despite the plaintiff's
failure to demonstrate a link between those past acts and current
racial imbalance.
The Court's use of the term "affirmative duty" implies that
A~

integration ~ the

preeminent -- indeed, the controlling -- edu-

cational consideration in school board decisionmaking.

It takes

precedence over other legitimate educational objectives subject
to same vague feasibility limitation.
cally demonstrated in this case.

That implication is dramati-

Both lower courts necessarily gave

- 22 A -

special significance to the Columbus School Board's post-1954
school construction and siting policies as supporting the system1
11
-J
wide remedy in this case.
They did not find -- indeed could

not have found -- that the siting and construction of schools

- 23 -

were racially motivated.

As the District court observed:

"In 1950, pursuant to a request of the
then Columbus school .superintendent, the.
Bureau of Educational Research at The Ohio
State University began a comprehensive,
scientific and objective analysis of the
school plant needs of the school system.
The Bureau studied and reported on community
growth characteristics, educational programs, enrollment projections, the system's
plan of organization, the existing plant,
and the financial ability of the community
to pay for new school facilities. Thereafter,
a number of general and specific recommendations
were made to the columbus Board by the Bureau.
The recommendations included the size and location of new school sites as well as additions
to existing sites. The recommendations were
conceived to accommodate the so-called 'community
or neighborhood school concept.' The 1950 concept was related to a distance criteria grounded
on walking distance to schools as follows: 3/4
mile for elementary, 1 1/2 miles for junior
high and 2 miles for senior high students.
The Board of Education adopted and relied
upon the Bureau's recommendations in proposing
and encouraging the passing of bond issues in
1951, 1953, 1956, 1959 and 1964. School construction of new facilities and additions to
existing structures were accomplished in sUbstantial conformity with the Bureau's periodic
studies and recommendations. 429 F.Supp., at
237-238.

J

Thus the Columbus Board of Education employed the most objective

)

criteria possible in the placement of new schools.

tl~

- 24 Nevertheless the District court and Court of Appeals found
that conformity with these recommendations was a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause because "in some instances the need
for school facilities could have been met in a manner having an
integrative rather than a segregative effect."
By endorsing this

log~,the

Id., at 243.

1Y

court, as a result of its finding

an
of/affirmative duty, employs remedy standards to determine the
existence of post-1954 violations in school construction and
ignores the previously pivotal role of discriminatory purpose.
This unprecedented "affirmative duty" superstructure sits
atop a weak foundation -- the existence of a "dual" school system
in 1954.

This finding was predicated on the presence of four

predominantly black elementary schools and one predominantly
black junior high school

on the "near east side of Columbus, ..

a then and now black residential area.

The Columbus School Board

- 25 at that time employed, as it does now, a neighborhood school

policy.

The specific Board actions that the District Court

cited were racial assignment of teachers and gerrymandering along

w

part of the border between two school districts.

The court con-

eludes that these violations involved a substantial part of
the Columbus school system in 1954, and invokes Keyes for the
proposition that the finding of a dual school system follows
"absent sufficient contrary proof by the Board, which was not
forthcoming in this case."

Ante, at 6.

There are two major difficulties with this use of Keyes.

First,

without any explanation the Court for the first time applies it
to define the character of a school system remote in time -here 25 or more years ago -- without any examination of the justifications for the Keyes burden-shifting principles
when those principles are used in this fashion.

-

26 -

Their use is a matter of "'policy and fairness, •" 413

u.s., at

209 (quoting Wigmore), and I think the Keyes "presumption .. scores
poorly on both counts when focused on a period beyond memory and

w

often beyond records.

What records are available are equally

available to both sides.

In this case the District court

~

relied almost exclusively on instances that occurred between

----

1909 and 1943:

-

~It,

~eo£~(.

undoubtedly beyond the period when many Board

~~

members had their experiences with the system as students, let ~~

~
alone as administrators.

It

~~

becomes much more

difficult for school board authorities to piece together the

~
~~

influences that shpaed the racial composition of a district

20,

7~ ~
~D.

30,

or

40

years ago.

increasingly anecdotal.

The evidence on both sides becomes

Yet the consequences of the School Board's

inability to make such a showing only become more dramatic.

- 27 -

____

.__
Here violations
with respect to five schools, only three of

which exist today, occurring over 30 years ago are the key
premise for a systemwide racial balanmremedy involving 172
schools -- most of which did not exist in 1950..
My second concern about the court•s use of the Keyes premay
sumptionlrender

my first concern academic.

For as I suggest

in Part III below, the court today endorses views regarding

the neighborhood school policy and racially identifiable neighIL

borhoods that essentially makes the Keyes presumption irrebuttable.
The departure

7T~------------------------------from established doctrinasof causation and

discriminatory purpose does not end

with the lower courts•

preoccupation with an "affirmative duty" exhumed from the conduct
of past generations to be imposed on the present without regard
to the forces that actually shaped the current racial tmbalance
in the school system.

It is also evident in their examination

- 28 of post-1954 violations, which the Court refers to as "the
intentionally segregative use of optional attendance zones,
discontiguous attendance areas, and boundary changes."

Ante,

at 9.... 10.

As a preliminary matter I note that the court Of Appeals
observed, I think correctly, that these post-1954 incidents
"can properly be classified as isolated in the sense that they
do not form any systemwide patterno"

583 F.2d, at 805o

All

the incidents cited, let alone those that can meet a properly
applied segregative intent standard, could not serve as
basis

the

for a systemwide racial balance remedy.

In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
429 U.So 252 {1977), and Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney, No. 78-233 {1979), we have emphasized that discrimi-
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natory purpose as a motivating factor in governmental action is
a , critical component of

a~

4equal protection violation. Like causation analysis, the discriminatory purpose requirement sensibly seeks to limit court
intervention to the rectification of conditions that offend the
Constitution -- stigma and other harm inflicted by racially
motivated governmental action -- and prevent unwarranted encroachment on the autonomy of local governments and private
individuals which could well result from a less structured appreach.
This court has not precisely defined the manner in which
discriminatory purpose is to be proved.

Indeed, in light of the

varied circumstances in which it might be at issue, simple and
precise rules for proving discriminatory purpose could not

be

drafted.

- 3 0 -

, however,
The focus of the 1nquiry in a case such as this/is not very
difficult to articulate:

Is a desire to separate the races

among the reasons for a school board's decision or particular
course of action?
plaintiffs.

The burden of proof on this issue is on the

Washington v. Davis, 426

u.s.

229, 244 (1976):

~----

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429

u.s.

252, 270 (1977).

The best evidence on this score would be a contemporaneous
explanation of its action by the school board,or other less
dramatic evidence of the board's

actual purpos~

cated that one objective was bo separate the races.
of Arlington Heights, supra, at 268.
probative.

which indiSee Village

Objective evidence is also

Indeed, were it not this case would warrant very

little discussion, for all the evidence relied on by the courts
below was of an "objective" nature.
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But objective evidence must be carefully analyzed for it
may otherwise reduce the

11

discr:iminatory purpose" requirement

a

to/ .. discriminatory impact" test by another name.
governmental conduct in

Private and

-' · ') matters of general :importance

to the community
/is notoriously ambiguous, and for objective evidence to carry
the day it must be a reliable index of actual motivation for a

governmental decision -- at least sufficient to meet the plaintiff's
burden of proof on purpose or intent.

We have only recently

emphasized:
.. 'D iscr imina tory purpose' • • • implies
more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences • • • • It implies
that the decisionmaker • • • selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of, • its adverse affects upon an identifiable groupo" Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, supra, at 21.
The maintenance of this distinction is important:

both to limit

federal courts to their constitutional missions and to afford
school boards the latitude to make good faith, color blind decisions
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about how best to effect legitimate educational objectives
without extensive post-hoc inquiries into whether integration
would have been better served -- even at the price of other educational objectives -- by another decision:

a different school

site, a different boundary or a different organizational structure.
In a school system with racially imbalanced schools, every school
board action regarding construction, pupil assignment, transportation,

annex~ion

and temporary facilities will promote

integration, aggravate segregation or maintain segregationo
Forseeability follows from the obviousness of that proposition.

Such a tight noose on school board decisionrnaking will invariably
move government of a school system from the town hall to the
courthouse.

- 33 -

The District Court in this case held that it was bound by
the standard for segregative intent articulated by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Oliver v. Michigan State Board of
Education, 508 F.2d 178, 182 (CA 6 1974):
"A presumption of segregative purpose
arises when plaintiffs establish that the
natural, probable, and foreseeable result
of pUblic officials' action or inaction was
an increase or perpetuation of pUblic school
segregation. The presumption becomes proof
unless defendants affirmatively establish
that their action or inaction was a consistent
and resolute application of racially neutral
policies." 429 F.Supp., at 254 n. 8.
This is precisely the type of "impact" trigger for shifting the
burden of proof

on

the intent component of an Equal Protect ion

violation that we rejected in Washington v. Davis, 426
{1976).

u.s.

229

There the Court of Appeals had applied the standards

of Title VII to determine whether a qualifying test for police
candidates discriminated against blacks in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.

According to the Court of Appeals,

- 34 -

the plaintiffs were initially required to show disproportionate

11/
impact on blacks.

That impact was a constitutional violation

absent proof by the defendants that the test was "an adequate
measure of job performance in addition to being an indicator
of probable success in the training program."

Id., at 237.

Put differently, the defendants were to show that the test was
the product of a racially neutral policy.

This court reversed,

rejecting "the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose
is unnecessary in making out an equal protection violation."
Id., at 245.
Indeed, reflection indicates that the District Court's
test for segregative intent in Columbus is logically nothing more
than the affirmative duty stated a different way.

Under the test

a "presumption of segregative purpose arises when plaintiffs
establish that the natural, probable, and foreseeable result of
pUblic officials' . • • inaction was • • • perpetuation of pUblic
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school segregation.

The presumption becomes proof unless

defendants affirmatively establish that their • • • inaction
· was a consistent and resolute application of racially neutral

policies."

If that standard were to be applied to the average

urban school system in the United States, the implications are
obvious.

Virtually every urban area in this country has racially

and ethnically identifiable neighborhoods, doUbtless resulting
from a melange of past happenings prompted by economic considerations, private discrimination, pUblic housing discrimination,
discriminatory school assignments, or a desire to reside near
people of one's own race or ethnic background.
School District v. United States, 429
J., concurring)o

u.s.

See Austin Independent

990, 994 (1976) (Powell,

It is likewise true that the most prevalent pupil

assignment policy in urban areas is the neighborhood school policy.
It follows inexorably that urban areas have a large number of
racially identifiable schools.
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certainly "public officials 1 • • • inaction •
____.--...
• • • publ 1·c school segregation" in this context.

o

• perpetuates

-----=>

• •

School aut h or1t1es

could move to pairing, magnet schools or any other device to integrate the races.

The failure to do so is a violation under Oliver

unless the "inaction was a consistent and resolute application of
racially neutral policies."

The policy that most schools boards

will rely on at trial, and the policy which the Columbus School
Board in fact did rely on, is the neighborhood school policy.
however,
According to the District Court in this case,/ not only is that
policy not a defense, but in combination with racially segregated
housing patterns, it is itself a factor from which one can infer
segregative intent and a facmr in this case from which the
District Court did infer segregative intent, stating that [t]hose
who rely on it as a defense to unlawful school segregation fail
to recognize the high priority of the constitutional right in-

7
)
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valved."

429 F.Supp., at 258.

But the Constitution does not command that school boards
not under an affirmative duty to desegregate follow a policy of

"integration Uber alles".
------·

If)

·~-" ·

L1the Court today endorses that view, and unfortunately one cannot
be sure, it has wrought one of the most dramatic results in the
history of public education and the Constitution.

A duty not

the School Board's
to discriminate in · / own actions is converted into a duty to
ameliorate or compensate for the discriminatory conduct of other
entities and persons.
I reserve judgment only because the Court at points in its
opinion seems of the view that the District Court applied a
test other than the Oliver test for segregative intent, despite
the District court•s clear indication to the contrary.

429 F.
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Supp., at 253-254 no 3.

Indeed in Dayton II, at 8 n. 8, the

Court expressly rejects the Oliver test, and in its opinion in
this case, ante, at 13, indicates that the District court
treated foreseeable effects as only another bit of evidence and
finds that not incompatible with this Court's prior cases.
"Those cases do not forbid 'the forseeable
effects standard from being utilized as one
of the several kinds of proofs from which an
inference of segregative intent may be
properly drawn.' Id. at 255. Adherence
to a particular policy or practice, 'with
full knowledge of the predictable effects
of such adherence upon racial imbalance in
a school system is one factor among many
others which may be considered by a court
in determining whether an inference of segregative intent should be drawn.' Ibid.,.

I have no

difficulty
1
with the proposition that forseeable effects

.;derations "as one of the several kinds
are permissible Cons ""'
are
of proofs" as long as they I not the only type of proof •

Use of

forseeable effects in the latter fashion would be clearly inconsistent with Davis, Arlington Heights, and Feeney.

But

I
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do have great difficulty with this court's taking the above
quotations from the District Court out of context and thereby
~puting

a general

test

of segregative intent to the District

court from a passage which in fact was part of a discussion of
the probativeness of a very special kind of evidence on intent:
a neighborhood school policy

s~pliciter.

w As

far as gauging

the purpose underlying specific actions, it is quite clear from
its expression of the relevant test for intent as well as its
application of it, that the District Court looked for forseeability
per se.
As

sue~

the District Court's treatment of specific post-1954

conduct reflects the same cavalier approach to causality and
purpose that underlies the 1954 affirmative duty.

It found vio-

lations with respect to three optional attendance zones.

The

Near-Bexley zone, the only zone discussed by this court, afforded

- 40 students the option to attend schools in either one of two
bordering districts.

The District Court found that the zone

gave white students of Bexley the opportunity to avoid attending
the predominantly black schools to the east.

I do not think

that the District Court's finding can be said to be clearly
erroneous despite the lack of any direct evidence on discriminatory
purpos~

for the school board did not suggest any educational

justification for this zone and none is apparent.

But as that

court recognized, the zone is of little significance as far as
the current state of segregation in the school system is concerned.
"The July 10, 1972, minutes of the State Board of Education • • •
appear to indicate that in 1972, there were 25 public elementary
school students and 2 public high school students residing in the

optional zone."

429 F.Supp., at 245 (emphasis added).

As of

1975 the zone has been dismantled, and the District Court clearly

- 41 the
suggests that it does not have any current effect on/columbus
school system.

J:9./

TWo other optional attendance zones were identified as
offensive.

One existed for two years, between

1955 and 1957,

and permitted students in a predominantly white neighborhood to
attend the

11

Whiter

11

West Broad Elementary school rather than

the predominantly black Highland school.

Like the Near-Bexley

option, there is no apparent educational justification, and
therefore no grounds to upset the District Court's finding of
a violation.

This optional zone afforded the District Court an

excellent opportunity to probe the effects of a past violation,
because in 1957 the optional zone was made a permanent part of
the West Broad district.

But the District court made no findings

as to the current effect of the past violation nor saw fit to

hypothesize how many students might have been affected.

It was
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clearly of the opinion that no such inquiry was necessary.
The final optional attendance zone demonstrates the influence
of the .. affirmative duty" -- whether the 1954 variety or that
which follows from Oliver.

This optional zone was also created

in 1955 in roughly the same part of Columbus.

It gave some

students within Highland 1 s boundaries the option of attending
the neighboring West Mound Elementary School.

A.g ain, the District

court found, this permitted transfer to a "whiter" school.

But

the District Court also found that there was a legitimate educational objective for creation of the zone:
crowded and West Mound was under capacity.

Highland was overThe District Court,

however, concluded that the School Board•s actions were objectionable because "feasible alternatives" were available, that is,
other optional attendance zones could have been drawn which would
have had "an integrative effect on West Mound."

This again

- 43 suggests a duty on the School Board to select the most integrative alternative.
The second set of post-1954 actions faulted by the District
court were two discontiguous attendance areas.

These were

situations where students in a defined geographical area were
assigned to a school in a zone not contiguous with their neighborhood.

One zone was established in 1963 and involved about 70

students.

unsuccessfully
?t trial
The School Board/argued/that the children were sent

to the predominantly white Moler Elementary School because
the nearest school, the predominantly black Alum Crest Elementary,
had no room for them.
violative condition

The District court indicates that this
existed until 1969, presumably because after

that date the discontiguous area had a substantial black population
and an integrative effect on the Moler Elementary School.

Since

the discontiguous area now has an integrative effect, one might

- 44 ask what is its current segregative effect on the school
Ironically,
I
under the District Court's reasoning, it would

system?

be a violation for the Columbus School Board to now disband the
Moler Elementary discontiguous attendance area.
The second discontiguous zone existed from 1957 to 1963
and permitted students on three streets within the Heirnandale
Elementary
school.

di~trict

to attend the "whiter" Fornof Elementary

The Columbus School Board "inherited" this discontiguous

attendance arrangement when it annexed the Marion-Franklin
District in 1957.
capacity

~nd

Both schools at that time were at or over

when a six classroom addition was made to Heimandale

in 1963, the discontiguous zone was terminated and the children
assigned to Heirnandale.

According to the HEW Civil Rights Survey,

Heirnandale today is a racially balanced school.

,;,_

Appx

at 747.
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The District court made no findings as to the current effect of
the Board's five-year retention of the Heimandale-Fornof arrangement.
The last discrete violation discussed by the District
Court involved the Innis-Cassady alternative organizational
proposals.

These proposals involved an area of the columbus

School District that was annexed in 1971.

The area had one

school, the Cassady Elementary School, which was very overcrowded,
and placing another school in the district was a priority for
the Columbus School Board in 1972.

The District court did not

fault the site chosen for the second school in the old Mifflin
District.

However, it inferred segregative intent in the school

board's decision to use a K-6 organization in both schools, rather
than using K-3 organization in one school and 4-6 organization

~

in the other andjdrawing students from throughout the district.
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The District Court found that the latter would have been the
more integrative alternative because of residential segregation
in the District.

At trial the School Board attempted to justify

its choice by pointing out that the pairing alternative would
have required sUbstantial transportation and a deviation from
the standard K-6 organization employed throughout the Columbus
School System.

The Court found "no evidence in this record"

that pairing would have necessitated "sUbstantial transportation"
and that the Board had on prior occasions used a K-3 structure -apparently a reference to the K-3 primary center for crippled
children.

w

This finding is again apparently prompted by the District
court's conception that there is some affirmative duty to select
the more integrative alternative and a consequent shift of the
burden of proof to the school Board to prove that the segregative

- 47 -

choice was mandated by other legitimate educational concerns.
But under Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arlington Heights, supra,
the burden is on the plaintiffs to show impact and purpose and in
a situation where there is "no evidence" in the record to prove
or disprove a proffered justification for a School Board decision,
the plaintiffs have failed to establish a violation of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, the fact that a School Board has once or twice
or three times in the past deviated from a policy does not
impugn that policy as a justification for a School Board decisiono
There is no constitutional requirement of perfect consistency.
Arlington Heights, supra, at 269.

The fact that the columbus

School Board currently maintains a K-3 organization for crippled
children hardly diminishes the Board's interest in maintaining
a standard organizational structure for traditional schools

w

throughout the school district.

Rather in Arlington Heights

- 48 -

we spoke of

substantive departures from existing policy as

casting light on discriminatory purpose, "particularly if the
fa,c tors usually considered important by the decisionrnaker strongly
favor a decision contrary to the one reached."

Id., at 267.

with
Thus it is clear that/respect to a number of the post-1954
to be
actions that the District Court found/independent violations,
foreseeability was not one kind of evidence, but the whole ball
game -- whether the District court thought that result dictated
by the Oliver test or the post-1954 "affirmative duty" purportedly
imposed as a result of pre-1954 conduct.

Those findings that

could be supported by the concept of discriminatory purpose propounded in Davis and Arlington Heights were not accompanied by
any effort to link those violations with current conditions of
segregation in the school system.

In sum, it is somewhat misleading

for the court to refer to these actions as in some sense inde-

- 49 pendent of the constitutional duty it suggests that the Columbus
Board assumed in 1954.

And, in any event, the small number of

students involved in these instances could not independently
support the sweeping racial balance remedy imposed by the District
court.

compare Dayton I, 433

u.s.

406 (1977).

- 50 -

III
The casualness with which the District court and court
of Appeals assumed that past actions of the Board had a continuing
effect on the school system, and the facility and doctrinal
confusion with which they went from these actions to announce
a "systemwide violation" undermine the basic limitations on the
federal court's authority.

If those violations are not the

product of a careful inquiry of the impact on the current school
system, if they are reaction to taint or atmosphere rather
than identifiable conditions that would not exist now "but for"
the constitutional violation, there are effectively no limits
on the ability of federal courts to supplant local authority.7
Only two Terms ago, in Dayton I, 433

u.so,

at 420, we set out

the basic line of inquiry that should govern school desegregation
litigation:

- 51 -

"The duty of both the District court
and the Court of Appeals in a case such as
this, where mandatory segregation by law
of the races and the school has long since
ceased, is to first determine whether there
was any action in the conduct of the business
of the school board which was intended to,
and did in fact, discriminate against minority
pupils, teachers, or staff. Washington v.
Davis, supra. All parties should be free to
introduce such additional testimony and
other evidence as the District Court may
deem appropriate. If such violations are
found, the District Court in the first
instance, subject to review by the Court
of Appeals, must determine how much
incremental segregative effect these
violations had on the racial distribution
of the Dayton School population as presently constituted, when that distribution
is compared to what it would have been
if the absence of such constitutional
violationse The remedy must be designed
to redress that difference, and only if
there has been a systemwide impact may
there be a systemwide remedy. Keyes, 430
U.S. at 213 o "
See also School District of Omaha v. United States, 433
667 (1977); Brennan v. Armstrong, 433

u.s.

u.s.

672 (1977).

The District Court made no attempt to determine the incremental segregative effects of identified violations -- indeed
given the absence of causality considerations in the court's

- 52 -

findings, it was

s~ply

not in a position to do soo

w

To

distinguish Dayton I the majority relies on the District Court's
conclusion that "its finding of liability in this case concerns
the columbus school district as a whole.
266.

11

429 F.Supp., at

But incantation is not a substitute for analysis and the

findings and
District Court's/analysis do

-------

not support its conclusion.

But the majority's opinion today takes on its most delusive
air when the court suggests that the scope of the remedy is

----

the Board's own fault.

'~--------------[T]he Board was given ample opportunity to
counter the evidence of segregative purpose
and current, systemwide impact, and the
finding of the courts below were against it
in both respects.
Ante, at 16.
11

11

Specifically the Court is alluding to the Board's purported
failure to show that the violation was not systemwide under Keyes
or that a more limited remedy should have been applied under

- 53 -

Swann.

In fact the logic of the District Court, apparently

endorsed by the Court today, turn the SWann and Keyes showings
into chimeras.
Once a showing is made that the District Court believes
satisfies the Keyes requirement of purposeful discrimination in
a substantial part of the school system, the School Board will
almost invariably rely on its neighborhood school policy and
residential segregation to show that it is not responsible for

the existence of certain predominantly black and white schools
in other parts of the school system.

Under the District Court's

reasoning, as I have noted, not only is that evidence not probative on the Board•s lack of responsibility, it itself supports
an inference of a constitutional violation.

Indeed, the District

Court relied on a general proposition that "there is often a
substantial reciprocal effect between the color of the school

- 54 and the color of the neighborhood it serves" to block any inquiry
into whether racially identifiable schools were the product of
racially identifiable neighborhoods or whether past discriminatory
acts bore a "but for" relationship to current segregative conditions.
"It is not now possible to isolate these factors
and draw a picture of what Columbus schools or
housing would have looked like today without
the other's influence. I do not believe that
such an attempt is required.
! do not suggest that any reasonable

action by the school authorities could have
fully cured the evils of residential segregation. The court could not and would not
impose such a duty upon the defendants. I
do believe, however, that the Columbus defendants could and should have acted to break
the segregative snowball created by their
interaction with housing. That is, they could
and should have acted with an integrative
rather than a segregative influence upon
housingr they could and should have been
cautious concerning the segregation influences that are exerted upon the schools by
housing. They certainly should not have
aggravated racial -' imbalance in the schools
by their official actions." 429 FoSupp., at
259 (Emphasis added).
But as the District court recognized, other factors play an
important role in determining segregated residential patterns.

- 55 "Housing segregation has been caused
in part by federal agencies which deal with
financing of housing, local housing authorities, financial institutions, developers,
landlords, personal preferences of blacks
and whites, real estate brokers and salespersons, restrictive covenants, zoning and
annexation, and income of blacks as compared t
to whites." 429 F.supp., at 259.
The Swann court cautioned that "(t]he elimination of racial
discrimination in public schools is a large task and one that
should not be retarded by efforts to achieve broader purposes
lying beyond the jurisdiction of school authorities.
can carry only a limited amount of baggage."

One vehicle

402 U.s., at 22.

Yet today the School Board is called to task for all the forces
beyond their control that shaped residential segregation in
Columbus.

There is thus no room for Keyes or SWann rebuttal either

with respect to the school system today or that of 30 years ago.
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I do not suggest that the inquiry required by Dayton I
and Keyes is a simple one, and reviewing courts must defer to
the findings of District Court judges.

But appellate courts

also must ensure that these judges are asking themselves the
right questions:

it is clear in the instant case that critical

questions regarding causality and purpose were not asked at all.
The City of Columbus has changed enormously in the last 25 years
and with it the racial character of many neighborhoods.

Inci-

dents related here may have been paved over by years of private
choice as well as undesirable influences beyond the control of
school authorities, influences such as poverty and housing discrimination, both pUblic and private.

Expert testimony should

play an important role in putting together the demographic history
of a city and the role of a school board in it.

I do not question

- 57 -

that there were constitutional violations on the part of the
Columbus School Board in the past, but there are no deterrence

4~

or retribution components of the rationale for a school desegre-

h.-.~ . .A 'I
/,_v
--"

----

gation remedy.

The fundamental mission of such remedies is to

restore those integrated educational opportunities that would
now exist but for purposefully discriminatory school board conduct.
Because critically important questions were neither asked nor
answered by the lower courts, the record before us simply cannot
inform as to whether so sweeping a remedy as that imposed is
justified.
At the beginning of this dissent, far too many pages ago,
I suggested that the Court's opinion may only communicate a "handsoff" attitude in school desegregation cases and that my concerns
should therefore be institutional rather than doctrinal.

School

desegregation cases, however, will certainly be with this Court
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as long as any of its current Members, and I doubt the court
can for long, like Pilate, wash its hands of disparate results
in cases throughout the country.
It is most unfortunate that the court chooses not to speak
clearly today.

Dayton I and Keyes are not overruled, yet their

essential messages are ignored.

The Court does not intimate

that it has fathomed the full implications of the analysis it
has sanctioned -- an approach that would indeed make school desegregation litigation a "loaded game board," SWann, supra, at
28, but one at which a school board could never win.

A school

system's only hope of avoiding a judicial receivership would be
a voluntary dismantling of its neighborhood school program.
If that is the court's intent today, it has indeed accepted the
role of Judge Learned Hand • s feared "Platonic Guardians"

121

and

intellectual integrity -- if not the constitution or the interests

- 59 -

of our beleaguered urban school systems and their students of
all races -- would be better served by discarding the pretextual
distinction between ·de facto and de jure segregation.

Whether

the court's result be reached by the approach of Pilate or Plato,
I cannot sUbscribe to it.

y
See Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton II)
No. 78-626 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

y
Cooper v. Aaron, 358
Education, 373

u.s.

u.s.

683

u.s.

(1963)~

1

(1958)~

~

v. Board of

Griffin v. School Board, 377

218 (1964).

In discussing the Brown II mandate, this Court in cooper
v. Aaron, 358

u.s.

1, 7 (1958), observed:

"Of course, in many 1ocations, obedience to
the duty of desegregation would require the
immediate general admission of Negro children,
otherwise qualified as students, for their
appropriate classes, at particular schools.
on the other hand, a District Court, after
analysis of the relevant factors (which, of
course, excludes hostility to racial desegregation), might conclude that justification
existed for not requiring the present nonsegregated admission of all qualified Negro
children."
A similar limited expectation pervades
cation, 383

u.s.

~

v. Board of Edu-

683 (1963), where this Court invalidated court-

ordered desegregation plans which permitted transfers on the
basis of race.

Specifically, the desegregation plan called for

the redrawing of school districts without reference to race,

:;./(Continued) :
but explicitly authorized transfers by students of one race
from a school where his race was a minority to a school where
his race was a majority.

There was no provision for majority

to minority school transfers.

This Court objected to the

explicit racial character of the transfer program.
"Our task then is to decide whether these
transfer provisions are • • • unconstitutional. In doing so, we note that if the
transfer provisions were made available to
all students regardless of their race and
regardless as well of the racial composition
of the school to which he requested transfer
we would have an entirely different case.
Pupils could then at their option (or that
of their parents) choose, entirely free of
any imposed racial considerations, to remain
in the school of their zone or transfer to
another. " Id., at 687.
Griffin v. School Board, 377

u.s.

218 (1964), involved a situation

where a school system literally closed down its schools rather
than desegregate.

The decree endorsed by this court, in the

face of massive resistence, was simply anader to the school

1/(Continued):
board requiring it to admit students without regard to race
to a white high school and to make plans for admissions to
elementary schools without regard to raceo

-· Two other cases were handed down on the same day as

31

Green.'

u.s.

Raney v. Board of Education, 391

443 (1968), in-

volved an almost identical factual situation with a s:iln.ilar
experience under a freedom of choice plan.

For the same rea-

sons that such a plan was inadequate for New Kent county, it
was found inadequate for the Gould School District involved
in the Raney litigation.

The other case handed down with

Green, Monroe v. Board of commissioners, 391
concerned the city of Jackson, Tennessee.
case was a
The

11

11

free transfer .. rather than

free transfer

11

11

u.s.

450 {1968),

At issue in that

freedom of choice .. plan.

provisions were part of a court-ordered

plan that essentially instituted a neighborhood school policy
for the three junior high schools in the system.

Any child

could transfer to another school if space was available, i.e.,

~/(continued):

if there were no neighborhood-zone residents to fill the
spaceso

This Court did not object to the neighborhood school

policy as part of a remedy, even though some neighborhoods
were racially identifiable, but it found that the effect of
the free-transfer policy was to maintain the racial characters
of the three junior high schools.
another

9~/o

white.

One remained all black and

jJ
There were two school desegregation cases heard in
this Court in the years between Swann and Green, Alexander v.
Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969), reiterated
of "all deliberate speed" had I

ended.

that the

era

States

Montgomery County Board of Education, 395

Vo

United

u.s.

225

(1969), involved an order requiring the reassignment of some
faculty and staff of the Montgomery County school system in
line with numerical targets set by the District Court.

21Nevertheless,

the court of Appeals refers to SWann as

an opinion which "dealt more thoroughly than any other opinion
of the court with the method of proof of constitutional violations, " 583 F. 2d, at 793, and relies on it throughout its
opinion for standards of proof in determining the existence of
a violation.

SWann was in fact an attempt to articulate the

"equitable remedial discretion of the District Court" which
admits more latitude than the standards for determining a violation.

There is no "discretion" in the latter context.

~

Later in its opinion the SWann court refers to the

district court's finding, "approved by the Court of Appeals,
that the school board had totally defaulted in its acknowledged
duty to come forward with an acceptable plan of its own,
notwithstanding the patient efforts of the District Judge who,
on at least three occasions, urged the board to submit plans."
402

u.s.,

at 24.

Four other cases came down the same day as Swann.

One was

disposed of for lack of jurisdiction, Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, 402

u.s.

47 (1971): one upheld a declaration

that a North Carolina Anti-Busing Law was unconstitutional, North
Carolina State Board of Education v. SWann, 402

u.s.,

43 (1971):

and another remanded a remedy order for reconsideration in light
of criteria laid down in SWann, Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402

u.s.

33 (1971).

The final case,

§/(Continued):
McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 UoS. 39 (1971), invalidated a state
court order barring on federal grounds a formerly statutory
dual system's voluntary transition to a modified neighborhood
school policy.

v
The point is reiterated later in the Keyes opinion.
"If the District Court determines that the
Denver school system is a dual school system,
respondent School Board has the affirmative
duty to desegregate the entire system 'root
and branch .. '" 413 UoS., at 213.

§/
In fact, th·is theory was pressed upon the Court in
Dayton I, Brief for Respondents at 58-71: yet it was implicitly
rejected in this Court's detailed articulation of the proper
approach to equal protection challenges involving school systems
'~here

mandatory segregation by law of the races in the schools

has long since ceased."

433

u.s., at 420.

~
As the Court notes, incidents relied on by the District

Court occurred anywhere from 1909 to 1943.

!.Q/

"The essential element of de jure segregation is

~a

current condition of segregation resulting from intentional
state action.'"

Washington

Vo

Davis, 426

UoSo

229, 240 (1976).

.lll
Indeed, reliance on school construction was critical.
As the Court of Appeals found, the other post-1954 incidents
relied on by the District Court were "isolated," 583 F.2d, at
805, and therefore could not have constituted a predicate for
a systemwide remedy.
433

u.s.

406 (1977).

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,
And the only other conduct arguably having

systemwide implications, racial assignment of teachers, had been
was
corrected~not

the sUbject of any remedial order, 429

u.s.,

at

238, and consequently could not itself support the systemwide
remedy under the Sixth Circuit's own precedents.

Higgins v.

Board of Education, 508 F.2d 779 (CA 6 1974): see Dayton II, at
8 n. 8.

Prefacing its discussion with the observation that
"in some instances initial site selection and boundary changes
present integrative opportunities," 429 F.Supp., at 241, the
District court made specific findings only with respect to two
of the 103 schools constructed between 1950 and 1975 in the
columbus school system -- Gladstone Elementary and Sixth Avenue
Elementary -- one of which does not exist today.

The sites

for both schools followed recommendations by the Bureau of
Educational Research of Ohio State University.

Ohio State Bureau

of Educational Research, The 1958-59 Study of the Public School
Building Needs of Columbus, Ohio

58 (1959}

(Sixth Avenue}: Ohio

State Bureau of Educational Research, The 1963-64 Study of the
Public School Building Needs of Columbus, Ohio 65 {1964} (Gladstone}.
The Gladstone Elementary School opened in 1965.

The "vic-

lation" inherent in that siting is described as follows by the
District court and this passage is quoted and fully adopted
by the court of Appeals.

~(Continued):

"The need for greater school capacity
in the general Duxberry area would have been
logically accommodated by the construction
of Gladstone north of its present location,
nearer to Hudson Street. This would, of
course, require some redrawing of boundary
lines in order to accommodate the need for
class space in Hamilton and Duxberry. If,
however, the boundary lines had been drawn
on a north-south pattern rather than an eastwest pattern, as some suggested, the result
would have been an integrative effect on
Hamilton, Duxberry and the newly-constructed
school." 4 29 F.Supp. at 242, guoted in 583
F.2d, at 803.
Thus the placement of Gladstone is a violation -- not because
the placement was racially motivated, it was demonstrably not so -but because another site would have had a more integrative impact, and it is a violation despite the determination by the
Bureau of Educational Research that objective and legitimate educational criteria militated in favor of the Gladstone site.
The secondary status of educational objectives other than
integration is even more obvious in the discussion of the Sixth
Avenue School where the District court characterized the relevant

W

{Continued) :

inquiry as whether "the objectives of racial integration would
have been better served" by a different site and different
boundarieso

Id., at 243o

The Sixth Avenue School does not

exist anymore, and students within its old boundaries attend
two neighboring, racially balanced schools.

w This

is explicitly recognized by the Court in Dayton II,

at 10.
"[T]he measure of the post-Brown conduct of
a school board under an unsatisfied duty to
liquidate a dual system is the effectiveness,
not the purpose, of the actions in decreasing
or increasing the segregation caused by the
dual system. "
But the cases relied on by the Court, ante at 7, to establish
this affirmative duty and its nnplications
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407

Dayton I and

u.s.

451 (1972}

bear absolutely no relation to the analysis in this case.

The

pages cited from Dayton snnply concur with a Court of Appeals
observation that there is nothing wrong with a school board
rescinding resolutions it was under no duty to promulgater as I
have indicated, the analysis articulated there is entirely inconsistent with the "affirmative duty" logic employed by the
courts below.

The citation to Wright is equally mysterious.

W

(Continued) :,
. -- The City of Emporia is located in Greensville county,

Virginia.

Up until 1968 it was part of Greensville County's

public school system.

A desegregation lawsuit was initiated

in 1965 and resulted in a court-ordered "freedom of choice"
desegregation plan for the Greensville County schools -- including
those within the City of Emporia.

After Green the court modified

its decree and ordered pairing of certain schools.
Emporia then announced its

~ intention

The City of

to withdraw its schools

from the Greeneville County school system.

The District Court

enjoined it from doing so because Emporia's schools had been
part of the adjudicated dual system and court's decree would
be frustrated by withdrawal of the Emporia schools.

In contrast

the instant case has nothing to do with frustrating outstanding
court orders ..

w As

the Court today acknowledges, Dayton II, at 8 n. 8,

of
racial assignment/teachers . does not make out a Keyes showing
regarding racial assignment of students.

And testimony on the

existence of gerrymandering went little beyond the establishment
of an irregular boundary line"
App. at 389-390.
(1964}.

Testimony of

w.

A. Montgomery,

cf. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376

u.s.

52

"The burdens of pleading and proof with
regard to most facts have been and should be
assigned to the plaintiff who generally seeks
to change the present state of affairs and
who therefore naturally should be expected to
bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion."
McCormick on Evidence 786 (2d ed. 1972).
There is a policy judgment sometimes made, which should not be
"overemphasized," id., at 787, that the facts on a particular
issue are so peculiarly within the knowledge of a certain party
that the burden of proof on that issue should be allocated to him.
Whatever the merits of the burden-shift to the school board where
contemporaneous board decisions are at issue, see Keyes v. School
District No. 1, 413

u.s.

189, 262-263 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting), they do not commend a burden-shift regarding conduct
25 or more years ago.

w The

columbus school system has changed dramatically in

the last 25 years.

The city grew from 40 square miles in 1950

to 173 square miles in 1975 and its student enrollment more
than doUbledo

Many of the system's schools serve areas that

were undeveloped in 1950.

One hundred and three new school

buildings were added during this period and 145 additions were
made to existing buildings.
were built each year.

On average, over 100 new classrooms

wTo

add the word "forseeable" does not change the analysis,

because the police department in Davis would be hard pressed to
say that the disparate impact of the exam was unforseeable.

It

is well documented that minorities do not perform as well as
Anglos on standardized exams -- principally because of cultural
and socioeconomic differences.

The Davis Court implicitly

recognized that the impact in that and similar cases was forseeable.
426

u.s.,

at 248 & n. 14.

See Personnel Administrator of

Massachusetts, No. 78-233, at 21-22 (1979).

Specifically, the District court prefaced its discussion
of the neighborhood school policy with the following question:
If a board of education assigns students
to schools near their homes pursuant to a
neighborhood school policy, and does so with
full knowledge of segregated housing patterns
and with full urderstanding of the forseeable
racial affects of its actions, is such an
assignment policy a factor which may be considered by a court in determining whether
segregative intent exists? A majority of
the United States Supreme Court has not
directly answered this question regarding
non-racially motivated inaction ... 429 F.Supp.,
at 254. {Emphasis added).
11

Before today I would

ha~e

thought that the question whether

~

racially motivated inaction was probative on discriminatory purpose
would answer itself with an emphatic no.

We have to date indi-

cated that only racially motivated governmental decisionmaking
is addressed by the Equal Protection Clause.

It was in the course

of reasoning to an affirma~ive answer to this question that the
District court made the first observation quoted by the Court,

!§/ (Continued) :
i.e., that the forseeable effects of non-racially motivated
inaction is probative on segregative intent.

And the second

quotation lifts the District court•s conclusion on this issue
out of context.
"Substantial adherence to the neighborhood
school concept with full knowledge of the
predictable effects of such adherence upon
racial imbalance in the school system is
one factor among many others which may be
considered by a court in determining whether
an inference of segregative intent should
be drawn." Id., at 255.

Thus the interesting proposition, worthy of Lewis Carroll at
his best, that a lack of discriminabory purpose will not Qy
itself support an inference of discriminatory purpose •

.
~

.
<

!21

In its general discussion of discriminatory intent or

purpose, the District Court defines the relevant test as follows:
"The intent contemplated as necessary
proof can best be described as it is usually
described -- intent embodies the expectations that are the natural and probable
consequences of one's act or failure to act.
That is, the law presumes that one intends
the natural and probable consequences of
one • s act ions or inactions. " 4 29 F. Supp. ,
at 252.
See id<t , at 254 n. 8.

!Q/
429 Fe Supp., at 245:

"The Court is not so concerned with
the numbers of students who exercised or
could have exercised this option, as it is
with the light that the creation and maintenance of the option sheds upon the intent
of the Colwnbus Board of Education."

w There

were apparently only two other instances where

the Columbus School Board has had K-3 primary units and both of
those were to supplement overcrowding in the lower grades of
K-6 home schools.

429 FoSuppo, at 249.

'1:.11

There is sUbstantial discussion in the District Court's

opinion about various groups that gave the Columbus School
Board notice that certain decisions would have a segregative
rather than

integra~ive

~pacta

429 F.Supp., at 255-256.

But

notice in and of itself only goes so far as to establish
foreseeability, and forseeability itself is not the ultimate
fact in issue if we continue to adhere to Davis and Arlington
Heights.

w Dayton I
this case.

was handed down after the liability phase of

It was brought to the District court's attention

while it was considering the remedy, and the District court dismissed it as simply reiterating the maxim that

11

the nature of

the violation determines the scope of the remedy."

Certainly

Dayton I was a much more precise articulation of what implementing
that maxim entailed than is found in this Court's prior cases.
And the Court of Appeals explanation of

11

incremental segregative

effect" in this case communicates no clear conception of the type
of inquiry into causation that Dayton I requires.
"It is clear to us that the phrases 'incremental segregative effect• and 'systemwide
~pact' employed in the Dayton case 'require
that the question of systemwide impact be
determined by judging segregative intent
and impact as to each isolated practice, or
episode. Each such practice or episode inevitably adds its own ' increment ' to the
totality of the impact of segregation. Dayton
does not, however, require each of fifty segregative practices or episodes to be judged
solely upon its separate ~pact on the system.
The question posed concerns the impact of the
total amount of segregation found -- after

W

(Continued) :
each separate practice or episode has added
its 'increment• to the whole. It was not
just the last wave which breached the dike and
caused the flood.," 583 F .. 2d, at 813-814 ..

.wThis empirical observation was

not the product of evi-

dence about Columbus, but general opinions expressed by two
experts, Dr. Karl TaeUber and Martin Sloane, the latter testified on federal housing policy in the United States.

As Justice

Powell has noted, experts have found that residential segregation
eXists "'regardless of the character of local laws and policies
and regardless of the extent of other forms of segregation and
discrimination.'"

Keyes v .. School District No. 1, 413 U.s. 223

(1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and aissenting m part)
(quoting Dr. Karl TaeUber).
Dr. TaeUber credited residential segregation to economics,
choice and discrimination.

In the latter category he included

racially motivated site selection in pUblic housing and urban
renewal programs, restrictive covenants in housing deeds, lending
policies of financial institutions, practices of the real estate

~(Continued):

industry, and zoning policies.

Entering into all of this is

same unspecified manner is the influence of school attendance
zones.

Testimony of Dr. Karl TaeUber, App. at 280-3llg

L. Hand, The Bill of Rights 73

(The Oliver Wendell

Holmes Lectures, 1958):
"For myself it would be most irksome to be
ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians even
if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly
do not.
If they were in charge, I should miss
the stimulus of living in a society where I
have, at least theoretically, some part in the
direction of public affairs."

78-610 Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick

Dear Bill:
Please J01n me in your dissentinq opinion, which I
think correctly states the principles that have quided the
Court in these cases until today.
I may write briefly. If I do, I will send it out
wihtin the next couple of days.
Sincerely,

'

~

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc: The Conference

'};'

lfp/ss

6/20/79
DAYTON · AMD · COLUMBUS
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting
I join the dissenting opinion of Mr.

Justice Rehnquist and write separately to emphasize
several points.

The Court's opinion in these two

cases is profoundly disturbing.

It appears to

endorse a wholly new constitutional concept
applicable to school cases.

The opinion also

S.C...VV'-t ~ ~ 0/'r \(~
appears Xto be insensitive to the now widely

accepted fact that a quarter of a century after
Brown the federal judiciary should be limiting
)

rather than expanding the extent to which courts
are operating
~

hatcUy with

cmt~~ieMsws

5ncce:;js

~

the public school systems of our country.

In expressing these views, I recognize, of course,
that my Brothers who have joined the Court's
opinion are motivated by purposes and ideals that
few would question.

My dissent is based on a

conviction that the Court's opinion is bad
constitutional law and even worse for public
education - an element of American life that is ~

so
essential>~specially~or minority children.

I

Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent

2.

demonstrates that the Court's decision marks a
break with both precedent and principle.
-~:.l.

lq ~

t.A::F\>A

IN'

01-pprmzfis-...t.b..e t str ing ing together of a chain of
"presumptions", not one of which is close enough to
reality to be reasonable.

This chain leads
~

inexorably to the remarkable conclusion that
\

u~ -\\ 4~ "~ ~~.,.S:-. ~~s:··"r
aeqree of segregatioR t Rat ex1sts in every one of
the

schools in Columbus and Dayton was caused

bv intentional violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment by the school boards of these two cities.
This is a conclusion that has not supported by

a.-J..
evidence in either of these cases
~n

7

-vtr

Als&,

no one could believe.

V<M-~"'-ti~v~ j~~
are S€9Fiigated schools wholly or predominan

1M

i~

o.

~ ~

is a •

~ There

t hat i s sehools that are

~,-rrl~k

or white

i n-t~rms

o£

compos.i t if"n't"-- in every major urbanized area in the

~s~....:....\
country ..iR- whieh ther:e
population.
~

i~

a substantial minority

This condition results primarily from

familiar segregated housing patterns, which -

in turn- are caused by social, economic and
demographic forces for which no sc hoo l board is

\
responsible.* •rhese indisputable facts ~'
*filaul
Cit ~ ane ~t:tote Celeman on t:his '?'J :Ujf -

net@

tz::B.

W\

~

3.

~

seem to be i gnoree

l •r~

ey

~ehool

feeeFal courts Mi

cases, t EI} ing upon fictions and presumptions that
repeatedly have been rejected in other Fourteenth
Amendment cases.

See, e.g., Personnel

Administrator v. · Feeney,

-

-···

u.s.

(1979).

Arlington Heights · v. Metropolitan · Housing
Development · corp., 429

u.s.

Washington · v. · Davis, 426

252 (1977) )

u.s.

~

229 (1976).

~cUrt's opinion also takes
unprecedented liberties even with the prior school
decisions of this Court, particularly Milliken · I,
Milliken · II and Dayton

I~

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

at

has dealt devastatingly

more than

a little

~ with the way in which, prior precedents
~Q

beeg

9Aeew~

with new wonderous meaning~

can add little to what he has said.
move to more

general~

I

I therefore

but, in my view, important

considerations that the Court has ignored.
II
Holding the school boards of these two
cities responsible for all of the segregation in
the Dayton and Columbus systems necessarily implies
a belief that the same school boards - under court

4.

supervision~nd '

now charged with the busing of tens

of thousands of childre~- will be capable of
bringing about and maintaining genuine balance in
each of these schools.

The experience in city
(Aa~~v~

after city demonstrates that this is ~ illusion.
Unless the racial balance quotas mandated by the
decisions of the Court of Appeals, now affirmed,
are updated at least every year with fresh busing

e.

decrei:JS, forces that no court can control will J

,

~ G-tl'M-\4 ~J.-t ~ w.~ ~if

commence the resegregation process "A !PM

p

1!.·

)

OM.~ ~

bws iAg deereg•

~'"'

,· ~

'(C._().A Vv\

~ ~(M..

Aiil~gry

Ml'tA+ ~~
e.f

.t ~~''d J-.. ~\ sv-J...

•

a.t;.t.aiA ~--a-1 "al·&ftee it!! bfiat

~ Wv-\'-o~~b.. e-J\~

M.J

0..~-"ci.... ,t.

The type of state-enforced segregation
that Brown properly condemned no long exists in
this country.

This is not to say that school

boards - particularly in the great cities of the
north and middle

~est

- are taking all reasonable

::;.

measures to provide integrated educational
opportunities.
opinion in Keyes · v; · school · District

No~ · l,

413

u.s.

,_ 2...'3 - 'l. 'l-4

189, ~ (1973), de facto segregation has existed
on a large scale in many of these cities, and often
it is indistinguishable in effect from the

~&

elJ

5.

~~~~~~
type of de jure segregationf

Where there is proof
~

of intentional segregative action or inaction,

Y"''-"~+
sfie~:~W

..t.ime has come fer- the federal courts
C..o...\.'\

~

A./I( I.,L\.

act.) but

J

P.bni L their remedies t-e~ the scope of the

constitutional violation.

Dayton ·

~j..,
r~
System-wide

"

remedies such as those orMced in these cases l'lilliliD..

~-4

~~

h

M
etty:e¥

~ ~"'-'"k ~~
(~'~

'H.~ ....... ~

v

u;

'~-~ ~

~ \-...~< ~

are justified/· The problems;, particularly in
~ '...\:- :_
t
'

Jv<_ 4). \o'\ ~ to ~td:r """''fA<~ ~J:' ...._ ,
th~ inner cities, are far too complex for ill

equipped and under staffed courts to undertake
extensive supervisory roles in derogation of the
responsibility of the legislative and executive
departments of government.
The orders affirmed today typify
intrusions on local and professional authorities
that are destructive of quality education.

They

require an extensive reqq}anization of both school
systems, including the reassignment of almost half
-\~ ~·~

of the 96,000 students in the Columbus system
some - t $")

-0 -~c?- ·

:::::::=:n

co:;__

students in Dayton.

and

They also

require reassignments of teachers and other staff

~
personnel, reorganization of grade structures,( the
closing of certain
~e

schools~ ~d

as

transpbrtatiofl of st:adenl!::s.

He~fi.d.

-

The orders

tf

6.

substantially dismantle and displace neighborhood
M

+kt. .f..._<..

<J

schools even though there

a~

compelling economic

and educational reasons for preserving them.

This

wholesale substitution of judicial legislation for
the judgments of elected officials and professional
educators derogates the entire process of public
education.

Moreover, it constitutes a serious

interference with the private decisions of parents
as to how their children will be educated.

These

consequences are the inevitable byproducts of a
judicial approach that ignores other relevant
factors in favor of a single-minded focus on racial
balance in every school.
I have mentioned above the self-defeating
nature of this judicial intrusion.

Parents, unlike

school officials, are not bound by these decrees
and they may frustrate them through the simple
expedient of withdrawing their children from a
public school system in which they have lost
confidence.

In spite of the substantial costs

often involved in relocation of the family or in
resort to private education, it is evident that
many parents view these alternatives as preferable

7.

to submitting their children to court-run school
systems.

In the words of a leading authority,
"An implication that should have been seen
all along but can no longer be ignored is
that a child's enrollment in a given
public school is not determined by a
governmental decision alone.
It is a
joint result of a governmental decision
(the making of school assignments) and
parental decisions, whether to remain in
the same residential location, whether to
sent their child to a private school, or
which school district to move into when
moving into a metropolitan area.
The fact
that the child's enrollment is a result of
two decisions operating jointly means that
government policies must, to be effective,
anticipate parental decisions and obtain
the parents' active cooperation in
implementing school policies." Coleman,
New Incentives for Desegregation, 7 Human
Rights 10, 13 (1978).
At least where inner-city populations

comprise a larqe proportion of racial minorities
and surrounding suburbs remain white, conditions
that exist in most large American cities, the
demonstrated effect of compulsory integration is a
substantial exodus of whites from the system.

~

j.
See Coleman, S. Kelly, and J. Moore, Trends in

"

School Segregation, 1968-1973, at 66, 76-77 (1975).
It would be unfair and misleading to attribute this
phenomenon to a racist response to integration per
se.

A reaction to the frustration of professional

and local control that occurs courts go into the
business of restructing and operating school
systems is at least as likely an explanation of

8.

this exodus.
Nor is reseqregation the only negative
effect of court-coerced integration.

Public

schools depend on community support for their
effectiveness.

When substantial elements of the

community are driven to abandon these schools,
their quality inevitably declines.

Members of

minority groups, who have relied especially on
education as a means of advancing themselves;CNEt •
~'

also are likely to react

to this decline in quality by removing their
children from public schools.2

As a result, public

school enrollment increasingly will become limited

~s
to children from families

whi~

either lack the

resources to obtain any alternative or are
indifferent to the quality of education.

The net

effect is an overall deterioration in public
education, the one national resource that
traditionally has made this country a land of
opportunity for diverse ethnic and racial groups.
See Keyes v. !ndependent · school · District

u.s.

189, 250 (1973)

No~

· 1, 413

(opinion of Powell, J.).

In this case, a real danger exists that the

9.

attempts of the courts below to bring about racial
balance throughout the Columbus and Dayton school
systems will be both futile and destructive.

No

justification for running these risks has been
offered or even addressed by the Court.

These are

not cases where local authorities have sought to
segregate schools at any cost, displaying
indifference to the educational needs of the
children under their responsibility.
v. County · school · Board, 377
Cooper v. Aaron, 358
of Education, 347

u.s.

u.s.

u.s.

Cf. Griffin

218 (1964);

1 (1958);

483 (1954);

Brown v. Board
Wilkinson, The

Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation,
1955-1970:
485 (1978).

A History and Analysis, 64 Va. L. Rev.
Aside from a few regrettable episodes

of no substantial impact, petitioners have been
guilty only of failing to respond vigorously to

~

form bot segregation caused by forces entirely
outside their control.

This failure alone has

never been enough, until today, to be viewed as a
constitutional violation.

u.s.

406 (1977);

Educa~on

Dayton v. Brinkman, 433

Pasadena · city Board · of

v. Spangler, 427

u.s.

424 (1976);

10 •

Milliken v. Bradley, 418

u.s.

717, 738 (1974);

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402

u.s.

1, 16 (1971).
III
If public education is not to suffer

further, we must "return to a more balanced
evaluation of the recognized interests of our
society in achieving desegregation with other
educational and societal interests a community may
legitimately assert".

Keyes, supra, at 253

(Powell, J., concurring). The ultimate goal is to
have quality school systems in which racial
discrimination is neither practiced nor tolerated.
It has been thought that ethnic and racial
diversity in the classroom is a desirable component
of sound education in our country of diverse
populations, a view to which I subscribe.

The

question that courts, in their single minded
pursuit of racial balance seem to ignore, is how
best to move toward this goal.
For a long decade or more after Brown,
the courts properly focused on dismantling
segregated school systems as a means of eliminating

11•

state - imposed discrimination and furthering
wholesome diversity in the schools.~ Experience in
recent years, however, has cast serious doubt upon
the efficacy of far-reaching judicial remedies
directed not against specific constitutional
violations, but rather imposed on an entire school
system on the fictional assumption that the
existence of identifiable black or white schools is
caused entirely by intentional segregative conduct,
and is evidence of system-wide discrimination.

In

my view, stated at the outset of this opinion, our
courts - now led by this Court - are pursuing a
path away from rather than toward the desired goal.

The time has come to seek more acceptable
and effective means of achieving ethnic and racial
diversity in the classrooms of our public schools.
The emphasis should be on the opportunities that
school authorities can provide, and that will
invite accommodation and cooperation of parents and
the community.

Although the emphasis in

Sw~

was

primarily on desegregating a district in which
state mandated segregation long had existed, the

1 2.

Court also cited examples importance of more
enduring and

palatab~edies:

"An optional majority-to-minority
transfer provision has long been
recognized as a useful part of every
desegregation plan.
Provision for
optional tranfer of those in the
majority racial group of a particular
school to other schools where they
will be in the minority [or less in
the majority] is an indispensable
remedy for those students willing to
tranfer to other schools in order to
lessen the impact on them of the
state-imposed stigma of segregation.
In order to be effective, such a
tranfer arrangement must qrant the
tranferring student free
transportation and space must be made
available in the school to which he
desires to move." 402 U.S., at 262 7.

See also Keyes, supra, at 240-241
Powell, J.).

(opinion of

Incentives can be employed to

encourage such tranfers, such as the creation
of magnet schools - especially in the inner
fit'~ ~·"'j
city - t1:rnt ~~ov. llia-extraordinary educational

benefits and state subsidization of those
schools that expand their minority
enrollments.

See,

e~g;,

Willie, Racial

Balance or Quality Education?, in School
Desegregation, Shadow and Substance (Levinsohn
and Wright eds. 1976).

These and like plans,

if adopted voluntarilv bv States, also could
counter the effects of racial imbalances
between school districts that are beyond the

13 •

reach of judicial correction.

See Milliken I;

cf. Coleman, 7 Human Rights 10, supra, at 48-

~

49.~

Professional educators no doubt can

devise other constructive approaches to the
furthering of ethnic and racial diversity in
public schools.
The point is a simple one, although
its implementation requires community and
government support:

Integrated schools, to

survive and succeed as such, must be made
attractive to parents who frequently have the
freedom to choose where their children will
attend school.

The converse is equally plain:

Treating integration as a burden to be forced
by court decree upon parents and children to
atone for past societal wrongs
~

ey

is doomed to failure.

earli§r

lfp/ss

6/20/79
DAYTON AND COLUMBUS
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting
I join the dissenting opinion of Mr.

Justice Rehnquist and write separately to emphasize
several points.

The Court's opinion in these two

cases is profoundly disturbing.

It appears to

endorse a wholly new constitutional concept
applicable to school cases.

The opinion also

appears to be insensitive to the now widely
accepted fact that a quarter of a century after
Br~

the federal judiciary should be limiting

rather than expanding the extent to which courts
are operating - hardly with conspicuous success many of the public school systems of our country.
In expressing these views, I recognize, of course,
that my Brothers who have joined the Court's
opinion are motivated by purposes and ideals that
few would question.

My dissent is based on a

conviction that the Court's opinion is bad
constitutional law and even worse for public
education - an element of American life that is so
essential especially for minority children.
I

Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent

2.

demonstrates that the Court's decision marks a
break with both precedent and principle.

It

approves the stringing together of a chain of
"presumptions", not one of which is close enough to
reality to be reasonable.

This chain leads

inexorably to the remarkable conclusion that the
degree of segregation that exists in every · one of
the

schools in Columbus and Dayton was caused

by intentional violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment by the school boards of these two cities.
This is a conclusion that has not supported by
evidence in either of these cases. Also, it is a
conclusion no one could believe.

There

are segregated schools - that is schools that are
wholly or predominantly black or white in terms of
composition - in every major urbanized area in the
country in which there is a substantial minority
population.

This condition results primarily from

the familiar segregated housing patterns, which in turn- are caused by social, economic and
demographic forces for which no school board is
responsible.* These indisputable facts often
*Paul - Cite and quote Coleman on this point - in a
note

3.

seem to be ignored by federal courts in school
cases, relying upon fictions and presumptions that
repeatedly have been rejected in other Fourteenth
Amendment cases.

See, e.g., Personnel

u.s.

Administrator v; · Feeney,

(1979).

· v; · Metropolitan · Hoasing
-Arlington · Heights
Development · corp;, 429

u.s.

Washington · v; · navis, 426

252 (1977) and

u.s.

229 (1976).

The Court's opinion also takes
unprecedented liberties even with the prior school
decisions of this Court, particularly Milliken · r,
Milliken · rr and Dayton · r.
has dealt devastatingly

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
- at more than a little

length - with the way in which prior precedents
have been endowed with new wonderous meaning.
can add little to what he has said.

I

I therefore

move to more generalized but, in my view, important
considerations that the Court has ignored.
II
Holding the school boards of these two
cities responsible for all of the segregation in
the Dayton and Columbus systems necessarily implies
a belief that the same school boards - under court

4.

supervision and now charged with the busing of tens
of thousands of children - will be capable of
bringing about and maintaining genuine balance in
each of these schools.

The experience in city

after city demonstrates that this is an illusion.
Unless the racial balance quotas mandated by the
decisions of the Court of Appeals, now affirmed,
are updated at least every year with fresh busing
decress, forces that no court can control will
commence the resegregation process. The history of
busing decrees to attain racial balance is that
they accelerate this process.
The type of state-enforced segregation
that

Br~

properly condemned no long exists in

this country.

This is not to say that school

boards - particularly in the great cities of the
north and middle west - are taking all reasonable
measures to provide integrated educational
opportunities.

As I indicated in my concurring

opinion in Keyes · v; · school · District · No; · l, 413
189,

u.s.

(1973), de facto segregation has existed

on a large scale in many of these cities, and often
it is indistinguishable in effect from the Brown

s.

type of de jure seqregation.

Where there is proof

of intentional segregative action or inaction, the
time has come for the federal courts should act but
limit their remedies to the scope of the
constitutional violation.

Dayton · r~

System-wide

remedies such as those oredred in these cases no
longer are justified. The problems, particularly in
the inner cities, are far too complex for ill
equipped and under staffed courts to undertake
extensive supervisory roles in derogation of the
responsibility of the legislative and executive
departments of government.
The orders affirmed today typify
intrusions on local and professional authorities
that are destructive of quality education.

They

require an extensive reogranization of both school
systems, including the reassignment of almost half
of the 96,000 students in the Columbus system, and
some · · · · · · ·- · · students in Dayton.

They also

require reassignments of teachers and other staff
personnel, reorganization of grade structures, the
closing of certain schools, and - as noted extensive transportation of students.

The orders

6.

substantially dismantle and displace neighborhood
schools even though there are compelling economic
and educational reasons for preserving them.

This

wholesale substitution of judicial legislation for
the judgments of elected officials and professional
educators derogates the entire process of public
education.

Moreover, it constitutes a serious

interference with the private decisions of parents
as to how their children will be educated.

These

consequences are the inevitable byproducts of a
judicial approach that ignores other relevant
factors in favor of a single-minded focus on racial
balance in every school.
I have mentioned above the self-defeating
nature of this judicial intrusion.

Parents, unlike

school officials, are not bound by these decrees
and they may frustrate them through the simple
expedient of withdrawing their children from a
public school system in which they have lost
confidence.

In spite of the substantial costs

often involved in relocation of the family or in
resort to private education, it is evident that
many parents view these alternatives as preferable

7.

to submitting their children to court-run school
systems.

In the words of a leading authority,
"An implication that should have been seen
all along but can no longer be ignored is
that a child's enrollment in a given
public school is not determined by a
governmental decision alone.
It is a
joint result of a governmental decision
(the making of school assignments) and
parental decisions, whether to remain in
the same residential location, whether to
sent their child to a private school, or
which school district to move into when
moving into a metropolitan area.
The fact
that the child's enrollment is a result of
two decisions operating jointly means that
government policies must, to be effective,
anticipate parental decisions and obtain
the parents' active cooperation in
implementing school policies." Coleman,
New Incentives for Desegregation, 7 Human
Rights 10, 13 (1978).
At least where inner-city populations

comprise a large proportion of racial minorities
and surrounding suburbs remain white, conditions
that exist in most large American cities, the
demonstrated effect of compulsory integration is a
substantial exodus of whites from the system.

J.

See Coleman, S. Kelly, and J. Moore, Trends in
School Segregation, 1968-1973, at 66, 76-77 (1975).
It would be unfair and misleading to attribute this
phenomenon to a racist response to integration per
se.

A reaction to the frustration of professional

and local control that occurs courts go into the
business of restructing and operating school
systems is at least as likely an explanation of

8.

this exodus.
Nor is resegregation the only negative
effect of court-coerced integration.

Public

schools depend on community support for their
effectiveness.

When substantial elements of the

community are driven to abandon these schools,
their quality inevitably declines.

Members of

minority groups, who have relied especially on
education as a means of advancing themselves over
the past quarter century, also are likely to react
to this decline in quality by removing their
children from public schools.2

As a result, public

school enrollment increasingly will become limited
to children from families which either lack the
resources to obtain any alternative or are
indifferent to the quality of education.

The net

effect is an overall deterioration in public
education, the one national resource that
traditionally has made this country a land of
opportunity for diverse ethnic and racial groups.
See Keyes v. !ndependent · school · District · No; · 1, 413
U.S. 189, 250 (1973)

(opinion of Powell, J.).

In this case, a real danger exists that the

9.

attempts of the courts below to bring about racial
balance throughout the Columbus and Dayton school
systems will be both futile and destructive.

No

justification for running these risks has been
offered or even addressed by the Court.

These are

not cases where local authorities have sought to
segregate schools at any cost, displaying
indifference to the educational needs of the
children under their responsibility.

u.s.

v. Coanty · School · Board, 377
Cooper v. Aa..E.£!!, 358 U.S.
of - Education, 347

u.s.

483

Cf. Griffin

218 (1964);

1 (1958);
(1954);

Brown v. Board
Wilkinson, The

Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation,
1955-1970:
485 (1978).

A History and Analysis, 64 va. L. Rev.
Aside from a few regrettable episodes

of no substantial impact, petitioners have been
guilty only of failing to respond vigorously to a
form of segregation caused by forces entirely
outside their control.

This failure alone has

never been enough, until today, to be viewed as a
constitutional violation.

u.s.

406 (1977);

Dayton v. Brinkman, 433

Pasadena · City · Board · of

Educatation v. Spangler, 427

u.s.

424 (1976);

1 0.

Milliken v. Bradley, 418
Swann v.
402

u.s.

u.s.

717, 738 (1974);

Charlotte~Mecklenborg · Board · of · Edocation,

1, 16 (1971).
III
If public education is not to suffer

further, we must "return to a more balanced
evaluation of the recognized interests of our
society in achieving desegregation with other
educational and societal interests a community may
legitimately assert".

Keyes, supra, at 253

(Powell, J., concurrinq). The ultimate goal is to
have quality school systems in which racial
discrimination is neither practiced nor tolerated.
It has been thought that ethnic and racial
diversity in the classroom is a desirable component
of sound education in our country of diverse
populations, a view to which I subscribe.

The

question that courts, in their single minded
pursuit of racial balance seem to ignore, is how
best to move toward this goal.
For a long decade or more after

Br~,

the courts properly focused on dismantling
segregated school systems as a means of eliminating

11•

state imposed discrimination and furthering
wholesome diversity in the schools.

Experience in

recent years, however, has cast serious doubt upon
the efficacy of far-reaching judicial remedies
directed not against specific constitutional
violations, but rather imposed on an entire school
system on the fictional assumption that the
existence of identifiable black or white schools is
caused entirely by intentional segregative conduct,
and is evidence of system-wide discrimination.

In

my view, stated at the outset of this opinion, our
courts - now led by this Court - are pursuing a
path away from rather than toward the desired goal.

IV
The time has come to seek more acceptable
and effective means of achieving ethnic and racial
diversity in the classrooms of our public schools.
The emphasis should be on the opportunities that
school authorities can provide, and that will
invite accommodation and cooperation of parents and
the community.

Although the emphasis in

Sw~

was

primarily on desegregating a district in which
state mandated segregation long had existed, the

1 2.

Court also cited examples importance of more
enduring and palatable remedies:
"An optional majority-to-minority
transfer provision has long been
recognized as a useful part of every
desegregation plan.
Provision for
optional tranfer of those in the
majority racial group of a particular
school to other schools where they
will be in the minority [or less in
the majority] is an indispensable
remedy for those students willing to
tranfer to other schools in order to
lessen the impact on them of the
state-imposed stigma of segregation.
In order to be effective, such a
tranfer arrangement must grant the
tranferring student free
transportation and space must be made
available in the school to which he
desires to move." 402 u.s., at 262 7.
See also Keyes, supra, at 240-241
Powell, J.).

(opinion of

Incentives can be employed to

encourage such tranfers, such as the creation
of magnet schools - especially in the inner
city - that provide extraordinary educational
benefits and state subsidization of those
schools that expand their minority
enrollments.

See,~,

Willie, Racial

Balance or Quality Education?, in School
Desegregation, Shadow and Substance (Levinsohn
and Wright eds. 1976).

These and like plans,

if adopted voluntarily by States, also could
counter the effects of racial imbalances
between school districts that are beyond the

1 3.

reach of judicial correction.

See

Milliken · !~

cf. Coleman, 7 Human Rights 10, supra, at 4849.4

Professional educators no doubt can

devise other constructive approaches to the
furthering of ethnic and racial diversity in
public schools.
The point is a simple one, although
its implementation requires community and
government support:

Integrated schools, to

survive and succeed as such, must be made
attractive to parents who frequently have the
freedom to choose where their children will
attend school.

The converse is equally plain:

Treating integration as a burden to be forced
by court decree upon parents and children to
atone for past societal wrongs by earlier
generations is doomed to failure.
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Mr; · Justice Powell, dissenting.
I fully agree with the views expressed in the
dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and I join it.
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6 ~.-e..~s

+~e- flaws

h'\

+1e-

I

1

write separately to ~ elaborate on ~ifiat I pe£-ee-ive to be the
illegitimate premises of the decisions affirmed by the Court
today.
I

As a matter of constitutional law, the Court's decision
in these two cases marks a break with both precedent and

.------------------ - - - - - - principle.

The Court indulges the courts below in stringing

together a chain of so-called presumptions, none of which is
likely enough as a general matter to be considered

reasonable~

.that- produce -t-he--re-sui L a f hoid ing- -a--~3-ei:l-:b----,l!:H~~l--l~arJ::L----Ic::

-Fe'S-r-o--n:-sc-b-+e:--CffiTH!i~u;..l~..l.O~I...I.-O~-.L-J.-a£r.:t:-e A fo-r

___s:2..L

under ::it.s juri 50-iG-t-ion-o--

--a-li-racicri-±nrba!"ance in the s-Ghools c:_:-·

This decison undermines our holding two

Terms ago in Dayton v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), and
wrenches out of context our much more limited opinion in Keyes
v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).

In effect a

special rule has been crafted for school cases, reversing the
general principle that the person claiming a constitutional
violation, and not the State, must bear the burden of persuading
the trier of fact that he has been harmed by intentional
discrimination.

u.s.

See, e.g., Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,

(1979).

_ _ _Q__

IL is cleat that the District Court in No. 78-610, and
the Court of Appeals in both of these cases, have created an

tftf>
------------~ extraordinary

legal fiction in order to achieve"' .a des ired

) L\ .-,, 1\~

result.

+~e.-..e..

/ o.,._jex""

2nd

fre.S.<l.'M.f'-Lo"Sl

_::___::.

c:.ov.,....-h.

~ithout any direct evidentiary support, thet

5olet_y
school officials

~Rgtllarly Aresponsible

for

*e.t
~

racial

distribution of students in these large urban school systems. 1

t~ tiS
~ ~effect ~hese

court~have

1

fa c..J-... aIJ

the ~question

begged

whether

segregation in these schools can be attributed to the actions of
these defendants, see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 402 U.S. 1, 22-23 ( 1971

)!t and instead have

he~

•
school syst-€m-as pawn for t tre-larger goal nf ac hlev 1ng-raci-crt-S<.._
_/

integration th-r:-e-ugoout each systeitH

The cold statistics of

racial balance have become for these courts the sole criterion

l C..o ~sf,-fvf,o>1a.!,fp
for assesssing the~ validity of these educational systems, and a

1

dtst'on~y

~-

re.\/ealed.

~~

f-h,of:.e

'S+,S!.-t,stiC...S,

constitutional violation has been fabricated to match t ~
By refusing to reverse these decisions and to
remand for findings of the actual degree of segregation
attributable to these defendants, the Court permits a
( po.re.f\"t )

tra~ucen~const1tut1onal

veneer to be applied to what is naked

social engineering.
II
Not only do the decisions of the courts below torture

al-so
legal principle to achieve

~rticula~A

social ends, but they "-

evince the problems that can be expected when courts substitute
sociology for jurisprudence.

Holding these petitioners

responsible for all of the segregation in the Dayton and
Columbus school systems leads directly to the dangerous illusion
that they actually are capable of bringing about desegregation
in these schools.

The foreseeable result of the rulings

affirmed today, which fully reflect this illusion, is
exacerbation of the fundamental racial problems which the
federal judiciary has a special

~confront.

mjssi~~ to

Increased

racial tension, decreased educational opportunities for racial
minorities, and, ultimately, greater segregation than before are
the predictable, if not inevitable, effects of these decrees.
The orders affirmed today require a massive
reorganization of both

school ~tems,

including the forced

·.

busing of thousands of students and the reassignment of many
more.

This wholesale substitution of judicial decisionmaking

for the judgments of professional educators and elected
officials derogates the entire process of public education.
Moreover, it constitutes a substantial interference with the
private decisions of parents as to how their children will be
educated.

But such imposition is the inevitable byproduct of a

'C£oco~ s ~'"' 1
judicial approach that 14gnores tb~particular characteristics of ~

,e_±-=0

\ o. do

~uni_ty and its school system in favor oiJ a single-minded

cc:::

focus on racial balance.
~ unfortuftaeel~ 7

it is increasingly

=

of courts seelting to administer desegregation decrees
that this sort of judicial imposition is self-defeating.
Parents, unlike school officials, are not bound by such decrees
and may frustrate them through the simple expedient of

withdrawing their children from the ; ffected

school~n

spite

of the substantial costs involved in relocation or private
education, it is evident that many parents view these
alternatives as preferable to submitting their children to
court-run school systems.

In the words of a leading authority,

~

"An implication that should have been seen all
along but can no longer be ignored is that a
child's enrollment in a given public school is not
determined by a governmental decision alone.

It

is a joint result of a governmental decision (the
making of school assignments) and parental
decisions, whether to remain in the same
residential location, whether to sent their child
to a private school, or which school district to
move into when moving into a metropolitan area.
The fact that the child's enrollment is a result
of two decisions operating jointly means that
government policies must, to be effective,
anticipate parental decisions and obtain the
parents' active cooperation in implementing school
policies."

Coleman, New Incentives for

Desegregation, 7 Human Rights 10, 13 (1978).
At least where inner-city populations comprise a large
proportion of racial minorities and surrounding suburbs
remain white, conditions that exist in most large American
cities, the demonstrated effect of compulsory integration
is a substantial exodus of whites from the system.

~

Coleman, S. Kelly, and J. Moore, Trends in School
Segregation, 1968-1973, at 66, 76-77 (1975).

It would be

unfair and misleading to attribute this phenomenon to a
racist response to integration per se.

A reaction to the

frustration of professional and local control that occurs
when courts go into the business of running school systems
is at least as likely an explanation of this exodus.

Nor is resegregation the only negative effect of
court-coerced integration.

Public schools depend on

community support for their effectiveness.

When

substantial elements of the community are driven to abandon
these schools, their quality inevitably declines.

Members

of minority groups, who have relied especially on education
as a means of advancing
~

themselve~

qu~

gver thQ past

also are likely to react to this decline in

quality by removing their children from public schools.2
As a result, public school enrollment increasingly will

+~~+
become limited to children from families whichAeither lack
the resources to obtain any alternative or are indifferent
to the quality of education.

The net effect is an overall

deterioration in public education, the very national
resource that traditionally has made this country a land of
opportunity for diverse ethnic and racial groups.
Keyes v. Independent School District No. 1, 413
250 (1973)

See

u.s.

189,

(opinion of Powell, J.).

In short, a very real danger exists that the
attempts of the courts below to bring about racial balance
throughout the Columbus and Dayton school systems will be
both futile and destructive.

No justification for running

these risks has been offered here.

These are not cases

where local authorities have sought to segregate schools at
any cost, displaying indifference to the educational needs
of the children under their responsibility.
~ounty

School · Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964):

358 U.S. 1 (1958):
483 (1954):

Cf. Griffin v.
Cooper v. Aaron,

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.

Wilkinson, The Supreme Court and Southern

School Desegregation, 1955-1970:
64 Va. L. Rev. 485 (1978).

A History and Analysis,

Aside from a few regrettable

episodes of no substantial impact, petitioners have been
guilty only of failing to respond vigorously to a form of

~

segregation caused by forces entirely outside their
control.

This failure alone has never been enouqh to

constitute a constitutional violation under our decisions,
Dayton v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977):

Pasadena City

Board of Educatation v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976):
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974):

Swann v.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board · of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971), and does not demonstrate the kind of
irresponsibility that can justify wholesale substitution of
judicial authority.

In sum, the decrees approved today

present the dangers associated with a desperate, last-ditch
attempt to stave off an impending disaster, without any
evidence that last-resort measures are needed or that a
disaster is pending.

It has become a commonplace that racial
segregation is a pervasive national problem, not a regional
phenomenon.

See Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S.

189, 217-236 (1973)

(opinion of Powell, J.).

The necessary

solution also must be national in scope, and cannot rest
solely on the shoulders of the federal judiciary.

To be

enduring, racial integration must be accomplished through a
process of accommodation and cooperation.

There are limits

to what judicial fiat can accomplish, as our experience
with school desegregation illustrates.
Limited judicial capabilities do not mean
impotence.

That the public schools of Dayton and Columbus

are not integrated is indisputable.

That school officials

in these two cities may have some limited responsibility
for the present racial distribution of the student
populations is possible.3

To the extent these officials

have contributed to the problem, the courts below have a
duty to compel them to undo the effects of their unlawful
action.

Beyond this, these courts have a role to play in

encouraging these officials to find effective means of
counteracting the diverse social forces that have led to
the substantial racial imbalance present in these schools.
At this point, however, courts can only be supportive of

good faith efforts to promote integration;

their coercive

powers become useless.
It is too late in the day to regard genuine,
durable integration as an unachievable goal for the public
schools.
end;

Various means have been suggested to further this

our prior opinions have not been silent on the

ik ~\:matter.

In Swann,

~L

remarked:

"An optional majority-to-minority transfer
provision has long been recognized as a useful
part of every desegregation plan.

Provision for

optional tranfer of those in the majority racial
group of a particular school to other schools
where they will be in the minority [or less in the
majority] is an indispensable remedy for those
students willing to tranfer to other schools in
order to lessen the impact on them of the stateimposed stigma of segregation.

In order to be

effective, such a tranfer arrangement must grant
the tranferring student free transportation and
space must be made available in the school to
which he desires to move."

402

u.s.,

at 26-27.

See also Keyes, supra, at 240-241 (opinion of Powell, J.).
Incentives can be employed to encourage such tranfers, such
as the creation of magnet schools

~

~ 'r"\3

provid

{

extraordinary educational benefits and state subsidization
of those schools that expand their minority enrollments.
See, e.g., Willie, Racial Balance or Quality Education?, in

School Desegregation, Shadow and Substance (Levinsohn and
Wright eds. 1976).

These plans, if adopted voluntarily by

States, could also counter the effects of racial imbalances
between school districts that are manifestly beyond the
reach of judicial correction.
10, supra, at 48-49.4

See Coleman, 7 Human Rights

Professional educators no doubt can

devise other approaches.

The point is a simple one,
I

although its implementation complex:

Integrated schools,

to succeed, must be made attractive to parents who have the
freedom to choose where their children will attend school.
The converse is equally plain:

Treating integration as a

burden to be placed on parents and children to atone for
past societal wrongs is doomed to failure.
III
is unclear to me, as it is to MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST,
whether the Court today is endorsing the incredible fabric
of presumptions erected by the courts below, or merely is
adopting a posture of extraordinary deference to lower
courts in busing cases.

Whichever of these interpretations

is correct, I regret that the Court has abandoned its
paramount role in supervising the orderly realization of
the constitutional principles announced in Brown.
Accordingly, I dissent.

FN1.

1.

It has long been realized that residential patterns are

responsible for much if not most of the racial imbalance in
present-day urban school systems.

See Farley, Residential

Segregation and Its Implications for School Integration, 39
L. & Contemp. Probs. 164 (1975);

Ne~es in Cities (1965).

K. Taeuber & A. Taeuber,

The courts below did not find

that Dayton or Columbus were any different in this respect;
rather, they treated the fact of residential seqregation as
irrelevant.

See post, at

& n. 24 (REHNQUIST, J.,

dissenting).
2.

Academic debate has grown as to the degree of

educational benefit realized by children due to
integration.

See R. Crain & R. Mahard, The Influence of

High School Racial Composition on Black College Attendance
and Test Performance (1978);

Coleman, New Incentives for

Desegregation, 7 Human Rights 10 (1978);

Weinberg, The

Relationship Between School Desegregation and Academic
Achievement:

A Review of the Research, 39 L. &. Contemp.

Probs. 240 (1975).
beside the point.

Much of the dispute seems somewhat
Whatever educational benefits afforded

minority children through attendance at majority schools-and at least some evidence indicates these benefits can be
substantial--

will be compromised if the actual method

FN2.

used to compel integration is destructive of school
quality.

Cf. St. John, School Desegregation Outcomes for

Chidren (1975).
3.

The District Court in No. 78-627 found that although

school officials had engaged in several intentionally
discriminatory acts, none of these actions had caused any
of the lack of integration currently existing in the Dayton
school system.

Because of the distorted burden-shifting

rules applied by the Court of Appeals, it has not yet had
an opportunity to review this finding under normal
sufficiency-of-the-evidence principles.

Similarly, the

District Court and Court of Appeals in No. 78-610, in
ruling that school officials were responsible for all of
the lack of integration in the Columbus system, also
applied presumptions that improperly shifted their focus
from the relevant inquiry.

It is at least conceivable that

more conventional evidentiary rules still might lead to
findings in each of these cases that racial discrimination
by school officials caused some amount of segregation in
these schools.

+~~
4.

One such State Lhas implemented a system of subsidized

intra- and inter-district majority-to-minority transfers is
Wisconsin.

1975 Laws of Wisconsin ch. 220, codified at

FN3.

Wise. Stat. Ann. 121.85.

Although it is too early to

determine whether this experiment in voluntary integration
has been successful, the contrast with the massive coercion
undertaken by the courts below is striking.

See also

Meadows, Open Enrollment and Fiscal Incentives, in School
Desegregation, Shadow and Substance (Levinsohn and Wright
eds. 1976).
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I join the dissenting opinion~of MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST
and write separately to emphasize several points.

The Court's

opinion in these two cases is profoundly disturbing.

It appears

to endorse a wholly new constitutional concept applicable to
school cases.

The opinion also seems remarkably insensitive to

the now widely accepted view that) a quarter of a century after
Brown, the federal judiciary should be limiting rather than
expanding the extent to which courts are operating the public
school systems of our country.

In expressing these views, I

recognize, of course, that my Brothers who have joined the
Court's opinion are motivated by purposes and ideals that few
would question.

My dissent is based on a conviction that the

Court's opinion creates bad constitutional law and will be even
worse for public education - an element of American life that is
essential, especially for minority children.
I

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent demonstrates that the
Court's decision marks a break with both precedent and
principle.

The Court indulges the courts below in their

2.

stringing together of a chain of "presumptions", not one of ·
which is close enough to reality to be reasonable.

This chain

leads inexorably to the remarkable conclusion that the absence
of integration found to exist in a high percentage of the 241
schools in Columbus and Dayton was caused entirely by
intentional violations of the Fourteenth Amenoment by the school
boards of these two cities.

Although this conclusion is tainted

on its face, is not supported by evidence in either case, and as
a general matter seems incredible, the courts below accepted it
as the necessary predicate for requiring as a matter of
constitutional - law a systemwide remedy prescribing racial
~

balance in each and every school.
There are unintegrated schools in every major urban
area in the country that contains a substantial minority
population.

This condition results primarily from familiar

segregated housing patterns, which - in turn - are caused by
social,

~conomic

and demographic forces for which no school

board is responsible.l/ r These indisputable facts were ignored
by the courts below, which relied instead upon fictions and

(~

presumptions that repeatedly have been rejected in other
Fourteenth Amendment cases.
v.

Feene~,

__-_-

u.s._-_-_-

See, e.g., Personnel Administrator

(1979);

Arlington Heights v.

Metro£olitan Housing Development Corp., 429

.

Washingt~n

'

v. Davis, 426

u.s.

229 (1976).

u.s.

252 (1977);

1

The type of state-enforced segregation that Brown
properly condemned no longer exists in this country.

This is

not to say that school boards - particularly in the great cities

'\

~

3.

of the North, Midwest, and Weat - are taking all reasonable
measures to provide integrated educational opportunities.

As I

indicated in my separate opinion in Kex.e,s . v. School District No.
.!,r 413

u.s.

189, 223-236 (1973), de facto segregation has

existed on a large scale in many of these cities, and often it
is indistinguishable in effect from the type of de jure
segregation outlawed by Brown.

Where there is proof of

intentional segregative action or inaction, the federal courts
must act, but their remedies should not exceed the scope of the
constitutional violation.

Dayton v. Brinkman, 433

u.s.

406

( 1977): . Au§!t;in Independent School -Di,strict v. United States,
429

u.s.

990, 991 (1976)

(Powell, J., concurring):

City - Board of Education v. Spangler, 427
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974):
Mecklenburg Board - of Education, 402

u.s.

u.s.

Pasadena

424 (1976):

_________

_...._
Swann v. Charlotte-

1, 16 (1971).

System-

wide remedies such as were ordered by the courts below, and
today approved by this Court, lack any principled basis when the
absence of integration in all schools cannot reasonably be
attributed to discriminatory conduct.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist has dealt devastatingly with the
way in which the courts below endowed prior precedents with new
and wonderous meanings.

I can add little to what he has said.

I therefore move to more general but, in my view, important
considerations that the Court

Holding the school boa~ds of these two cities
responsible for all of the segregation in the Dayton and

4.

Columbus systems and prescribing fixed racial ratios in every
school as the constitutionally required remedy necessarily
implies a belief that the same school boards - under court
supervision - will be capable of bringing about and maintaining
the desired racial balance in each of these schools.

The

experience in city after _ city demonstrates that this is an
illusion.

The process of resegregation, stimulated by

resentment against judicial coercion and concern as to the
effect of court supervision of education, will follow today's
decisions as surely as it has in other cities subjected to
similar sweeping decrees.
The orders affirmed today typify intrusions on local
and professional authorities that affect adversely the quality
education.

They require an extensive reorganization of both
.

.

~~~~

school systems, including the reassignment of almost half of the
.....

96,000 students in the Columbus system and the busing of some
15,000 students in Dayton.

They also require reassignments of

teachers and other staff personnel, reorganization of grade
structures, and the closing of certain schools.

The orders

substantially dismantle and displace neighborhood schools in the
face of compelling economic and educational reasons for
preserving them.

This wholesale substitution of judicial

legislation for the judgments of elected officials and
professional educators derogates the entire process of public
education.~/

Moreover, it constitutes a serious interference

with the private decisions of parents as to how their children
will be educated.

These harmful consequences are the inevitable

('

5.

byproducts of a judicial

appr~ach

that ignores other relevant

factors in favor of an exclusive focus on racial balance in
every school.
These harmful consequences, moreover, in all likelihood

will provoke responses that will defeat the integrative purpose
of the courts• orders.

Parents, unlike school officials, are

not bound by these decrees and may frustrate them through the
simple expedient of withdrawing their children from a public
school system in which they have lost confidence.

In spite of

the substantial costs often involved in relocation of the family

.

.

. .aJ

.

or 1n resort to pr1vate educat1on, exper1ence

d

.
h
emonstrates t at

I\

5~
~

many parents view these alternatives as preferable to submitting

&~

their children to court-run school systems.

n/

In the words of a

leading authority:
"An implication that should have been seen all
along but can no longer be ignored is that a
child's enrollment in a given public school is not
determined by a governmental decision alone.
It
is a joint result of a governmental decision (the
making of school assignments) and parental
decisions, whether to remain in the same
residential location, whether to send their child
to a private school, or which school district to
move into when moving into a metropolitan area.
The fact that the child's enrollment is a result
of two decisions operating jointly means that
government policies must, to be effective,
anticipate parental decisions and obtain the
parents• active cooperation in implementing ~chool
policies." Coleman, New Incentives for
Desegregation, 7 Human Rights 10, 13 (1978).
At least where inner-city populations comprise a
large proportion of racial minorities and surrounding
suburbs remain white, conditions that exist in most large
American cities, the demonstrated effect of compulsory
integration is a substantial exodus of whites from the

6.

system.

See J. Coleman, S. K.elly, and J. Moore, Trends in

School Segregation, 1968-1973, at 66, 76-77 (1975).

It

would be unfair and misleading to attribute this phenomenon
to a racist response to integration per se.

It is at least

as likely that the exodus is in substantial part a natural
reaction to the displacement of professional and local
control that occurs when courts go into the business of
restructuring and operating school systems.
Nor will this resegregation be the only negative
effect of court-coerced integration on minority children.
Public schools depend on community support for their
effectiveness.

When substantial elements of the community

are driven to abandon these schools, their quality
~ 1-o
-~--~..:~...c.-c- ~~.
A i~ declines
Members of minority ~roups, who have
relied especially on education as a means of advancing
themselves, also are likely to react to this decline in
quality by removing their children from public schools. )'i
As a result, public school enrollment increasingly will
become limited to children from families that either lack
the resources to choose alternatives or are indifferent to
the quality of education.

The net effect is an overall

deterioration in public education, the one national
resource that traditionally has made this country a land of
opportunity for diverse ethnic and racial groups.
Keyes, supra, at 250 (opinion of Powell, J.).

See

7.

If public education is not to suffer further, we
must "return to a more balanced evaluation of the
recognized interests of our society in achieving
desegregation with other educational and societal interests
a community may legitimately assert".

~'

at 253.

The

ultimate goal is to have quality school systems in which
racial discrimination is neither practiced nor tolerated.
It has been thought that ethnic and racial diversity in the
classroom is a desirable component of sound education in
our country of diverse populations, a view to which I
subscribe.

The question that courts in their single-minded

pursuit of racial balance seem to ignore, is how best to
move toward this goal.
For a decade or more after Brown, the courts
properly focused on dismantling segregated school systems
as a means of eliminating state-imposed discrimination and
furthering wholesome diversity in the schools. K/
Experience in recent years, however, has cast serious doubt
upon the efficacy of far-reaching judicial remedies
directed not against specific constitutional violations,
but rather imposed on an entir~ school system on the
fictional assumption that the existence of identifiable
black or white schools is caused entirely by intentional
segregative conduct, and is evidence of system-wide
discrimination.

In my

view ~~w
1\

led by this

Court - are pursuing a path away from rather than toward
the desired goal.

~-

8.

While these courts conscientiously view their
judgments as mandated by the Constitution {a view that
would have astonished constitutional scholars throughout
most of our history), the fact is that restructuring and
overseeing the operation of major public school systems · as ordered in these cases - fairly can be viewed as social
engine~ring that hardly is appropriat~ for the federal

judiciary.
The time has come for a thoughtful reexamination
of the proper limits of the role of courts in confronting
the intractable problems of public education in our complex
society.

Proved discrimination by state or local

aut~orities

should never be tolerated, and it is a first

responsibility of the judiciary not to tolerate it where it
has been proved.

But many courts have continued also to

impose wide-ranging judicial remedies, and to retain
continuing supervision over school systems. Local and state
legislative and administrative authorities have been
~

supplanted or relegated to initiative - stifftling roles as
missions of the courts.

Indeed, there is reason to believe

that legislative bodies often have welcomed judicial
activism with respect to a subject - so inherently
difficult and so politically sensitive - that the prospect
of others confronting its problems seems inviting.

Federal

courts no longer should encourage this deference by the
appropriate authorities - no matter how willing they may be
to defer.

Courts are the branch least competent to provide

9.

long-range solutions acceptable to the public and most
conducive to achieving both diversity in the classroom and
quality education.
School boards need not wait, and many have not
waited, for innovative legislative guidance • . The wide
ranging opinion of

th~

Court in Swann, though often cited

(as in this case) for views I think were never intended,
identified some constructive actions always open to school
authorities:
"An optional majority-to-minority transfer
provision has long been recognized as a useful
part of every desegregation plan. Provision for
optional tranfer of those in the majority racial
group of a particular school to other schools
where they will be in the minority [or less in the
majority] is an indispensable remedy for those
students willing to tranfer to other schools in
order to lessen the impact on them of the stateimposed stigma of segregation.
In order to be
effective, such a tranfer arrangement must grant
the tranferring student free transportation and
space must be made available in the school to / . (
which he desires to move." 402 u.s., at 26-27.
See also Keyes, supra, at 240-241 {opinion of Powell, J .).
Incentives can be employed to encourage these transfers,
such as creation of magnet schools providing special
educational benefits and state subsidization of those
schools that expand their minor-ity enrollments.

See, e . g.,

Willie, Racial Balance or Quality Education?, in School
Desegregation, Shadow and Substance {Levinsohn and Wright,
eds. 1976).

These and like plans, if adopted voluntarily

by States, also could help counter the effects of racial
imbalances between school districts that are beyond the
reach of judicial correction.

See Milliken

~Bradley,

/

1 0.

supra; cf. Coleman, 7 Human Rights 10, supra, at 48-49. /.51
~ After all, and in spite of what many view as excessive

government regulation, we are a free society - perhaps the
most free of any in the world.

Our people instinctively

resent coercion, and perhaps most of all when it affects
their children and the opportunities that only education
affords children.

It is now reasonably clear that the goal

of diversity that we call integration, if it is to be
lasting and conducive to quality education, must have the
support of parents who so frequently have the option to
choose where their children will attend sch~ L courts, of
course, should confront discrimination
to exist, but

~h~~n~~ be

authorities.

~,I.e~~~

wherever ~ it

is found

left with school

It is only through these

institutions, acting within the democratic processes and
~
ith community understanding and support, that the goal ~
J\

can be attained.

FN1.

1.

een recogn1ze

a..IA.o

resent-da

See t\Farley,

Residential Segregation and Its Implications for School
Integration, 39 L. & Contemp. Probs. 164 (1975);
Taeuber & A. Taeuber, Negroes

(1965).

K.
The courts

y

below

d ~·~B-IP.e.ll~...H~;;..&ii..s-.-r"1s-e;~G-t--;,~-:-'
-rcl__rtt~~~~ treated the fa e t;...
~ residential

~A/~~~~

segregation Aas irrelevant.

See post, at

& n. 24 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
2.

The defending of law suits that remain active for

years~

and complying with elaborate court decrees also divert the
time, attention, and resources of school authorities from

:"!

/d ... -_/. 1 0
~~Academic debate has ~ as to the degree of
.1\
~~~-~-s-~~J~.'
-,-~
~ educational benefit realized by- children '\d ue t o

.dvl

f)
~

education.

.

LA4-~

3.1\

I

integra~ion.

See R. Crain & R. Mahard, The Influence of

High School Racial Composition on Black College Attendance
and Test Performance (1978);

Co~eman,

New Incentives for

Desegregation, 7 Human Rights 10 (1978);

Weinberg, The

Relationship Between School Desegregation and Academic
Achievement:

A Review of the Research, 39 L. &. Contemp.

Probs. 240 (1975).

Much of the dispute seems beside the
~

point.

Whatever educational benefitsAafforded minority
~H(.~-~
.
children through attendance at Hwje = : ; schools-- and at
A

least some evidence indicates these benefits can be
substantial--

will be compromised if the actual method

FN2.

~ ~ ~~ ~ 1-tJ .t...._
used to compel integration is destructive of school
quality.

"'

Cf. St. John, School Desegregation Outcomes for

Children (1975).
~ ~.

During this period the issues confronted by the courts

by and large involved combatting the devices by which
States deliberately perpetuated dual school systems and
dismantling segregated systems in small, rural areas.
E;g., Green v. County School - Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968);
Griffin v. School - Board, 377

u.s.

218 (1964);

Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963);
358

u.s ..

1 (1958).

Goss v.

Cooper v. Aaron,

See Wilkinson, The Supreme Court and

Southern School Desegregation, 1955-1970:
Analysis, 64 Va. L. Rev. 485 (1978).

A History and

This Court did not

begin to face the difficult administrative and social
problems associated with de facto segregation in large
urban school systems until Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).

It is especially

unfortunate that the Court today refuses to acknowledge
these problems and chooses instead to sanction methods
that, although often appropriate and salutary in the
earlier context, are disruptive and counterproductive in
school systems like those in Columbus and Dayton.
5.

Wisconsin has implemented a system of subsidized intra-

and inter-district majority-to-minority transfers.

1975

Laws of Wisconsin ch. 220, codified at Wise. Stat. Ann.
121.85.

One need not endorse this experiment, as it is too

early to determine whether its objective of encouraging

FN3.

·substantial integration will be attained successfully.

But

it is the sort of effort that should be considered by state
and local officials and elected bodies.

The contrast

between the underlying philosophy of the Wisconsin plan and
the massive coercion undertaken by the courts below is
striking.

See Meadows, Open Enrollment and Fiscal

Incentives, in School Desegregation, Shadow and Substance
(Levinsohn and Wright eds. 1976).
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Rider A, pq. 7 Columbus ~

------While these courts conscientiously view their
judgments as mandated by the consitution (a view that would
have astonished constitutional scholars throughout most of
our history), the fact is that restructuring and overseeing
the operation of major public school systems - as ordered in
these cases - fairly can be viewed as social engineering that
hardly is appropriate for the federal judiciary.
The time has come for a thoughtful reexamination of
the proper limits of the role of courts in confronting the
intractable problems of public education in our complex
society.

Proved discrimination by state or local authorities

should never be tolerated, and it is a first responsibility
of the judiciary not to tolerate it where it has been proved.
But many courts have continued also to impose wide-ranging
judicial remedies, and to retain continuing supervision over
school systems. Local and state legislative and
administrative authority have been supplanted or relegated to
initiative stiffling roles as missions of the courts.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that legislative bodies
often have welcomed judicial activism with respect to a
subject - so inherently difficult and so politically
sensitive - that elected officials would prefer for others to
confront its problems.

Federal courts no longer should

2.

encourage this deference by the appropriate authorities - no
matter how willing they may be to defer.

Courts are the

branch least competent to provide long-range solutions
acceptable to the public and most conducive to achieving the
both diversity in the classroom and quality education.
In at least one state, legislation has been enacted
in furtherance of a system of subsidized intra- and interdistrict majority-to-minority transfers.

See 1975 laws of

Wisconsin, Chapter 220, codified at Wise. Stat. Ann. 121.85.
One need not endorse the Wisconsin experiment, as it is too
early to determine whether its objective of encouraging
substantial voluntary integration will be attained
successful.

But it is the sort of effort that should be

considered by state and local officials and elected bodies.
The contrast between the underlying philosophy of the
Wisconsin plan and the inherently coercive character of court
ordered systemwide inteqration is strikinq.

See Meade!!,

Open Enrollment and Fiscal Incentives, in School
Desegregation, Shadow and Substance (Levinsohn and Wright,
eds. 1976).
School boards need not wait, and many have not
waited, for innovative legislative guidance.

The wide

ranging opinion of the Court in Swann, though often cited (as
in this case) for views I think were never intended,

.

~

3.

identified some constructive actions always open to school
authorities:

(Paul:

here pick up your quote at the bottom

of page 7.)

See also Keyes, supra, at 240-241 (opinion of Powell, Jr.).
Incentives can be employed to encourage these transfers, such
as creation of maqnet schools providing special educational

.'

benefits and state subsidization of those schools that expand
their minority enrollments.

See,

~,

Willie, Racial

'•.

Balance or Quality Education?, in School Desegregation,
Shadow and Substance (Levinsohn and Wright, eds. 1976).
These and like plans, if adopted voluntarily by States, also
could help counter the effects of racial imbalances between
school districts that are beyond the reach of judicial
correction.

See Milliken v. Bradley, supra: cf. Coleman, 7

Human Rights 10, supra, at 48-49.

!/

After all, and in spite of what many view as
excessive government regulation, we are a free society
perhaps the most free of any in the world.

Our people

instinctively resent coercion, and perhaps most of all when
it affects their children and the opportunities that only
education affords children.

It is now reasonably clear that

.
·'•

4.

the goal of diversity that we call integration, if it is to
be lasting and conducive to quality education, must have the
support of parents who so frequently have the option to
choose where their children will attend school.

'•.

.. ,

Courts, of

course, should confront discrimination wherever it is found
to exist, but the continuing role must be left with school
and public authorities.

It is only they, acting within the

democratic processes and with community understanding and
support, that the goal I have described can be attained.

·,

LFP/lab
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Rider A, pg. 1 .

This chain leads inexorably to the remarkable conclusion that
all of the absence of inteqration found to exist in a high
I

percentage of the .241 schools in Columbus and Dayton was
caused by intentional violations of the Fourteenth Amendment
by the school boards of these two cities.

Although this

conclusion is tairited on its face, is not supported by .
evidence in either case, and as a qP.neral matter no one would
believe it, the courts below (the Court of Appeals in both
cases and the District Court in Columbus) moved grandly to
the further conclusion that there were "systemwide
violations" requirinq as a matter of constitutional law a
systemwide remedy mandating a ratio of racial balance in each
and every school.

lfp/ss

6/23/79

Rider, fn

(Columbus)

Consider adding a footnote along the following lines:

In my concurring opinion in Keyes, I suqgested the
importance of identifying the constitutional right that is
asserted in school desegregation cases.

The Court's

decisions have hardly been lucid on this point.

In Brown II

the Court identified the "fundamental principle" enunciated
in Brown I as being the unconstitutionality "of racial
discrimination in public education."

349

u.s.

at 298.

I

undertook to define the right, derived from the Equal
Protection Clause, as to attend an "integregated school
system", a system in which the school authoritiesconsistently with the educational qoal of quality education must make and implement their customary decisions with a view
toward enhancing integrated school opportunities.

I also

.•..
~

2.

noted that an inteqrated system does not mean that "every
school must in fact be an integrated unit

<!2·,

at ___l, and

emphasized that the Eaual Protection Clause "does not require
the school authorities to undertake widespread student
transportation solely for the sake of maximizing
inteqration".

Id., at

•

When challenged, the school

authorities must show that in fact they were operating an
integrated system in the foregoing sense.

This is quite

different from the burden imposed upon the school authorities
by the Courts of Appeals in these cases, and accepted by the
Court today, of showing that there had been an affirmative
duty on the school authorities since 1954 to eliminate every
racially identifiable school "root and branch", and that the
burden was on such authorities to prove that they had
discharqed that duty.

L ...

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 2 (Columbus)

These causes of the greater part of the school
segregation problem are not newly discovered.

Nearly a

decade ago, Professor Bickel worte:

"In most the larger urban areas, demographic
conditions are such that no policy that a court can
order, and a school board, a city or even a state
has the capability to put into effect, will in fact
result in the foreseeable in racially balanced
public schools. Only a reordering of the
environment involving economic and social policy on
the broadest conceivable front might have an
appreciable impact."
Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of
Proaress, n. 7, at 132 (1970)."
Federal courts, including this Court today, continue to
ignore these indisputable facts.

Relying upon fictions and

presumptions in school cases that undercut established
principles of equal protection law in all other cases (that
place the burden of proving intentional discrimination upon
parties who assert it,[ see, e.g., Personnel Administrator v •
Feeney,

u.s.

(1979): Arlington Heights v.

Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
Washington v. Davis, 426

u.s.

229 (1976).]

u.s.

•
252 (1977)1

Federal courts

>·

=-·· '
'i'•.

I

2.

prescribe system-wide remedies and implement them by
extensive transportation decress.

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 10 (Columbus)

Courts, of course, should confront discrimination wherever it
is found to exist.

But they should recoqnize limitations on

judicial action inherent in our system and also the limits of
effective judicial power.

The primary and continuing

responsibility for public education, including the bringing
about and maintaining of desired diversity, must be left with
school and public authorities.

lfp/ss

6/23/79

Rider FNl (Columbus)

Add a footnote, keyed to the indicated sentence on page 5,
along the following lines:

A third alternative is available to parents moving
for the first time into a metropolitan area where a school
district is operatinq under a "system-wide remedy" decree.
To avoid the probability of their children being bused away
from neighborhood schools, and in view of the widely held
belief that schools under a court decree are likely to be
inferior, these parent seeks residences beyond the urban
school district.

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 2 (Columbus)

These causes of the greater part of the school
segregation problem are not newly discovered.

Nearly a

decade ago, Professor Bickel worte:

"In roost of the larger urban areas, demographic
conditions are such that no policy that a court can
order, and a school board, a city or even a state
has the capability to put into effect, will in fact
result in the foreseeable future in racially
balanced public schools. Only a reordering of the
environment involving economic and social policy on
the broadest conceivable front might have an
appreciable impact."
Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of
Progress, n. 7, at 132 (1970)."
Federal courts, including this Court today, continue to
ignore these indisputable facts.

Relying upon fictions and

presumptions in school cases that are irreconcilable with
principles of equal protection law applied in all other cases
(that place the burden of proving intentional discrimination
upon parties who assert it [see, e.g., Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney,

u.s.

-

(1979)~

Arlington
.

Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
252

(1977)~

Washington v . Davis, 426

u.s.

u.s.

229 (1976)),

·:.,

2.

federal courts prescribe system-wide remedies without
relation to the causes of the segreqation found to exist, and
implement their decrees by requirinq extensive transportation
of children of all school ages.

'

.

lfp/ss
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MEMORANDUM
Eric and Paul

DATE: 6/25/1979

Powell, Jr • .,
Columbus and Dayton
Before the above cases come down (which could be as
early as Wednesday) I would appreciate it if each of you
''

would review our opinion once more.

• .. •

r

'•

I have two concerns in mind.
As a southerner and former school board chairman, I
have tried to keep a low profile in the desegregation cases
'r-,

except for stating my basic views in Keyes.

As my views are

so different from those of the NAACP, it is predictable that
sooner or later I will be blasted for alleged "racist" views.
During the turbulent desegregation period in Virginia, I was
viewed with more than a little suspicion as beinq "liberal"
on the race issue.

The fact is that I believe firmly - as my

Bakke opinion suggests - in the merit of diversity in the
classrooms of our schools, colleges and unversities.

''

~·

My second concern is whether my interest in public

..

education unduly colors my reaction to the Court's position

''

that system-wide remedies implemented by busing, are required

:~

t

by the Constitution.
My duty here is to decide questions according to my
independent judgment of the law.

Yet, at this level and

under our system, the Supreme Court often is a policy making

.

•'.

'•

2.

branch of government.
not purely legal.

Thus our judgments all too often are

Bearinq this in mind, I do not want any

personal predilections that

I

may have to lead me into making

unsound judgments or writing dissenting opinions that

I ,:',,

' ..

students of the Courtwill view as reflectinq bias or

I

But

I

.

"·

prejudice.
do not mind criticism.

That goes with my "job".

do want to be a detached and principled judge.

Thus,

.....
I

feel rather stronqly that the views expressed in my Columbus
and Dayton dissent are sound and principled. But

I

particularly like your final check of the language

would
I

have

'

used.

L.F.P., Jr.

.

'
.

• I

.'

ss
.~ ,.

···
'

'

..

i

'..

. ''

\o.. ·-
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Bruce, David, Eric and Paul

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: 6/25/1979

Columbus and Dayton
Before the above cases come down (which could be as
early as Wednesday) I would appreciate it if each of you
would review our opinion once more.
I have two concerns in mind.

.•'

As a southerner and former school board chairman, I

,'•

have tried to keep a low profile in the desegregation cases except for stating my basic views in Keyes.

As my views are

so different from those of the NAACP, it is predictable that

.·

sooner or later I will be blasted for alleged "racist" views.
During the turbulent desegregation period in Virginia, I was
viewed with more than a little suspicion as being "liberal"
on the race issue.
Ba~

The fact is that I believe firmly - as my

opinion suggests - in the merit of diversity in the

classrooms of our schools, colleges and unversities.
My second concern is whether my interest in public
education unduly colors my reaction to the Court's position
that system-wide remedies implemented by busing, are required

.

'

by the Constitution.
My duty here is to decide questions according to my
independent judgment of the law.

Yet, at this level and

under our system, the Supreme Court often is a policy making

'·'
'•'

.
.,,

'\•.

I

2.

branch of government.
not purely legal.

Thus our judgments all too often are

Bearing this in mind, I do not want any

personal predilections that I may have to lead me into making
unsound judgments or writing dissenting opinions that
students of the Courylw ill view as reflecting bias or
prejudice.
I

do not mind criticism.

That goes with my "job".

But I do want to be a detached and principled judge.

Thus, I

feel rather strongly that the views expressed in my Columbus
and Dayton dissent are sound and principled. But I would
particularly like your final check of the language I have
used.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

·fp/ss

6/25/79

Rider X, fn

(Columbus)

~ In his opinion in this case, Mr. Justice

.

~ the rationality of the basic

Stewart ~ reJect~

presumption relied upon by the Court of

$:,

Appea~ ~

much has changed in the 25 years since

Br~,

'·'

he "simply

cannot accept the shift in the ligitative burden of proof"
'•

adopted by the Court of Appeals and apparently accepted without any consideration of its current reasonableness - by
this Court.

Ante, at

,

~~,~~
s~~ vu-w-~~~~

J

,

~1-e.,L ~~ ~2-,r- ~ ~·e

~~
,

-

~
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__I

(Columbus)

In his opinion in this case, Mr. Justice

Stewart, in rejecting the rationality of the basic
presumption relied upon by the Court of Appeals stated that
~-·

so much has changed in the 25 years since Brown, he "simply
I,

cannot accept the shift in the ligitative burden of proof"
adopted by the Court of Appeals and apparently accepted .,._

without any consideration of its current reasonableness - by
this Court.

~'

at

___ ----·
,

'·'" .

.~....

1

'\>

1•
:+:. I.~.

•

'I

!

>r_:' .

•.

~!
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et al Petitioners
On Writ of Certiorari to th.e
'
United States Court of Ap.,
v. . k
peals for the Sixth Circuit,
·
Gary L . Pemc et a1.
[May - , 1979]
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The public schools of Columbus, Ohio, are highly segregated
by race. In 1976. over 32 % of the 96,000 students in the system were black. About 70 % of all students attended schools
that were at least 80% black or 80% white. 429 F. Supp. 229,
240 (SD Ohio 1977). Half of the 172 schools were 90%
black or 907c white. 583 F. 2d 787, 800 (CA6 1978). Fourteen named students in the Columbus school system brought
this case on June 21 , 1973, against the Columbus Board of
Education, the State Board of Education, and the appropriate
local and state officials. 1 The second amended complaint,
filed on October 24, 1974, charged that the Columbus defendants had pursued a.nd were pursuing a course of conduct having the purpose and effect of causing and perpetuating the
segregation in the public schools, contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment. A declaratory judgment to this effect and
appropriate injunctive relief were prayed. Trial of the case
began a year later, consumed 36 trial days, produced a record
containing over 600 exhibits and a transcript in excess of 6,600
pages, and was completed in June 1976. Final arguments
1

A similar group of plaintiffs was allowrd to intervenr, and the original
plaintifTl:i were allowed to file an amendrd complaint that was certified as a
class action . 429 F. Supp. 229, 233-234 (SD Ohio 1977) ; App. 50.
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were heard in September, ttnd in March 1977
the Distdct
.
. I
Court filed an opinion and order containing its· findings' of
fact and conclusions of law. 429 F. Supp. 229.
The trial court summarized its findings:
"From the evidence adduced at trial, the Court has
found earlier in this opinion that the Columbus Public
Schools were openly and intentionally segregated on the
basis of race when Brown [v. Board of Edueation (/}~
347 U. S. 488,] w.as decided in 1954. The Court has
I~mnd that the Columbus Board of Education never a·c~
tively set out to dismantle this dual system. The Court
has fouud that until legal action was initiated by the
Columbus Area Civil Rights Council, the Columbus
Board did not assign teachers and administrators to C~:
lumbus schools at r11ndom, without regard for the racial
cemposition ~f the 'studenf; enrollment ~t those scho~is:
The Columbus Boar.9 even in very recent ~imes: .. h~ a_P,:c
proved optional attendanc~ zones, discontiguous attend~
!1-nce areas and boundary cp~nges which h~ve maintaineq
and enhanced racial imbal~;tnce in the Columbus Public
Schools. The Board, even in very recent times and aftep
promising to do otherwise, has adjurerJ [sic] workable ~ug,..
gestions for improving the racial balance of city schools.
" Viewed in the context of segregative optionttl attend,
ance zones, segregative faculty and administrative hiring
and assignments, and other such actions and decisions of
the Columbus Board of Education in recent and remote
history, it is fair and reasonable to draw an inference of
segregative intent from the Board's actions and omission
discussed in this opinion." I d., at 260-261.
The District Court's ultimate conclusion was that at the
time of trial the racial segregation in the Columbus school_
system "directly resulted from [the Board's] intentional segregatiy~ acts a11d orpissions," id., at 259, in viol11;tion of the
1
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Ahlendment. Ac-
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cordingly, judgment was entered against the local and state
defendants enjoining them from continuing to discriminate on
the basis of race in operating the Columbus public schools and
ordering the submission of a systemwide desegregation plan.
Following decision by this Court in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (!), 433 U. S. 406, in June 1977, and in
response to a motion by the Columbus Board, the District
Court rejected the argument that Dayton I required or permitted any modification of its findings or judgment. It reiterated its conclusion that the Board's " 'liability in this case
concerns the Columbus School District as a whole,'" Pet. App.
94, quoting 429 F. Supp., at 266, asserting that, although it
had "no real interest in any remedy plan which is more sweeping than necessary to correct the constitutional wrongs plaintiffs have suffered,'' neither would it accept any plan "which
fails to take into account the systemwide nature of the liability of the defendants." Pet. App. 95. . The Board subsequently presented a plan that complied with the District
Court's guidelines and that was embodied in a judgment entered on October 7. The plan was stayed pending appeal tO
the Court of Appeals.
Based on its own examination of the extensive record, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments entered against the
local defendants. 2 583 F. 2d 787. The Court of Appeals
could not find the District Court's findings of fact clearly
erroneous. ld. , at 789. Indeed , the Court of Appeals examined in detail each set of findings by the District Court and
found strong support for them in the record. I d., at 798, 804,
805, 814. The Court of Appeals also discussed in detail and
found unexcrptionable the District Court's understanding and
application of the Fourteenth Amendment and the cases construing it.
Thr Comt of Apprals vaeatrd thP judgmrnt against. the state defendants and rrm n ndrd l'or l'mt hN prorreding~ regarding 1hoRr pnrt ie~ . 583
F . 2d 787, 815-818 (CA6 1978) . l\'o issue w1th respect to the state
defendants iH before us now.
2
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of th~ desegregation plan was stayed pepd,
ing our dispositon of the case,- U. S . - (1978) (REHN"
QUIST, J.). We granted the Board's petition for certiorari,
~U.S.- (1979), and we uow affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
II
The Board earnestly contends that when this case was
brought and at the time of trial its operation of a segregated
school system was no~ c;lone with any general or specific
racially discriminatory purpose, and that whatever unconsti~
~utional conduct it may have been guilty of in the past such
conduct at no time had systemwide segregative impact and
surely no remaining systemwide impact at the time of trial.
A systemwide remedy was therefore contrary to the teachings
of the cases, such as Dayton I, that the scope of the constitu-'
tional violation measures the scope of the remedy.3
' We have discovered no reason, however, to disturb the judg~
ment of the Court of Appeals, based on the findings and conclusions of the District Court, that the Board's conduct at
t.he time of trial and before not only was animated by an un~
constitutional, segregative purpose, but also had current segre~
gative impact that was sufficientiy systemwide to warrant the
remedy ordered by the District Court.
These ultimate conclusions were rooted in a series of constitutional vioiations that the District Court found the Board
to have commited and that together dictated its judgment and
decree. In each instance, the Court of Appeals found the
District Court's conclusions to be factually and legally sound.
8 Petitioners a lso argue that the District Court erred in requiring that
every school in the system be brought roughly within proportionate racial
balance. We see no misu~e of mathematical ratio;; under our decision
in Su·ann v. Charlotte-Mecklenbw·g Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 22-25
(19il), e~pcriall~· in light of the Board'~ failure to ju~tify thP contin ued
existence of ''some school~ that arc all or predominantly of one race. , , ."
!d .. at 26 ; see Pet. App. 102-103 . Petitioner~ do not otherwi:;e question
the' re)ncdy if a :;ystemwidc violation wa~ proper! · fotlnd,

,.
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A
First, although at least since 1888 there had been no statutory requirement or authorization to operate segregated
schools/ the District Court found that in 1954, when Brown I
was decided, the Columbus Board was not operating a racially
neutral, unitary school system, but was conducting "an enclave of separate, black schools on the near east side of Columbus," and that "ft]he then-existing racial separation was
the direct result of cognitive acts or omissions of those school
board members and administrators who had originally intentionally caused and later perpetuated the racial isolation .... "
429 F. Supp., at 236. Such separateness could not "be said to
have been the result of racially neutral official acts." Ibid.
Based on its own examination of the record, the Court of
Appeals agreed with the District Court in this respect, observing that, " [ w ]hile the Columbus school system's dual blackwhite character was not mandated by state law as of 1954, the
record certainly shows intentional segregation by the Columbus Board. As of 1954 the Columbus School Board had
'carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a
4

In 1871, pursuant to the requirements of state law, Columbus maintained a complete separation of the races in the public schools. 429 F.
Supp., at 234-235. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled in 1888 that state law
no longN required or permitted the segregation of school children. Boa1'd
of Education "· State. 45 Ohio St. 555. Even prior to that, in 1881, the
Columbus Board aboli~hed its separate schools for black and white students,
but by thC' end of the first decade of this century it had returned to a
segregated school policy. Champion AvenuC' School was built in 1909 in a
predommantly black area and was completely staffed with black teachers.
Other hlack schools werC' established a· the black population grew. The
Board gerrymandered attendance zoncH so that white students who lived
near these schoolR were assigned to or could attend wh1te schools, which
often were further from their homes. By 1943 a total of five schools had
almo~t C'Xclusivcly black HI udent bodiC'~, and each wa · assignrd an all-black
facult~·, often through all-white to all-black faculty tran~fcr;; that occurred
each time thC' Board camC' to con::;idcr a particular school as a black school.
!d., at 234-236.

·.
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substantial portion of the students. schools, teachers and facilities within the school system.' " 583 F. 2d, at 798-799, quoting Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189, 201-202 (1973).
The Board insists that, since segregated schooling was not
commanded by state law and since not all schools were wholly
black or wholly white in 1954, the District Court was not warranted in finding a dual system. 0 But the District Court found
that the "Columbus Public Schools were officially segregated
by race in 1954," Pet. App. 94 (emphasis added); nand in any
3 Hoi h the dissent and thr ~rpnrnte concurrrnce put grmt weight on
thr ab~rnrr of a siatutor~· mandai<' or· authorization to di;;criminatE', but
tiH• E>qunl protretion elau~r was aimrd nt all oflicial actions, not ju~t those
of ,;tate lt>gi~lature~. " I~ lo agrnc~· of the Stntr, or of ihr officE-r~ or agents
hy whom it;; powt'r~ nrr E'xrrtrd, ~:<hall drn~· to an~· pPrson within it,.; jurisdirtron 1he equal prot ret ion of tlw laws. Whot'ver, by vrrtu<> of public
po:;ition under a Statr gonrnmrnt, . . . clrnies or inkes away thE' equal
proi('etion of thP laws ... violai<'>i the constitutional inhibition; and a:s he
acts in th(• n:mw and for thr Sbttt', and i~ C'loihrd with 1lw State'H lJOwer,
his act is that of thr Sink" R.c ]Jal'te Virginia. 100 U.S. 3:l9, :34.7 (1880).
Thu;;, in }'ick 1ro v. Jfopkins, 118 LT . S. ;)56 (1886), thr di~criminatory
npplication of an ordinanC'e fair on rf;: facr wns found to hr unconstitutional
stair nction. Enn aetion~ of stntr agrnts that may be illE'gal 1111d<>r state
law are attributabl<' to tlw Stair. [ ' mted States\'. Prire. 3R3 U. S. 787
(19GG) ; Scmcs v. Cnited :::itates. :~25 LT. R. 91 (19-+5). Our d<>ci~ion in
Keyes v. Srhoo/ Dist. No. 1. .+I:~ TT. S. 189 (1973). plain!~· drmon~trates in
the rducational contrx1 thnt there i,; no magical diffrrence be1wem sE'grcgaicd ~chool~ mandntrd h~· ~1atu1e and iho~e that rrsult from local RegreI!;Hiivr arts and policie~ . Thr prr~Pnrr of n stntutr or ordinancr commanding Rrpnration of Ihr ntc·e~ would <>ase the plaintiff'~ problrms of
prool', hut herr thr Di~trict C'our1 found that thr local offirird;;, b~· their
conduct mtd policir;;, had maintainPd a dual school systrm in violation of
tlw Fourit•Pnth Amrndmrnt . Thr Comt of Appeal~ agr<><>d, and we fail to
ser wh~· 1h<•re ;;hould br a lr~~rr rons1 itutwnal duty to rliminntc that .~yti
trm than there would have b<•en had the ~~·stem orclainrd by law.
6 The dr~SelllA in t hi:- ra~r (']aimlf a britrr gra~p of thr hiR1 ori(':tl and
ultimatP facts than tlw two comts ])(']ow hnd. But on ihP i~Rur of whrther
thrrr wa~ a dual ;;rhool s~·"i<·m 111 Columhu~, Ohio, in 195-t. on th<> rprord
bPforr 11s we :nr muC'h morr impreH~Pd by the virw~ of tlw jmlgrH who
lmve lived with th<· CHHC on•r the ·ears. Al~o, our di~scnling Brolhe~
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event, there is no reason to question the finding that as the
"direct result of cognitive acts or omissions'' the Board maintained "an enclave of separate, black schools on the near
east side of Columbus." 429 F. Supp., at 236. Proof of purposeful and effective maintenance of a body of separate black
schools in a substantial part of the system itself is prima facie
proof of a dual school system and supports a finding to this
effect absent sufficient contrary proof by the Board, which was
not forthcoming in this case. Keyes, supra, at 203. 7

· ' : 1
1 •

B

/

~econd, both courts below declared that since the decision
in Brown v. Board of Education (II), 349 U. S. 294 ( 1955),
the Columbus Board has been under a continuous constitutional obligation to disestablish its dual school system and
that it has failed to discharge this duty. Pet. App. 94; 583
F. 2d, at 799. Under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
cases that have construed it, the Board's duty to dismantle its
dual system cannot be gainsaid.

·,

suggestion that this Court should play a special
oversight role in reviewing the factual determinations
of the lower courts in school desegregation cases, post
at
, asserts an omnipotence and omniscience that we
do not have and should not claim.
'It is argued that Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (!), 433
U. S. 406 (1977), implicitly overruled or limited those portions of Keyes
a.nd Swann approving. in certain circumstances, inferences of general, systemwide purpose and current, systemwide impact from evidence of discriminatory purpose that bas resulted in substantial current segregation,
and approving a systemwide remedy absent a showing by the defendant
of what part of the current imbalance was not caused }Jy ~he constitutional
breach. Dayton I does not purport to disturb an~· aspect of Keyes and
Swann; indeed , it cites both cases with approval. On the facts found by
the Dist rict Court and affirmed by the Court. of Appeals at the time Dayton first came before us, there were only isolated instances of intentional
segregation, which were insufficient to give rise to an inference of s~·stem
wide institutional purpose and which did not add up to a faciall~· substantial sy;-;temwide impart. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (II),
post, a t - .

I
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Where a racially discriminatory school system has been
found to exist, Brown II imposes the duty on local school
boards to "efl'ectuate a transition to a racially non-discriminatory school system." 349 U. R.. at 301. "Brown II was a call
for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems," and
school boards operating such systems were "clearly charged
with th e affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be l:'liminated root and branch." Green v.
County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-438 (1968). Each
instance of a failure or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty
continues the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dayton I, 433 U. S. , at 413-414; Wright v. Council of City of
Emporia , 407 F. R. 451. 460 (1972); United States v. Scotland
N eck City Board of Education, 407 U . S. 484, (creation of a
new school district in a city that had oprratecl a dual school
system but was not yet the subject of court-ordered
desegregation ) .
The Green case itself was ·decided 13 years after Brown I I.
The core of the holding was that the school board involved
had not done enough to eradicate the lingering consequences
of the dual school system that it had been operating at the
time Brown was decided. Even though a freedom of choice
plan had been adopted, the school system remained essentially
a segregated system , with many all-black and many all-white
schools. The board 's continuing obligation, which had not
been satisfied, was " 'to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work .. . now ... until it is clear that stateimposed segregation has been completely removed. ' " Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1,
13 ( 1971), quoting Green, supra, at 439 (emphasis in original).
As THE CHIEF JusTICE's opinion for a unanimous Court
in Swann recognized, Brown and Green imposed an affirmative
duty to desegregate. "If school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations under those holdings, judicial authority may

,,
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be invoked. . . . In default by the school authorities of their
obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has
broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary
school system." 402 U. S., at 15-16. In Swann, it should be
recalled, an initial segregation plan had been entered in 1965
and had been affirmed on appeal. But the case was reopened,
and in 1969 the school board was required to come forth with
a more effective plan. The judgment adopting the ultimate
plan was affirmed here in 1971, 16 years after Brown II.
In determining whether a dual school system has been disestablished, Swann also mandates that matters aside from
student assignments must be considered :
"[W] here it is possible to identify a 'white school' or a
'Negro school' simply by reference to the racial composition of teachers and staff, the quality of school buildings
and equipment, or the organization of sports activities, a
prima facie case of violation of substantive constitutional
rights under the Equal Protection Clause is shown." 402
U.S., at 18.
Further, Swann stated that in devising remedies for legally
imposed segregation the responsibility of the local authorities
and district courts is to ensure that future school construction
and abandonment are not used and do not serve to perpetuate
or re-establish the dual school system. Id. , at 20-21. As for
student assignments, the Court said:
" No per se rule can adequately embrace all the difficulties of reconciling the competing interests involved; but
in a system with a history of segregation the need for
remedial criteria of sufficient specificity to assure a school
authority's compliance with its constitutional duty warrants a presumption against schools that are substantially
disproportionate in their racial composition. Where the
school authority's proposed plan for conversion from a
·dual to a unitary system contemplates the continued
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existence of some schools that are all or predominantly
of one race, they have the burden of showing that such
school assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory."
!d., at 26.
The Board's continuing "affirmative duty to disestablish
the dual school system" is therefore beyond question, M cDaniel v. BarreS'i, 402 U.S. 39,41 (1971), and it has pointed to
nothing in the record persuading us that at the time of trial
the dual school system and its effects had been disestablished.
The Board does not appear to challenge the finding of the
District Court that at the time of trial most blacks were still
going to black schools and most whites to white schools.
Whatever the Board's current purpose with respect to racially
separate education might be, it knowingly continued its failure to eliminate the consequences of its past intentionally
segregative policies. The Board "never actively set out to dismantle this dual system." 429 F. Supp., at 260.

c
Third, the District Court not only found that the Board had
breached its constitutional duty by failing effectively to eliminate the continuing consequences of its intentiona.I systemwide
segregation in 1954, but also found that in the intervening
years there had been a series of Board actions and practices
that could not "reasonably be explained without reference
to racial concerns," id., at 241, and that "intentionally aggravated, rather than alleviated," racial separation in the
schools. Pet. App. 94. These matters included the general
practice of assigning black teachers only to those schools with
substantial black student populations. a practice that was terminated only in 1974 as the result of a conciliation agreement
with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission; the intentionally
segregative use of optional attendance zones/ discontiguous
~ DP~p1tr prtitwurr~' nvowrdl~· strong prefrrPnrr for neighborhood
schools, in times of residential racial transit ion the Board created optional

1
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attendance areas,n ami boundary changes; 10 and the selection
of sites for new school construction that had the foreseeable
and anticipated effect of maintaining the racial separation of
the schools. l l The court generally lloted that "[sj ince the
attendance zones to allow white students to avoid predominantly black
schools, which were often closer to the homes of the white pupils. For
example, until well after the time the complaint was filed, petitioners
allowed ~tudents '· in a small, white enclave on Columbus' predominantly
black near-east ~ide . .. to e~capr attendance at black" schools. 429 F.
Supp., at 244. The court could perceive no racially-neutral reasons for
this optional zone. Id., at 245 . "Quite frankly, the Near-Bexley Option
appears to this Court to be a cla,;:sir example of a segregative device designed to permit white students to escape attendance at predominantly
black schools." Ibid.
H Thi ~ trchniqur wn s apphrd whrn llPighborhood schoob would have
tended to desegregate the involved schools. In the 1960s, a group o-f
white students were bused past their neighborhood school to a "whiter"
school. The District Court could "discern no other explanation than a
Facial one for the existence of the Moler discontinuous attendance area
for the period 1963 through 1969." !d., at 247 . From 1957 until 1963
students living in a predominantly white area near Heimandale elementary
school attended a more remote, but identifiably white, school. /d., at 247248.
10 Gerrymandrrmg of boundary linrR al~o continurd after 1954.
The
District Court found, for instance, that for one area on the west side of
the city containing three white schools and one black school the Board had
altered the lines so that white rrRidential areas were removed from the
black school 's zone and black students were contained within that zone.
Jd ., at 245~247. The Court found that the segregative choice of lines was
not justified "as a matter of academic administration" and "had a substantial and continuing Regregative impact upon these four west side
schools." !d. , at 247 .
Another example involved the former Mifflin district that had been
absorbed into the Columbus district. The Board staff presented two alternative means of drawing necessary attendance zonrs: one that was desegregative and one that wa~< segregative. The Board chose the segregative
option, and the District Court was unperHuaded that it had any legitimate
educational rea;;ons for dmng so. !d .. at 24~250.
11 Thr Di,;tnrt Cou rt found that , of the 10;) ;;r hool~ built by the Board
between 1950 and 1975, 87 opened with racially identifiable student bodies
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1954 Brown decision, the Columbus defendants or their predecessors were adequately put on notice of the fact that action
was required to correct and to prevent the increase in" segregation, yet failed to heed their duty to alleviate racial separation in the schools. 429 F. Supp., at 255. t 2
and 71 rrmained that way at the time of trial. This result was rea~onably
foreseeable under the circumstancri:\ in light of the sites selected, and the
Board was often specificall~r warned tha.t it was, without apparent justification, choosing Sites that would maintam or further segregation . !d., at
241-243 . As the Comt of Appeals noted :
"[Tlhis record actually rcqmre:; no reliance upon inference, since, as indicated above, it con1 ams repeated instances where the Columbus Board was
warned of the segregative effect of proposed site choices, and was urged to
consider alternatives which could have had an integrative effect. In these
instanees thr Columbus Board cho~e the segregative sites. In this situation the Distmt Judge was justified in relymg in part on the history of
the Columbus Board's site choices and construction program in finding
deliberate and unconstitutional systemwide segregation." 583 F. 2d, at

804.
Lora! commumt~· and civil rights groups, the "Ohio State Univer:;lty
Advisory Commission on Problems Facing the Columbus Public Schools,
and officials of the Ohio State Board of Education all called attention to
the problem [of segregation l and made certain curative instructions." 429
F. Supp., at 255. This was particularly important because the Columbus
system grew rapidly in terms of geography and number of students, creating many crossroads where the Board could either turn toward segregation or away from it. See icl., nt 243. Specificnlly, for exam11le, the University Commi;;~ion in 1968 made certain recommendations that it thought
not only would assist desegregntion of the schools but would . encourage
integrated residential patternR. !d., at 256. The Board itself came to
similar conclusions about what could be done, but its response was "minimal." Ibid. See also id., at 264. Additionally, the Board refusrd to create a site selectiOn advisory group to assi:>t m nvoiding sites with a segregative effect, rrfused to ask state education officials to present plans for
desegregating the Columbus public schools, nnd refused to apply for federal
dcsgregation-assistnnce funds . lcl., at 257 ; see id., at 239. The District
Court drew "the inference of segregntive intent from the Columbus defemlhnt 1 failures , after notiCe, to consider predictable racial consequences
12
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III
Against this background, we cannot fault the conclusion of
the District Court and the Court of Appeals that at the time
of trial there was systemwide segregation in the Columbus
schools that was the result of recent and remote intentionally segregative actions of the Columbus Board. While appearing not to challenge most of the subsidiary findings of
historical fact, Tr. of Oral Arg., at 7, petitioners dispute many
of the factual inferences drawn from these facts by the two
courts below. On this record, however, there is no apparent
reason to disturb the factual findings and conclusions entered
by the District Court and strongly affirmed by the Court of
Appeals after its own examination of the record.
Nor do we discern that the judgments entered below rested
on any misapprehension of the controlling law. It is urged
that the courts below failed to heed the requirements of Keyes,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), and Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U. S. 252 ( 1977), that a plaintiff seeking to make out an equal
protection violation on the basis of racial discrimination must
show purpose. Both courts, it is argued, considered the requirement satisfied if it were shown that disparate impact
would be the natural and foreseeable consequence of the
practices and policies of the Board, which, it is said, is nothing
more than equating impact with intent, contrary to the controlling precedent.
The District Court, however, was amply cognizant of the
controlling cases. It is understood that to pr.evail the plaintiffs were required to " 'prove not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it was brought about or maintained by
intentional state action,'" 429 F. Supp., at 251, quoting Keyes,
supra, at 198-that is, that the school officials had "intended
of their acts and omi~::;ionH when alternativeR were available which would
I1a:ve eliminated or le,;sened racial imhalnnee ." fa., at 240 ..

7 -610-0PI ION
14

COLUMBLT.. BOARD OF EDUCATION v. PENICK

to segregate." 429 F. Supp .. at 2.54. See also 583 F. 2d, a.t
801. The District C'ourt also recognized that under those
cases disparate in•pact anfl foreserahle consequences, without
more. do not establish a constitutional violation. See. e. g., 429
F. Supp., at 251. Nevertheless. the District Court correctly
noted that artions having foreserable and anticipatrd disparate
impact are relevant rvidcnce to prove thr ultimate fact. forbidden purpose. Those casrs do not forbid "the foreseeable
effects standard from being utilized as one of thr several kinds
of proofs from which an inference of segregative intent may
be properly drawn." Id., at 255. Adherence to a particular
policy or practicr. "with full knowledge of the predictable
effects of such adhrrence upon racial imbalance in a school
system is one factor among many others which may be considered by a court in determining whether an inference of
segregative intent should be drawn." Ibid. The District
Court thus stayed well within the requirements of vYa,shington
v. Davis and Arl1:ngton Heights. See Personnel A dm,i nistrator
of Massachusetts v. Feeney,- U.S.-,- n. 25 (1979).
It is also urged that the District Court a.ncl the Court of
Appeals failed to observe the requirements of our recent decision in Dayton I, which reiterated the accepted rule that the
remedy imposed by a court of equity should be commensurate
with the violation ascertained, and held that the remedy for
the violations that had then been established in that case
should be aimed at rectifying the "incremental segregative
effect" of the discriminatory acts identifiecl. ~ In Dayton I,
1

1 3 P<•iiiionrrs h;lv<· mdira1rd 1hai :1 frw of thr rrrrn1 viola1ions specifically discussed by the District Court involved so few ~:;tudents and lasted
for such a short time that they are unlikely to have any current impact.
But that contention says little or nothing about the incremental impact of
systemwide practices extendmg over many years. Petitioners also argue
that because many of the involved schools were in areas that had become
predominantly black residential areas by the time of trial the racial separation in the schools would have occurred even without the unlawful conduct
of Detitioners. But, as the Di~trict Court found; petitioners' evidence in

•.'
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only a few apparently isolated discriminatory practices had
been foui1d; 14 yet a systemwide remedy had been imposed '
without proof of a systemwide impact. Here, however, the
District Court repeatedly emphasized that it had found pur·
--T
this respect was insufficient to counter r~spond~nts' proof. See Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, .
271 n. 21 (1977); Mt. Healthy School Dist . Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429
U. S. 274, 287 (1977). And the phenomenon described by petitioners
seems only to confirm, not disprove, the evidence accepted by the District
Court that school segregation is a contributing cause of housing segregation. 429 F. Supp., at 259; see Keyes, 413 U. S., at 202-203; Swann, 402
U. S., at 20-21.
14 A1though the Dist rict Court in this case discussed in its major opinion
a number of specific instances of purposeful srgrega.tion, it made it quite
clear that its broad findings were not limited to those instances: "Viewing
the Court's March 8 findings in their totality, this case does not rest on
three specific violations, or eleven, or any other specific number. It concerns a school board which since 1954 has by its official acts aggravated,
rather than alleviated, the racial imbalance of the public schools it administers. These were not the facts of the Dayton case." Pet. App. 94.

,
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posefully segregative practices with current, systemwide impact.1" 429 F. Su~g., at 252, 259-260, 264, 266; Pet. App. 95;
583 F. 2d, at 799. And the Court of Appeals, responding to
similar arguments, said:
"School board policies of systemwide application necessarily have systemwide impact. 1) The pre-1954 policy
of creating an enclave of five schools intentionally designed for black students and known as 'black' schools, as
found by the District Judge, clearly had a 'substantial'- t
indeed, a systemwide-impact. 2) The post-1954 failure I
of the Columbus Board to desegregate the school system
in spite of many~requests and demands to do so, of course,
had systemwiae1impact. 3) So, too, did the Columbus
Board's segregati!ve school construction and siting policy
as we have detailed it above. 4) So too did its student
assignment policy which, as shown above, produced the
large majority of racially identifiable schools as of the
school year 1975-1976. 5) The practice of assigning
black teachers and administrators only or in large majority to black schools likewise represented a systemwide
policy of segregation. This policy served until July 1974
to deprive black students of opportunities for contact
with and learning from white teachers, and conversely to
deprive white students of similar opportunities to meet,
I
I
know and learn from black teachers. It also served
as discriminatory, systemwide racial identification of
schools." 583 F: 2d, at 814.
:~>

~

I

I

I
MR. JUSTICE
REHNQUIST Is

J---:---.;,.1

;_u: /
dissent erroneously states that we have "reliev[ed] school desegregatiOn plaintiffs from any showing of a causal nexus between intentional
segregative actions and the conditions they seek to remedy." Post. a t - .
~:l s we have expressly noted , both the District Court. and the Court of
Appeals found that the Board's purposefully discriminatory conduct and
policies had current, systemwide impact-an essential predicate, as both
courts recognized, for a systemwide remedy. Those courts reveal -a much
more knowledgeable and reliable Yiew of the facts and of the record than
- d<*~ dissenting Brothe:_.s,

16

'For example, there is little dispute that Champion, Felton, Mt. Vernon, Pilgrim and Garfield were de jure jegr~gated by direct acts of the
Columbus defendants' predecessors. They were almost completely segregated in 1954, 1964, 1974 and today. Nothing has occurred to substantially alleviate that continuity of discrimination of thousands of black
students over the intervening decades." 429 F. Supp., at 260 (footnote
omitted).
"The finding of liability in this case concerns the Columbus school district as a whole. Actions and omissions by public officials which tend to
make black schools blacker necessarily have the reciprocal effect of making
white schools whiter. '[I]t is obvious that the practice of concentrating
Negroes in certain schools by structuring attendance zones or designating
"feeder" schools on the basis of race has the reciprocal effect of keeping
other nearby schools predominantly white.' K eyes [, supra. at. 201] · 1
The evidence in this case and the factual determinations made earlier in
this opinion support the finding that those elementary, junior, and senior !
high schools in the Columbus school district which presently have a pre- ,
dominantly black student enrollment have been substantially and directly
affected by the intentional acts and omissions of the defendant local and
state school boards." 429 F . Supp., at 266.

..
78-GlO-OPINIO"
COL1.J:\IBlTS ROAHD OF EDUCATION v. PEKICK

17

Nor do we perceive any misuse of Keyes, where we held that
purposeful discrimination in a substantial part of a school
system furnishes a sufficient basis for an inferential finding of
a systemwide discriminatory intent unless otherwise rebutted,
and that given the purpose to operate a dual school system
one could infer a connection between such a purpose and racial
separation in other parts of the school system. There was no
undue reliance here on the inferences permitted by Keyes, or
upon those recognized by Swann. Furthermore, the Board
was given ample opportunity to counter the evidence of segregative purpose and current, systemwide impact, and the findings of the courts below were against it in both respects. 429
F. Supp., at 260; Pet. App. 95, 102, 105.
Because the District Court and the Court of Appeals committed no prejudicial errors of fact or law, the judgment appealed from must be affirmed.

So ordered.

'
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Columbus

It is essential that the diverse peoples of our country learn
to live in harmony and mutual respect.

~~~F
~~oroma-trve-yeen::!!
student bodies.

1

This end is furthered

:a,. atten d'~ sc h oo 1 s w1t
. hd'1verse

But the benefits that may be achieved

through this experience often will be compromised where the

method~employed
A

to promote
integration
.

~ ~

measures such as compelled transportation to achieve some
theoretically desirable racial balance.
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Columbus Board of Education
et al., Petitioners,
78-610
v.
On Writs of Certiorari to the
Gary L. Penick et al.
United States Court of ApDayton Board of Education
peals for the Sixth Circuit.
et al., Petitioners,
78- 627
v.
Mark Brinkman et al.
[June - , 1979]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
J join the dissenting opinions of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST
and write separately to emphasize sevPral points. The
Court's opinion in these two cases is profoundly disturbing.
It appears to endorse a wholly new constitutional concept
applicable to school cases. The opinion also seems remarkably insensitiw to the now widely accepted view that a quartPr of a century after Brown, the fedPral judiciary should be
limiting rather than expanding the extent to which courts are
operating the public school systems of our country. In expressing thesr views. I recognize. of course. that my Brothers
who have joined the Court's opinion are motivated by purposes and ideals that few would question. My dissent is
based on a conviction that the Court's opinion creates bad
constitutional law and will be evPn worse for public education-an clement of American life that is essential, especially
for mi110rity children.

I
Mn. JusTICE REHNQurs•r's dissent drmonstrates that the
C'ourt's decision marks a break with both precedrnt and prin-
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ciplC'. The Court inclulgC's the courts bC'low in their stringing
together of a chain of "presumptions," not one of which is
close enough to reality to be reasonabk. This chain leads
inexorably to the remarkable conclusion that the absence of
integratio11 found to exist in a high percentage of the 241
schools in Columbus and Dayton was caused entirely by intentional violations of the Fourteenth Amendment by the
school boards of these two cities. Although this conclusion
is tainted on its face. is not supported by evidence in either
case, and as a general matter seems incredible. the courts below accepted it as the 11ccessary predicate for requiring as a
matter of constitutio nal law a systemwide remedy prescribing
balance in each and every school.
There arc u nin tegratcd schools in every major urban area
in the country that contains a substantial minority population. This condition results primarily from familiar segregated housing patterns. which-in turn-are caused by social,
economic, and demographic forces for which no school board
is responsible. 1 These indisputable facts were ignored by the
courts below, which relied instead upon fictions and presumptions that repeadedly have been rejected in other Fourteenth
Amendment cases. See. e. g., Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney, U. S. (1979); Arlington H eights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977);
Washington Y. Davis, 426 U. S. 22}) (1976).
The type of state-enforced segregation that Brown properly
condemned 110 longer C'xists in this country. This is not to
say that school boards-particularly in the great cities of the
1 It ha~ long bf'Pn rf'rognizPd that rPHidf'ntial pattpr·rw nrf' rC'sponRiblc
for murh if not most of thP racial imhalanep in JH'f:oent-day urban school
s ~·::;tPmK. Sf'e Fnrlp~· . H!•:;idPntinl SfgrPgation and ltK Implication::; for
School Intpgrntion, :l9 L. & CntPmp. Prob~. 16~ (Hli5); K Tneuber &
A. Taeuber, N!•gru!'~ in C'iti!'~ (19n5). Thr rourt~ lwlow did not find thnt
Dayton or Cohnnbu~ wPrP an~· diffrr!'nt in t hi~ rP~Jl!'C't : rn t her, t Jtpy
treated thr faet of re~idcntial >'f'grrgation <lS irrdrnm!. Sec 1Jost, at-,
and 11. 24 (HE H.K(lUIK'l', J., di~;,('Ilting).
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North, Midwest, and West-are taking all reasonable measures to provide integrated educational opportunities. As I
indicated in my separate opinion in Keyes v. School District
1\'o. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 223-236 (1973), de facto segregation has
existed on a large scale in many of these cities, and often it
is indistinguishable in effect from the type of de jure segregation outlawed by Brown. Where there is proof of intentional
segregative action or inaction, the federal courts must act, but
their remedies should 11ot exceed the scope of the constitutional violation. Dayto11 v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 ( HJ77);
Austin Independent School District v. United States, 429 U. S.
990, 991 (1976) (PowELL, J .. concurring); Pasadena City
Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 lJ. S. 717 (1974); Swann v. CharlottleMecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971).
Systemwide remedies such as were ordered by the courts below, and today approved by this Court, lack any principled
basis when the absence of integration in all schools cannot
reasonably be attributed to discriminatory conduct.
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST has dealt devastatingly with the
way in ·which the courts below endowed prior precedents with
new and wonderous meanings. I can add little to what he
has said. I therefore move to more general but, in my view,
important considerations that the Court today simply ignores.

II
Holding the school boards of these two cities responsible
for all of the segregation in the Dayton and Columbus sysstems and prescribing fixed racial ratios in every school as
the constitutionally required remedy necessarily implies a
belief that the same school boards-under court supervisionwill be capable of bringing about and maintaining the desired
racial balance in each of these schools. The experience in
city after city demonstrates that this is an illusion. The
process of resegregation, stimulated by resentment against

7 610 & 78-627-DISSENT (A)
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judicial coercion and concern as to the effect of court supervision of education, will follow today's decisions as surely as
it has in other cities subjected to similar sweeping decrees.
The orders affirmed today typify intrusions on local and
professional authorities that affect adversely the quality education. They require an extensive reorganization of both
school systems. including the reassignment of almost half of
the 96,000 students in the Columbus system and the busing
of some 15.000 students in Dayton. They also require reassignments of teachers and other staff personnel, reorganization of grade structures. and the closing of certain schools.
The orders substantially dismantle and di"'place neighborhood
schools in the face of compelling economic and educational
reasons for preserving them. This wholesale substitution of
judicial legislation for the judgments of elected officials and
professional educators derogates the entire process of public
education.~ Moreover. it constitutes a serious interference
with the private decisions of parents as to how their children
will be educated. These harmful cm1sequences are the iuevitable byproducts of a judicial approach that ignores other
relevant factors in favor of an exclusive focus on racial balance
in every school.
These harmful consequences. moreover. in all likelihood
will provoke responses that will defeat the integrative purpose
of the courts' order. Parents, unlike school officials. are not
bound by these decrees and may frustrate them through the
simple expedient of withdrawing their children from a public
school system in which they have lost confidence. 1n spite of
the substantial costs often involved in relocation of the family
or in resort to private education, experience demonstrates that
many parents view these alternatives as preferable to sub! Thr dPfrndinp; of law~uit~ that rrmain artivr for )'Carf: and romplying
with rlaboratr court decrer~ al~o divert the time, attention, and rc::;ourcco;
of school authontics from education.
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mitting their children to court-run school systems. In the
words of a leading authority :
"An implication that should have been seen all along
but can no longer be ignored is that a child's enrollment
in a given public school is not determined by a governmental decision alone. It is a joint result of a governmental decision (the making of school assignments) and
parental decisions, whether to remain in the same residential location, whether to send their child to a private
school, or which school district to move into when moving
into a metropolitan area. The fact that the child's enrollment is a result of two decisions operating jointly
means that government policies must, to be effective,
anticipate parental decisions and obtain the parents' active cooperation in implementing school policies." Coleman, New Incentives for Desegregation, 7 Human Rights
10, 13 (1978).
At least where inner-city populations comprise a large proportion of racial minorities and surrounding suburbs remain
white, conditions that exist in most large American cities, the
demonstrated effect of compulsory integration is a substantial
exodus of whites from the system. See J. Coleman, S. Kelly,
and J. Moore, Trends in School Segregation, 1968-1973, at 66,
76-77 (1975). It would be unfair and misleading to attribute
this phenomenon to a racist response to integration per se.
It is at least as likely that the exodus is in substantial part
a natural reaction to the displacement of professional and
local control that occurs when courts go into the business of
restructuring and operating school systems.
Nor will this resegregation be the only negative effect
of court-coerced integration on minority children. Public
schools depend on community support for their effectiveness.
When substantial elements of the community are driven to
abandon these schools, their quality inevitably declines.
Members of minority groups, who have relied especially on
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education as a means of advancing themselves, also arc likely
to react to this decline in quality by removing their children
from public schools." As a result, public school enrollment
increasingly will become limited to children from families
that either lack the resources to choose alternatives or are
indifferent to the quality of education. The net effect is an
overall deterioration in public education. the one national resource that traditionally has made this country a land of opportunity for diverse ethnic and racial groups. See Keyes,
supra, at 250 (opinion of PowELL, J.).

III
If public education is not to suffer further. we must "return
to a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests of
our society in achieving desegregation with other educational
and societal interests a community may legitimately assert."
!d., at 253. The ultimate goal is to have quality school systems in which racial discrimination is neither practiced nor
tolerated. It has been thought that ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom is a desirable component of sound education in our country of diverse populations, a view to which
I subscribe. The question that courts in their single-minded
pursuit of racial balance seem to ignore, is how best to move
toward this goal.
Aradrmir c!Phntr h[li' grown as to the clrgrrr of rdurational brrwfit
rrn lizrd h~· ehildrrn dur to intPgl':lfion. SrP n. Crain & H. \Jahard. The
Influ<'tH'<' of High Sehool H<~('ial Compo~tl ion 011 Blaek Coll<·gr AI I <>nda nee
ami TP~t Jlrrl'ormanrr ( 197~): Col<>man, N rw Tne<•nl i\'!'~ for D<'~<'grrga1iou, 7 Human Hights 10 (1978); WPinhrrg, Tlw Hrlation~hip Bl'twrcn
School D<·~rgrrgation and Aead<'mir Arhu.•vrnwnt: A Hrvirw of thr Hesearc·h, :39 L. & Contrmp. Prob~. 2-W (1975). Much of thr ditiputr ;,;rrms
brs1dP tlw point. Whnt<•vrr rdurational brnrfit~ affordrd minority childn•n
through alfrndanr<' at majont~· ~rhoob-and at h•ast ~om<' rvidPncr indtcntr~ thr::-:r hrnrfit~ <·an br ~ub~tantwl-will be rompromi~l'd if 1hr actual
mel hod 11~rd to romprl intpgration i~ dr~1 rurtivr of srhool qua lit •. Cf.
t. John, Sehool D('~cgrrgntion OutcomP:; for Children ( L975).
3
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For a decade or more after Brown, the courts properly
focused on dismantling segregated school systems as a means
of eliminating state-imposed discrimination and furthering
wholesome diversity in the schools. 1 Experience in recent
years, however, has cast serious doubt upon the efficacy of
far-reaching judicial remedies directed not against specific
constitutional violations, but rather imposed on an entire
school system on the fictional assumption that the existence
of identifiable black or white schools is caused entirely by
intentional segregative conduct. and is evidence of systemwide discrimination. ru my view, our courts-now led by
this Court-are pursuing a path away from rather than
toward the desired goal.
While these courts conscientiously view their judgments as
mandated by the Constitution (a view that would have astonished constitutional scholars throughout most of our history),
the fact is that restructuring and overseeing the operation of
major public school systems-as ordered in these cases-fairly
can be viewed as social engineering that hardly is appropriate
for the fedrral judiciary.
The time has come for a thoughtful re-examination of the
proper limits of the role of courts in confronting the intractaDuring this prriod thr i~~ur~ confrontrd by thr ronrtR b~· and large
im·olvrd combatting tlw drvicr~ by which Statrs drlibrratrl~' prrprtuated
dual :-:chool sy~trms and di~mantling; spgregai cd s~·strm~ in ~mall, rural
arraR. E. g.. Greeu \'.County School Board. 39J U.S. 4:W (19(18); G1iffin
v. School Board. :{77 U. S. 21R (196-1-); Goss v. Board of Education, 37:3
U. S. 68:3 (Hl6:n: Cooper v. Aaron. :358 U. S. 1 (1958) . Sre Wi lkin,.;on,
The Sn]lrl'lM Comt and Southrrn School Dr~egn•gation, 1955-1970: A
Histor~· and Annl~·,;i~. 64 Va. L. Rrv . 4R5 (197R). This Court did not
brgin to facr the difficult admimstrativr and :-:ocial problrm~ as:<ociated
with de facto srgrrgation 111 largr urban school sy~tcms uutil Swann v.
Charlotte-Meckl!'11burg Board of l?ducation. -1-02 U. S. 1 (1971). It iH
e,;pecmll~· unfortunatP thai tlw Couri toda~· rPfu:-;r,; to acknowledge these
probiPm~ and chooRr,.; in:-;tpad to sanction mrthods that , although often
appropria tr allCI sa lui n r~· in t hP ra rlirr context, a rr disru p1 ivr nncl counterproductiYc in ~chool ~y" tem~ likr tlw~c in C'ohnnbu,; and Dayton.
4
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ble problems of public education in our complex society.
Proved discrimination by state or local authorities should
never be tolerated, and it is a first responsibility of the judiciary not to tolerate it where it has been proved. But many
courts have continued also to impose wide-ranging judicial
remedies. and to retain continuing supervision over school
systems. Local and state legislative and administrative authorities have been supplanted or relegated to initiative stifling roles as missions of the courts. Indeed, there is reason
to believe that legislative bodies often have welcomed .i udicial
activism with respect to a subject-so inherently difficult and
so politically sensitive-that the prospect of others confronting
its problems seems inviting. Federal courts no longer should
encourage this deference by the appropriate authorities-no
matter how willing they may be to defer. Courts are the
branch least competent to provide long-range solutions acceptable to the public and most conducive to achieving both
diversity in the classroom and quality education.
School boards need not wait, and many have not waited,
for innovative legislative guidance. The wide ranging opinion of the Court in Swrmn, though often cited (as in this
case) for views I think were never intended. identified some
constructive actions always open to school authorties:
"An optional majority-to-minority transfer provision
has long been recognized as a useful part of every desegregation plan. Provision for optional transfer of those
in the majority racial group of a particular school to
other schools where they will be in the minority [or less
in the majority] is an indispensable remedy for those
students willing to transfer to other schools in order to
lesseu the impact on them of the state-imposed stigma
of segregation. In order to be effectivr, such a transfer
arrangement must grant that transferring student free
transportation and space must be made available in the
school to which he desires to move." 402 U. S., at 26-27.
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Sre also Keyes, SUJn·a. at 240- 241 ( opinio11 of Pow~;LL, J.).
In ern ti ves can br ('Ill ployed to encouragP th<•se transfprs. such
as cn•atio11 of tnagnPt schools providi11g sprcial educational
benefits aml state subsidization of thosr schools that expand
their minority rmollnwnts. RPr. e. g., Willie. Racial Balance
or Quality Educatio11 '?. in School Desegre~~:ation. ~hadow and
Sub~tance (Lpvinsohn and \\'right. cds. HJ76). ThesP and
like plans. if adopted volu1ttarily by ~tatef:. also could hc>lp
counter the (•ffects of racial illlbalancPs betwee11 school districts that are b(•yoJHl the reach of .i udicial eon·(•ction. See
Millike11 v. Bradley, supra; cf. C'ok111an. 7 Human Hights 10,
supra, at 48- MJ. '· Aft<•r all. and in spit<> of what mally Yiew
as excessive govemnH'nt regu latioll. \H' an• a fn.>(' societyperhaps the most fnw of any in the world. Our 1wople instinctively resent CO(,rcion. and pc>rhaps most of all when it
affects their children and the opportuniti<•s that only education affords childrc•n. It is uow rrasonably clear that the goal
of diversity that we call inh•gration. if it is to bP lasting and
comlucivr to quality <•ducation. must hav(' thr support of
parents who so fn•quently haw tlw option to choos<' where
their children will attend school. ( 'ourts. of course. should
confront discrimination whpn•ver it is found to exist. but thr
continuing rolr ntust br ldt with school and public authorities. Tt is only throuKh tlwsr iJJStitutioJtS. acting ·withiu the
democratic processes and with community understanding and
support. that tlw goal [ haw rleseribf'd ca11 lw attained.
5 ~'i~c·on:<in ha,; impiPtlH'IliPd n ~~·~(Pill of ~uh"idizPd intr;t- and init•rdi,;tril't ntajorit~ · -to-minorit~ · tr:lll.,fc•r8. Hl75 L:tw;: of Wi~con:<in ('h. :2:20.
codiliPd at Wi~. Stat. Ann. l:.!l.K5. OtH' nc•rd not t•tulor:<t' thi>< t•xpPrinwnt,
a~ it i>< too Pari~ · to dc·trnttitH' whPihrr it;: objPctivt· of PrH·our;t!!ing ~ub
stantial iniPp;ration will hl' attaint·d "lH'I'l'""fnll~ · . Hut it i.; thl' .-ort of
pft'ort thai .;hould hr c·on~idc•n·d h~· :<tatP and lcH'al oflici:tl;: and pJc>et~>d
hodir~. ThP c·oni ra.;t IH't wt•t·n t he• unde•rl~·ing philo"oph.1· of the· Wi:<c·on:<in
plan nne! thP ma~"i\'l' c·opr£'ion undprtahn h~· t he• c·omt>< hPiow i>< :<triking.
Sc•r \fradow~. Opl'tt l:::nrollmc•nt :nul Fi.;e·:d lnc•pnt in·.;, in ::\C'hool Dt>"t•gn·gation, ~lwdow and ;-;uiJ"tanre (Lc•Yin"ohn and Wright Pd~. HJIU) .
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and write separately to emphasize several points. The
Court's opinion in these two cases is profoundly disturbing.
It appears to endorse a wholly new constitutional concept
applicable to school cases. The opinion also seems remarkably insensitive to the now widely acce1)ted view that a quart;)
1
r (.~~,.,_)
· _1_,
11. D oo.N'I'k o\
tcr of a century after BrowrY:the federal JUdiCmry shuald--B
"t~e-u.~ . ..,~
,
3
1 r17
limiting rather than expanding the extent to which courts are
operating the public school systems of our country. In ex( 1q S -+\>
pressing these vi{'ws, I recognize, of course, that my Brothers
who have joined the Court's opinion are motivated by purposes and ideals that few would question. My dissent is
based on a collviction that the Court's opinion creates bad
constitutional law and will be even worse for public education-an clement of American life that is css{'ntial, especially
for minority children.

I
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST's dissent demonstrates that the
('ourt's decision marks a break with both precedent and prin-
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ciple. The Court indulges the courts bclo'" in their stringing
together of a chain of "presumptions," 11ot one of which is
close enough to reality to be reasonable. This chain leads
inexorably to the remarkable conclusion that the absence of
i11tegration found to exist in a high percentage of the 241
schools in Columbus and Dayton was caused entirely by in·
tentional violations of the Fourteenth Amendment by the
school boards of these two cities. Although this conclusion
is tainted on its face. is not supported by evidence in either
case, and as a general matter seems incredible, the courts below accepted it as the necessary predicate for requiring as a
matter of constitutional law a systemwide remedy prescribing
balance in each and every school.
.There are unintegrated schools in every major urban area
in the country that contains a substantial minority population. This condition results primarily from familiar segregated housing patterns, which-in turn-are caused by social,
economic, and d o raphic forces for which no school board
· res )Onsibl 1 These in · ispu a e ac s were Ignored by c
courts below, which relied instead upon fictions and presumptions that repeadedly have been rejected in other Fourteenth
Amendment cases. See, e. g., Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney, U. S. (1979); Arlingto11 H eights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 F. S. 252 (1977);
Washin ton \'. Davis, 426
S. 229 (1976).
The type of state-enforced segregation t at rown properly
condemned no longer exists in this country. This is not to
say that school boards-particularly in the great cities of the
1 !+ ht\t )Q]:IS l~ppn rcco~nizcd that rcsjdgntiAl J1atlttiiS ciit t(~polt~i6le-
foi atuch if not Jiio!t ef the t""inl jJnlwhJv•o in pt' 0 'b'Qnt doc utbdn :!eHeelJ7(dtPRll': Srt>'~'t<'nrlry, Rl'~idPntial Srgn•gation and It~ I~plirntion~ for
School Integration, :m L. & Cntrmp. Prob~ . 164 (1075); K. Tneulwr &
A. Taru})('r, ?\(•groP~ in Citir~ (19fi5). The f'ourts below did nst .ti11d th<~t
Doyte~ QP Colttrnhu.< nerf' HH?. 'litfeput1 itt tlti . G tt .<pt'l'l. rnfhr1, tl•cy •
treated the f~ rr~idrntial srgr<'gatwn pls irreleYaut. Sec po~t, at-,

~n. 24

(HEHNQUli>'l',

J ., dii:i:'('llting) .
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These causes of the greater part of the school

segregation problem are not newly discovered.

Nearly a decade

ago, Professor Bickel wrote:
# "In most of the larger urban areas, demographic
conditions are such that no policy that a court
can order, and a school board, a city or even a
state has the capability to put into effect, will
in fact result in the foreseeable future in
racially balanced public schools. Only a
reordering of the environment involving economic
and social policy on the broadest conceivable
front might have an appreciable impact."
Are¥de'~ Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea
o~ Progress 132 n. 7 (1970).
·
Federal courts, including this Court today, continue to
ignore these indisputable facts.

Relying upon fictions and

presumptions in school cases that are irreconcilable with
principles of equal protection law applied in all other
cases, see, e.g., Personnel Administrator v.

------

u.s.

Fe~ney,

(1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing

Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)],

federal courts prescribe

~

syste ~ wide

remedies without relation to the causes of the

segregation found to exist, and implement their decrees by
requiring extensive transportation of children of all
school ages.
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North, Midwest, and West-are taking all reasonable measures to provide integrated educational opportunities. As I
indicated in my separate opinion in Keyes Y. School District
No.1, 413 U.S. 189,223-236 (1973), de facto segregation has
existed on a large scale in many of these cities, and often it
is indistinguishable in effect from the type of de jure segregation outlawed by Brown. Where there is proof of intentional
segregative action or inaction, the federal courts must act, but
their remedies should not exceed the scope of the constitutiollal violation. Dayton v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 (1977);
Austin Independent School District v. United States, 429 U. S.
990, 991 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring); Pasadena City
Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974); Swa:nn v. CharlottleMecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971).
Systemwide remedies such as were ordered by the courts below, and today approved by this Court, lack any principled
basis when the absence of integration in all schools cannot
~
reasonably be attributed to discriminatory conduct. l.
~
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST has dealt devastatingly with the
way in which the courts below endowed prior precedents with
new and wonderous meanings. I can add little to what he
has said. I therefore move to more general but, in my view,
important considerations that the Court ~simply ignores.

II
Holding the school boards of these two cities responsible
for all of the segregation in the Dayton and Columbus sysstems and prescribing fixed racial ratios in every school as
the constitutionally required remedy necessarily implies a
belief that the same school boards-under court supervisionwill be capable of bringing about and maintaining the desired
racial balance in each of these schools. The experience in
city after city demonstrates that this is an illusion. The
pro,cess of resegregation, stimulated by resentment against

,.

2.
Rider B
2.

As I suggested in my separate opinion in

Keyes, it is essential to identify the constitutional right
that is asserted in school desegregation cases.

~

Court's decisions hardly have been lucid on this point.

In

Brown II, 348 U.S. 294 (1955), the Court identified the
"fundamental principle" enunciated in Brown I, as being the
unconstitutionality "of racial discrimination in public
education."

.!2...:_, at 298.

In Keyes I undertook to define

the right, derived from the Equal Protection Clause, as one
to attend an "integrated school system," a system in which
school authorities, when confronted with substantial and
pervasive racial imbalance, take into consideration the
enhancement of integrated school opportunities in addition
to the goal of quality education in making and implementing
their customary decisions.

Id., at 226.

I also noted that

an integrated system does not mean that "every school must
in fact be an integrated unit,"

id., at 227, and

emphasized that the Equal Protection Clause "does not
require the school authorities to undertake widespread
student transportation solely for the sake of maximizing
integration."

Id., at 242.

When challenged, the school

authorities must show that in fact they are operating an
integrated system in the foregoing sense.

This is quite

different from the burden imposed on the school authorities
by the courts below of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that they have met an affirmative duty in
existence since 1954 to eliminate every racially
identifiable school "root and branch."
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super~

judicial coercion and concern as to the effect of court
vision of education, will follow today's decisions as surely as
it has in other cities subjected to similar sweeping decrees.
The orders affirmed today typify intrusions on local and
professional authorities that affect adversely the quality education. They require an extensive reorganization of both
school systems. including the reassignment of almost half of
the 96,000 students in the Columbus system and the busing
of some 15,000 students in Dayton. They also require reassignments of teachers and other staff personnel, reorganization of grade structures, and the closing of certain schools.
The orders substantially dismantle and displace neighborhood
schools in the face of compelling economic and educational
reasons for preserving them. This wholesale substitution of
judicial legislation for the judgments of elected officials and
professional educators derogates the entire process of public
education ~ Moreover, it constitutes a serious interference
with the private decisions of parents as to how their children
will be educated. These harmful consequeuces are the inevitable byproducts of a judicial approach that ignores other
relevant factors in favor of an exclusive focus on racial balance
in every school.
These harmful consequences, moreover, in all likelihood
will provoke responses that will defeat the integrative purpose
of the courts' order. Parents, unlike school officials. are not
bound by these decrees and may frustrate them through the
simple expedient of withdrawing their children from a public
school system in which they have lost confidence. In spite of
the substantial costs often involved in relocation of the family
~
or in resort to private education ~ experience demonstrates tha~
many parents view these alternatives as preferable to sub-

3 Thr drfrnchn~ of lawstllt l' that rrmaiu active for year1< and rom plying
With ria borate court derrer:-~ al"o clivrrt the time, attention, and re:;ource:;
of Kchool authontH'S from education.

.J

'.

'·'

..

3.

Rider C
4.

A third alternative is available to

par ~ ts
~

moving for the first time into a metropolitan ~ where a
school district is operating .under a
decree.

"system~ ide

remedy"

To avoid the probability of their children being

bused away from neighborhood schools, and in view of the
widely held belief that schools under a court decree are
likely to be inferior, these parents seeks residences
beyond the urban school district.
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mitting their children to court-run school systems. In the
words of a leading authority :
"An implication that should have been seen all along
but can no longer be ignored is that a child's enrollment
in a given public school is not determined by a governmental decision alone. It is a joint result of a governmental decision (the making of school assignments) and
parental decisions, whether to remain in the same residential location, whether to send their child to a priva.t e
school, or which school district to move into when moving
into a metropolitan area. The fact that the child's enrollment is a result of two decisions operating jointly
means that government policies must. to be effective,
anticipate parental decisiOns and obtain the parents' active cooperation in implementing school policies." Coleman, New Incentives for Desegregation, 7 Human Rights
10, 13 (1978) .
At least where inner-city populations comprise a large proportion of racial minorities and surrounding suburbs remain
white, conditions that exist in most large American cities, the
demonstrated effect of compulsory integration is a substantial
exodus of whites from the system. See J. Coleman, S. Kelly,
and J. Moore, Trends in School Segregation, 1968-1973, at 66,
76-77 (1975). It would be unfair and misleading to attribute
this phenomenon to a racist response to integration per se.
It is at least as likely that the exodus is in substantial part
a natura] reaction to the displacement of professional and
local control that occurs when courts go into the business o / f
restructuring and operating school systems.
Nor will this resegregation be the only negative effect
of court-coerced integration on minority children. Public
schools depend on community support for their effectiveness.
, _J.:
When substantial elements of the community are driven to tv,...cl\ "to OJl ~
andon these schools, their quality ifievitably desliRee("
s~\:~ w
Members of minority groups, who have relied especially on
L
•\.

r

~Q.N' ... t..Q,

o·
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For a decade or more after Brown, the courts properly
focused on dismantling segregated school systems as a means
of eliminating state-imposed discrimination and furthering
wholesome diversity in the schools.' Experience in recent
years, however, has cast serious doubt upon the efficacy of
far-reaching judicial remedies directed not against specific
constitutional violations, but rather imposed on an entire
school system on the fictional assumption that the existence
of identifiable black or white schools is caused entirely by
r 1 1
s~ 'tt<MXo..\
intentional segregative conduct, and is evidence of systemwide discrimination. In my view, ..Courts-now led by
this Court-are pursuing a path away from rather than
oward the desired goal.
While these courts conscientiously view their judgments as
mandated by the Constitution (a view that would have astonished constitutional scholars throughout most of our history),
---------the fact is that restructuring and overseeing the operation o~
major public school systems-as ordered in these cases-fairly
can be viewed as social engineering that hardly is appropriate
Ior the federal j ucliciary.
The time has come for a thoughtful re-examination of the
proper limits of the role of courts in confronting the intracta' During thi~ period thr i~lillf'R confronted by
involved combatting the drvices by which States
dual school systems and di::;mantling segregatrd
areaR. E. g., Green v. County School Board, 391

thr courts by and large
drlibf'rately perpetuated
systems in small, rural
U. S. 430 (1968); Griffin

v. School Board, ?,77 U. S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Board of Education, 373
U.S. 68:3 (106:3) ; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) . Sre Wilkinson,
Thr Suprrmr Court and Southern School De:;egregation, 1955-1970: A
History and Anal~·,;is, 64 Va. L. Rrv. 485 (1978) . Tins Court did not
begin to fnrr thr diffirult administrative and social problrms as::;ociated
with de facto segrrgation 111 largr urban Hchool ::;yt:~tem~> until Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. 402 U. S. 1 (1971). It is
e::;pecmlly unfortunatr that thr Court today refu::;e::; to acknowledge these
problems and chooses in:>trad to sanction methods thai, although often
appropriate and sa lui a ry in t hr ea rlirr context, arr cli~n1pi ivr and l'Otmterprodurtivc in ~rhool Hy~tem" likP those in Columbu:> and Dayton.

.•
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education as a means of advancing themselves, also are likely
to react to this decline in quality by removing their children
from public schools.? As a result, public school enrol1ment
increasingly will become limited to children from families
that either lack the resources to choose alternatives or are
indifferent to the quality of education. The net effect is an
overall deterioration in public education. the one national resource that traditionally has made this country a land of opportunity for diverse ethnic and racial groups. See Keyes,
supra, at 250 (opinion of PowELL, J.).

III
If public education is not to suffer further, we must "return
to a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests of
our society in achieving desegregation with other educational
and societal interests a community may legitimately assert."
!d., at 253. The ultimate goal is to have quality school systems in which racial discrimination is neither practiced nor
~
tolerated. It has been thought that ethnic and racial dive~
sity in the classroom is a desirable component of sound education in our country of diverse populations, a view to which
I subscribe. The question that courts in their single-minded
pursuit of racial balance seem to ignore, is how best to move
toward this goal.
.:..-t....~:t· .. l

~ Arnclrmir drbnie hns ~ ns to the clegrre of edurntionnl benefit
realized b~· childrrn due to intrgrntion. SeeR. Crain & H. l\Iaharcl. The
Influrncr of High Srhool Racial CompoHition on Black Coll!•ge AtfPndancc
and Tr~t Prrfom11mcr (197R); Coleman, New Incentive~ for DeHegregntion, 7 Humnn Rights 10 (1978); Weinbc•rg, The Rrlationship Between
School Desrgrrgat ion and Arademic Achievement: A Rrvicw · of the Research, :39 L. & Contrmp. Prob:>. 240 (1975). l\Iuch of the di~pute ::;eems
b 'Side t hr 1oint. Whatever rduca tiona! bmefii~ afforded minority children
through nttendancr n
: · . · ~choob-nnd at lrast somr rvidencr indicnte~ the::;e lwnefit~ ean br ~ub~tnntwl-will be compromi~ed if t hr actual
method """' to compel ;,tcgmHm> ll~1moHvo of "hool "'"''' •. Cl.
t. John, School Dcscgregntion Outco r:; for Children (1975).

~a ~tv-~~1. rt. o. S:

te>

~

,.

•
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ble problems of public E'ducation in our complex sociE'ty,
Proved discrimination by state or local authorities should
never be tolerated, and it is a first responsibility of the judiciary not to tolerate it where it has beE'u proved. But many
courts have continued also to impose wide-ranging judicial
remedies, and to retain continuing supervision over school
systems. Local and state legislative and administrative authorities have been supplanted or relegated to initiative stifling roles as missions of the courts. Indeed, there is reason
to believe that legislative bodies often have welco
· dicial
activism with respect to a subjec so m er 1tly difficult and
so politically sensitiv
a
e prospect of others confronting
it~1 olsl ,, a:• seems i11'vit~1g. Federal courts no longer should
encourage this deference by the appropriate authorities-no
matter how willing they may be to defer. Courts are the
branch least competent to provide long-range solutions acceptable to the public and most conducive to achieving both
diversity in the classroom and quality education.
School boards need not wait, and many have not waited,
for innovative legislativE' guidance. The wide ranging opinion of the Court in Swann, though often cited (as in this
case) for views I think were never intended, identified some
constructive actions always open to school authorties:
" An optional majority-to-minority transfer provision
has long been recognized as a useful part of every desegregation plan . Provision for optional transfer of those
in the majority racial group of a particular school to
other schools where they will be in the minority [or less
iu the majority] is an indispensable remedy for those
students willing to transfer to other schools in order
lcsscn the impact on them of the state-imposed stigma
of segregation. In order to be effective, such a transfer
arrangement must grant that transferring student free
transportation and space must be made available in the
school to which he desires to mow." 402 U. S., at 26-27.

.,.,.,.
~

ty-
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See also Keyes, supra. at 240-241 (opinion of PowELL, J.).
Incentives can he cmploy<•d to t-ncourage these transfers, such
as creation of mag11et schools providing special educational
benefits and state subsidization of those schools that expand
their n1inority enrollments. R<:>e. e. g., Willie. Racial Balance
or Quality Education'?. in Rchool Desegregation. Shadow and
Substance (Lcvinsohn and Wright. eels. Hl76). These and
like plans. if adopted voluntarily by Rtat<~s. also could help
counter the eft'ects of racial imbalances hctwPen school districts that are bPyond the reach of judicial corTection. See
Milliken v. Bradley, supra; cf. Coleman. 7 Human Hights 10,
supra, at 48-49.•~ fter alL and in spite of what mauy view
as excessive govern nwnt regulation. we arc a free societyperhaps the most fre<' of any in the world. Our ]Wople instinctively resent coercion, and perhaps most of aU ~·hen it
aft'
their childn•n and the opportunities that· only educaL---""'"~"tion aft'orcls
1.
Tt is now reasonably clear that the goal
of diversity that W<' call integration. if it is to be lasting and
conducive to quality <><lucation, must have the support of
parents 'vho so frequently have the option to choose where
their children will attend {school. Courts. of course. should
confront discrimination wherever it is found to exist~ u t e
· • uthore must be e w1 1 sc 100
con 1 ·
ies. It is only through these institutions. acting within the
emocratic iwocesses and with community understanding and
U )Ort
ha the roal .
' described " n
tt .
1 Wi~eOJl~in haR implrnwnted a s~·~tem of ~uh~idir.<·d intra- and intt>rdi,.;t rid majorit~·-to-millorit~· t r:m.-<fcors. Hl15 Laws of Wi~con~in rh. 220,
codifird at 'Wis. Stat. Ann . 1:21 .1<5. On<' JH•ed 11ot <'JHior~<' thi~ <'XJlf'riment,
as it i~ to<; P;\I·J~· io d<"tPnnin<' whrthrr its oLjPC'iiw of rnrouraginp; ~ub
stantial intPp;ration will lH' attained ~ll<'f'l'~~ftdl~·. Hut it i~ the ~ort of
('ffort that ~hould hr <·onBidl'rl'd b~· ~intP and loeal oJJieiab and Plretrd
hodir~. Thr ront ra,.:t lwt W<'<'n the und<·rl~·ing philo~oph,1· of t h<· Wi~rou~in
pla11 and ih(• llla8~i\'P ('(ll-l'<"iun tmckrtak(']l by thr comts lwlow i" ~triki11g.
Srl.' :\Iearlow:i. Op<'ll Enrollmf'Jlt and Fi,c:d TncPnt in·~, in School DP~<·gre
gatioll, Shadow allCl ~ub"ta llf'C (L<•Yin~ohn and Wright eels. H.JIG).

4.
Rider D
But they should recognize limitations on judicial action
inherent in our system and also the limits of effective
judicial power.

The primary and continuing responsibility

for public education, including the bringing about and
maintaining of desired diversity, must be left with school
and public authorities.

t.1- .(f.
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MR. Jus'riCE PowELL, dissenting.
I join the dissenting opinions of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST
and write separately to emphasize several points. The
Court's opinion in these two cases · is profoundly disturbing.
It appears to endorse a wholly new constitutional concept
applicable to school cases. The opinion also seems remarkably insensitive to the now widely accepted view that a quarter of a century after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S.
483 (1954) , the federal judiciary should be limiting rather
than expanding the extent to which courts are operating the
public school systems of our country. In expressing these
views, I recognize, of course, that my Brothers who have
joined the Court's opinion are motivated by purposes and
ideals that few would question. My dissent is based on a
conviction that the Court's opinion creates bad constitutional
Jaw and will be even worse for public education-an element
of American life that is essential, especially for minority
ehildren .
I
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST's dissent demonstrates that the
Court's decision marks a break with both precedent and priu-
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ciple. The Court indulges the courts below in their stPinging
together of a chain of "presumptions," not one of which is
close enough to reality to be reasonable. This chain leads
inexorably to the remarkable conclusion that the absence of
integration found to exist in a high percentage of the 241
schools in Columbus and Dayton was caused entirely by in~
tentional violations of the Fourteenth Amendment by· the
school boards of these two cities. Although this conclusion
is tainted on its face, is not supported by evidence in either
case, and as a general matter seems incredible, the courts below accepted it as the necessary predicate for requiring as a
matter of constitutional law a s~stemwide remedy prescribinV
balance in each and every school.
There are unintegrated schools in every major urban area
in the country that contains a substantial minority population. This condition result~ primarily from familiar segregated housing patterns, which-in turn-are caused,fYI:cial,
economic, and demographic forces for which no schoclboard
is responsible. 1 These causes of the greater part of the school
segregation problem are not newly discovered. · Nearly a
decade ago, Professor Bickel wrote:
"In most of the larger urban areas, demographic conditions are such that no poiicy that a court can order, and
a school board, a city or even a state has the capability
to put into effect, will in fact resuit in the foreseeable
future in racially balanced public schools. Only a reordering of the environment involving economic and social
policy on the broadest conceivable front might have an
appreciable impact." Bickel, The Supreme Court and
the Idea of Progress 132 n. 7 (1970).

~

~ Farley, Residential Segregation and Its Implications for School

~

In::er:~,

39 L. & Cntemp. Prob::;. 164 (1975) ; K. Taeuber & A. Taeubcr, Negroed in Cities (1965). The ~5P!ow f r<'afea the resiclentiar
:;egregation in Dayton and Columbus as irrelevant. See post, at - , ·and
n, 24 (REHNQUIS'f 1 J ., dissmting),

~"'-
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Federal courts, including this Court today, continue to ignore
these indisputable facts. Relying upon fictions and presumptions in school cases that are irreconcilable with principles of
equal protection law applied in all other cases, see, e. g., Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,- U.S.-- (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U. S. 252 ( 1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 ( 1976)],
federal courts prescribe systemwide remedies without relation
to the causes of the segregation found to exist, and implement
their decrees by requiring extensive transportation of children
of all school ages.
The type of state-enforced segregation that Brown properly
condemned no longer exists in this country. This is not to
say that school boards-particularly in the great cities of the
North, Midwest, and West-are taking all reasonable measures to provide integrated educational opportunities. As I
indicated in my separate opinion in Keyes v. School District
No.1, 413 U.S. 189,223-236 (1973), de facto segregation has
existed on a large scale in many of these cities, and often it
is indistinguishable in effect from the type of de jure segregation outlawed by Brown. Where there is proof of intentional
segregative action or inaction, the federal courts must act, but
their remedies should not exceed the scope of the constitutional violation. Dayton v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 ( 1977);
Austin. Independent School District v. United States, 429 U. S.
~!!)0, 991 (1976) (PoWELL, J., concurring); Pasadena City
'hoard of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976); Milliken v. f3radleyJ, 418 U. S. 717 (1974); Swann v. CharlottleMecklenbilrg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971).
$ystcmr.ide remedies such as were ordered by the courts betow, and today approved by this Court, lack any principled
basis when ~the absence of integration in all schools cannot
reasonably be attributed to discriminatory conduct. 2
2

As I suggested in my separate opinion in Keyes, it is essential to id.en-·
~chool desegregation cases...

tify th e: co,nstit1J:tional nght that is n::;;.;ertrd in

.,

·,
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Mn. JusTICE REHNQurs·r has dealt devastatingly with the
way in which the ~f~ bele~enClo;ed pnor precedents with
new and wonderous meanings. I can add little to what he
has said. I therefore move to more general but, in my view,
important considerations that the Court[slmply ignores. .

"\€£. ,;

II
Holding the school boards of these two cities responsible
for all of the segregation in the Dayton and Columbus sysstems and prescribing fixed racial ratios in every school as
the constitutionally required remedy necessarily implies a
belief that the same school boards-under court supervisionwill be capable of bringing about and maintaining the desired
racial balance in each of these schools. The experience in
city after city demonstrates that this is an illusion. The
process of resegregation, stimulated by resentment against
judicial coercion and concern as to the effect of court superThr Court's derisions hardly havr bern lucid on this point. In Brown 11,
248 U. S. 294 (1955), the Court identified the "fundamental principle"
enunciated in Brown I, as being the uncon~titutionality ''of racial discrimination in public education." ld., at 298. In Keyes I undertook to define
the right, drrivrd Jrom the Equal Protection Clause, as one to attend an
"intrgratrd schoo l system," a sy:rtem m which school authorities, when
confronted with l:!Ubstantinl and pcrval:liV<' racial imbalunrc, take into consideration the enhancemmt of integrated school opportunitirs in addition
to the goal of quality education in making and implementing their customary decision:>. ld., at 226. I al~o notrd that an mtegrated ::;ystem
does not mean that "every school mul:lt in fact he an integrated unit," id.,
at '227, and empha:oized that the Equal Protection Clau::;e "doe::; not require
the school authorities to undertake widespread ~tudent transportation
::;olely for the sake of maximizing integration." ld., at 242. When challenged, the school authorities must show that in fact the~· arr operating an
integrated sy::;tem in the foregoing sen~e. Th1~ is quite different from the
burden impo;.;ed on the school authorities by the @OlHt.to bQJ~Sof provmg,
hy n J>reponderance of the evidence, thai they have met an affirmative
duty in exi ·tenrr sinrr 1954 to eliminate evrry racially identifiable "ehool
"root 1md hraneh."

z[
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vision of education, will follow today's decisions as surely as
·i t has in other cities subjected to similar sweeping decrees.
The orders affirmed today typify intrusions on local and
professional authorities that affect adversely the qualityj{,_e..,dru-- - cation. They require an extensive reorganization of both
school systems, including the reassignment of almost half or
the 96,000 students in the Columbus system and the busing
of some 15,000 students in Dayton. They also require reassignments of teachers and other staff personnel, reorganization of grade structures, and the closing of certain schools.
'rhe orders substantially dismantle and displace neighborhood
schools in the face of compelling economic and educational
reasons for preserving them. This wholesale substitution of
judicial legislation for the judgments of elected officials and
professional educators derogates the entire process of public
education. 8 Moreover, it constitutes a serious interference
with the private decisions of parents as to how their children
will be educated. These harmful consequences are the inevitable byproducts of a judicial approach that ignores other
relevant factors in favor of an exclusive focus on racial balance
in every school.
These harmful consequences, moreover, in aU likelihood
will provoke responses that will defeat the integrative purpose
of the courts' order. Parents, unlike school officials, are not
bound by these decrees and may frustrate them through the
simple expedient of withdrawing their children from a public
school system in which they have lost confidence. In spite of
tlw ~uhstantial rost!" oftrn involwd in relocation of the family
or in resort to private education,4 experience demonstrates that
8 The defending of lawsuits that remain active for year::; and complying
with elaborate court decrees also divert the time, attention, and resources
of school authorities from education.
4 A third alternative is available to parent;;; moving for the first time into
n, mrt ropolit an area where a school di~·ti·i ct is opPra ting under a 1'system-
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many parents view these alternatives as preferable to sub~
mitting their children to court-run school systems. In the
words of a leading authority :
"An implication that should have been seen all along
but can no longer be ignored is that a child's enrollment
in a given public school is not determined by a governmental decision alone. It is a joint result of a governmental decision (the making of school assignments) and
parental decisions, whether to remain in the same residential location, whether to send their child to a private
school, or which school district to move into when moving
into a metropolitan area. The fact that the child's enrollment is a result of two decisions operating jointly
means that government policies must, to be effective,
anticipate parental decisions and obta.in the parents' active cooperation in implementing school policies." Coleman, New Incentives for Desegregation, 7 Human Rights
10, 13 (1978).
At least where inner-city populations comprise a large proportion of racial minorities and surrounding suburbs remain
white, conditions that exist in most large American cities, the
demonstrated effect of compulsory integration is a substantial
exodus of whites from the system. See J. Coleman, S. Kelly,
and J. Moore, Trends in School Segregation, 1968- 1973, at 66,
V6-77 (1975). It would be unfair and misleading to attribute
this phenomenon to a racist response to integration per se.
It is at least as likely that the exodus is in substantial part
& natural reaction to the displacement of professional and
local control that occurs when courts go into the business of
restructuring and operating school systems.
Nor will this resegregation be the only negative effect
wide remedy" decreP. To avoid the probability of their children being
bused away from neighborhood schools, and in view of the widely held
belief that the schools under a court decree are likely to be inferior, theRe
1jarents seeks residences "beyond the urban school di trict.

I
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of court-coerced integration on minority children. Public
schools depend on community support for their effectiveness.
When substantial elements of the community are driven to
abandon these schools, their quality tends to decline-sometimes markedly. Members of minority groups, who have
relied especially on education as a means of advancing themselves, also are likely to react to this decline in quality by removing their children from public schools. 5 As a result,
public school enrollment increasingly will become limited to
children from families that either lack the resources to choose
alternatives or are indifferent to the quality of education. The
net effect is an overall deterioration in public education, the
one national resource that traditionally has made this country
a land of opportunity for diverse ethnic and racial groups.
See Keyes, supra, at 250 (opinion of PowELL, J.).

III
If public education is not to suffer further, we must "return
to a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests of
our society in achieving desegregation with other educational
and societal interests a community may legitimately assert."
Id., at 253. The ultimate goal is to have quality school systems in which racial discrimination is neither practiced nor
tolerated. It has been thought that ethnic and racial diver5 Acadrmic debate has intensified as to thP degrre of rducational benefit
realizPd by children due to integratiOn . Sre R. Crain & R Mahard, The
Influence of High School HaCJal Composition on Black College Attendance
and Test Performance (197R); Coleman, New Incentives for Desegregation, 7 Human Rights 10 (1978); Weinberg, The Helationl>hip Between
School Drsegregation and Academic Achievemrnt : A Review of thr Research, 39 L. & ContPmp. Probs. 240 (1975). Much of th(' dispute seems
beside the poi~t . Whatever ('ducation!ll bPnefit~tJTdPCI 1ninot1 r.r cffirlctreu·
through atn•n anee at rourt-intrgratPd :;chools-nnd at least some evidrnc('
indicates th('sf' benrfit,; can .be .;;ub:st.antml-wJll br compromised if the
actual mPthod u~;ed to_somp('] integration is_§o mtrusiv.r a~ to b~. d~l>tr~Jc
li¥e...o.(, :-;rhool quality, t?. 'St ..John, School Dc::;rgrrgation Outcomes for
Children ( 1975).

J
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of court-coerced integration on minority children. Public
schools depend on community support for their effectiveness.
When substantial elements of the community are driven to
abandon these schools, their quality tends to decline-some·
times markedly. Members of minority groups, who have
relied especially on education as a means of advancing themselves, also are likely to react to this decline in quality by removing their children from public schools. 5 As a result,
public school enrollment increasingly will become limited to
children from families that either lack the resources to choose
alternatives or are indifferent to the quality of education. The
net effect is an overall deterioration in public education, the
one national resource that traditionally has made this country
a land of opportunity for diverse ethnic and racial groups.
See Keyes, supra, at 250 (opinion of PowELL, J.) .
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Rider A, pg. 8

Columbus

It is essential that the diverse peoples of our country learn
to live in harmony and mutual respect.

This end is furthered

during formative years by attending schools with diverse
student bodies.

But the benefits that may be achieved

through this experience often will be comoromised where the
method employed to promote inteqration involves forced
measures such as compelled transportation to achieve some
theoretically desirable racial balance.
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sity in the classroom is a desirable component of sound education i11 our country of diverse populations, a view to which
I subscribe. The question that courts in their single-minded
pursuit of racial ba.lance seem to ignore, is how best to move
toward this goal.
For a decade or more after Brown, the courts properly
focused on dismantling segregated school systems as a means
of eliminating state-imposed discrimination and furthering
wholesome diversity in the schools. 6 Experience in recent
years, however, has cast serious doubt upon the efficacy of
far-reaching judicial remedies directed not against specific
constitutional violations, but rather imposed on an entire
school system on the fictional assumption ·that the existence
of identifiable black or white schools is caused entirely by
intentional segregative conduct, and is evidence of systemwide discrimination. In my view, some federal courts-now
led by this Court--are pursuing a path away from rather than
toward the desired goal.
While these courts conscientiously view their judgments as
mandated by the Constitution (a view that would have astonished constitutional scholars throughout most of our history),
the fact is that restructuring and overseeing the operation of
6 During this period the issues confronted by the courts by and large
involved combatting the devices by which States deliberately perpetuated
dual school systems and dismantling segregated systems in small, rural
areas. E. g., Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S . 430 (1968); Griffin
v. School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Board of Ed·ucation, 373
U. S. 683 (1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958). See Wilkinson,
The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation , 1955-1970: A
History and Analysis, 64 Va. L. Rev. 485 (1978). This Court did not
begin 1o face the difficult administrative and social problems as::;ocia ted
with de facto srgregation in large urban ;;chool sy::;tems until Swann v.
Charlotte-,"\-! ecklenburg Board of Education , 402 U. S. 1 (1971). It is
especially tmfortunate that the Court today refuse~ to acknowledge these
problems and chooses in~tead 1o ~anction methods that, although often
appropriate and salutary in the earlier context, are disruptive and counterproductive in school sy;;tem, hke t has<.' i11 Columbus and Dayton.

·.
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major public school systems-as ordered in these cases-fairly
can be viewed as social engineering that hardly is appropriate
for the federal judiciary.
The time has come for a thoughtful re-examination of the
proper limits of the role of courts in confronting the intractable problems of public education in our complex society.
Proved discrimination by state or local authorities should
never be tolerated. and it is a first responsibility of the judiciary not to tolerate it where it has been proved. But many
courts have continued also to impose wide-ranging judicial
remedies, and to retain continuing supervision over school
systems. Local and state legislative and administrative authorities have been supplanted or relegated to initiative stifling roles a& MissioRs o
e cour . n ee , ere is reason
to believe t at legislative bodies~ have welcomed judicial
activism with respect to a subject so inherently difficult and
so politically sensitive, that the prospect of others confronting
it seems inviting. Federal courts no longer should encourage
this deference by the appropriate authorities-no matter how
willing they may be to defer. Courts are the branch least
competent to provide long-range solutions acceptable to the
public and most conducive to achieving both diversity in the
classroom and quality education.
School boards need not wait, and many have not waited,
for innovative legislative guidance. The wide ranging opinion of the Court in Swann, though often cited (as in this
case) for views I think were never intended, identified some
constructive actions always open to school authorties:
"An optional majority-to-minority transfer provision
has long been recognized as a useful part of every desegregation plan. Provision for optional transfer of those
in the majority racial group of a particular school to
other schools where they will be in the minority [or less
in the majority] is an indispensable remedy for those
students willing to transfer to other schools in order to ,

bfk-.v~

.

nai.>bA OJGl..-'

78-610 .& 78-627-DISSENT (A)

COL1!:\fBUS BOARD OF EDUCATION v. PENICK

10

lessen the impact on them of the state-imposed stigma
of segregation. In order to be effective, such a transfer
arrangement must grant that transferring student free
transportation and space must be made available in the
school to which he desires to move." 402 U. S., at 26-27.
See also Keyes, supra, at 240-241 (opinion of PowELL, J.).
Incentives can be employed to encourage these transfers, such
as creation of magnet schools providing special educational
benefits and state subsidizatiou of those schools that expand
their minority enrollments. See. e. g., Willie, Racial Balance
or Quality Education?, in School Desegregation, Shadow and
Substance (Levinsohn and Wright, eds. 197·6 ). · These and
like plans, if adopted voluntarily ' by States, also could help
counter the effects of racial imbalances between school districts that are beyond the reach of judicial correction. See
Milliken v. Bradley, supra; cf. Coleman, 7 Human Rights 10,
supra, at 48-49 .7
After all. and in spite of what many view as excessive government regulations, we are a free society-perhaps the most
free of any in the world. Our people instinctively resent
coercion, and perhaps most of all when it affects their children
and the opportunities that only education affords them. It is
now reasonably clear that the goal of diversity that we call
integration, if it is to be lasting and conducive to quality
education. must have the support of parents who so frequently
have the option to choose where their children will attend
7

Wbcon::;in has implcmentrd a sysl<'m of subsidized intra- and interdistrict majority-to-minority transfers. 1975 Laws of Wisconsin ch. 220,
codifird at Wis. Stat . Ann. 121.85. One need not endorse thi::; experiment,
as it i::; too early to determine whrthrr its objectiv<' of encouraging substantial integration will br attained succrs::;fully. But it i;; the ::;ort of
effort that should be considered by ;;tate and local officials and elected
bodies. The contra::;t betwern the underlying philosophy of the Wisconsin
plan and the massive coercion undertaken by thr courts brlow il:i striking.
See Meadows, Oprn Enrollment and Fiscal Incentives, in School Desegregation, · Shadow a'nd SubHtanre (Levinsohn nnd Wright eds. 1976) .
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school. Courts, of courS(>, should confront discrimination
wherever it is found to exist. But they should recognize limitatious on judicial action inherent in our system and also the
limits of effective judicial power. The primary a.nd continuing responsibility for public education, including the bringing
about and maintaining of desired diversity, must be left with
school and public authorities.

'
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
I join the dissenting opinions of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST
Q...fC..
and write separately to emphasize several points. The
~
Court's opinions in these two cases (!'""profoundly disturbing.
~ appear~o ~ndorse a wholly new constitutional concep~
/
~ ~plicable to school cases. The opinion~ also seem~
~~
,._ ably insensitive to the now widely accepted view that a quarrJ
ter of a century after Brown v. Board of Education , 347 P. S.
483 (1954) , the federal judiciary should be limiting rather
than expanding the extent to which courts are operating the
public school systems of our country. In expressing these
views, I recognize. of course. that my Brothers who have
~
joined the Court's opinio11S are motivated by purposes and
"
"
ideals that few would question.
My disse~I~lt:.,_::is:_::b~a~se~c:!...l~o~n~'------~~
~
conviction that the Court's opinions
a COJlstitutional
/\ / law and will be even worse for public education- an element
of American life that is essential, especially for minority
children.

~issents demonstrat~

MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST's
Court's decision~mark~ak with b'Oth precedent and priu-
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ciple. The Court indulges the courts below in their stflingiug
together of a chain of "presumptions." not one of whic
close enough to reality to be reasonable. This chain leads
inexorably to the remarkable conclusion that the absence of
, integration found to exist in a high percentage of the 241
schools in Columbus and Dayton was caused entirely by in~
tentional violations of the Fourteenth Amendment by the
school boards of these two cities. Although this conclusion
is tainted on its face, is not supported by evidence in either
case. and as a general matter seems incredible, the courts be\Pe.-vw:~
low acrepted it as the necessary ~t·eEliea:trfor requiring as a
~
matter of constitutional law a systemwide remedy prescribing ;---t'Q..u. . SZ.
.._balance in each and every school.
There are unintegrated schools in every major urban area
in the country that contains a substautial minority population. This condition results primarily from familiar se · y social,
gated housing patterns. which-in turll-are cause
economic, and demographic forces for which no school board
is responsi
These causes of the greater part of the school
segregation problem arc not newly discovered. Nearly a
decade ago, Professor Bickel wrote:

P..

"In most of the larger urban ai·eas, demographic conditions are such that no policy that a court can order, and
a school board. a city or even a state has the capability
to put into eft'ect. will in fact result in the foreseeable
future in racially balanced public schools. Only a reordering of the environment involving economic and social
policy 011 the broadest conceivable front might have an
appreciable impact.'' A.Bickel, The Supreme Court an ~
" n. 7 (1970)."
l!.
the Idea of Progress 1:32
~

Tt~

,..

Cl

1
See abo Farley, Rr,;idential Segrrgation and
Implications for Sehool
Integration, :~g L. & Cf1t0mp.
!'rob~.
164(HJi.'S);
K.
Ta011bPr & A. Taru,.
brr, ~l'groe~ in Citie~ (1965). ThP
~ wlo\\' trC'ated thr rr~iclrntw
~egregntion in Da~· ton and C'olumhu~ a~ irrrJr,·ant. Sre po~t, at , and
n. 24 (REHNQUI~T, J ., dis~cnting).
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Federal courts. including this Court today, continue to ignore
these indisputablE' facts. Relying upon fictions and presumptions in c:::chool cases that are irreconcilabl<' with principles of
equal p:·otection law applied in all other cases, see. e. g., Personnel Administrator v. Fee ney , - U.S.-- (1979); Arlington Heights Y. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429~
U. S. 252 ( H)77) ; Washi11Utvn Y. Davis, 426 r. S. 229 (1976)cr,federal courts prescribe systenn"·ide remedies without relation
to the causes of the segregation found to exist. and implement
their decrees by requiring extensive transportation of children
of all school ages.
The type of state-enforced segregation that Brown properly
condemned no longer exists in this country. This is not to
say that school boards- particularly in the great cities of the
Xorth, Midwest. and West-are taking all reasonable measures to provide integrated educational opportunities. As I
indicated in my separate opinion in Keyes "· School District
A·o. 1, 413 U. S. 189. 223- 236 (1973), de facto segregation has
existed on a large scalP in many of these cities, and often it
is indistinguishable in effect from the type of de jure segregation outlawed by Brown. 'Where there is proof of intentiouai
segregative action or inaction, the federal courts must act. but
their remedies should not exceed the scope of the constitutional violation. Dayton v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 (1977);
Austin Independent School District\'. United States, 429 U.S.
990, 991 (1976) (PowELL, J .. concurring); Pasadena C·i ty
Board of Education v. Spanqler, 427 V . S. 424 (1976); Milli- ~
ken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlott/i[:
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971).
Systemwide remedies such as were ordc:·ed by the courts below. and toda~pproved by this Court, lack any principled
~
basis when the absence of integration in all schools cannot
reasonably be attributed to discriminatory conduct. 2
~
2
.\s r
t i.f\ t he•·

~ ugg r~ tPd

in my ::;epanltr opinion in K eyes. it is r~::; rntial to idrnright that i~ a~sr rtrd in ~ rhool dr~rgrrgnt ion rn"rs ..

<'O)l~ti.tutionnl
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";-Y in which the
en owed prior precedents with
new and wonderous meanings. I can add little to what he
has said. T therefore move to more general but, in my view,
important considerations that the Court simply ignores.

II
Holding the school boards of these two cities responsible
for all of the segregation in the Dayton and Columbus sysstems and prescribing fixed racial ratios in every school as
the constitutionally required remedy necessarily implies a
belief that the same school boards-under court supervisionwill be capable of bringing about and maintaining the desired
racial balance in each of these schools. The experience in
city after city demonstrates that this is an illusion. The
process of resegregation, stimulated by resentment against
judicial coercion and concern as to the effect of court super~
The Court's drri~ion~ hardly haw bren lucid on this point. In Brou·n II,
848 P. S. 294 (1955), thC' Court idrntified the '·fundamental principle"
rnunciated in Brou·n I, a,; bring the uneon~titutionality "of rncial discrimination in public rduration." !d .. at :298. In Keyes I undrrtook to define
t hr right, dC'rin•d from tlw Eqnal Protection Clau~e, a~ onC' to attt>nd an
"int<'g;ratecl ~rhool s~·stem," a ~~·,;trm in which school authorities, when
ronfrontc•d with ~ubstant i:d :wei pc•rva~ive racial imbnlanrr, take into ronlj.S.
siderntion the c·nhnmenwnt of intrgrated school opportuniti<'s in addition
L\1'3 ~
tothr goal of qualit~· <'duration in makin{.!: and implemrnting their cus~ry clecJ~Ion,;. ttf .. at :2:26. 1 al~o notrd that an intr~~:ratrd ~yst<'m
doc·~ not mran that "eva.11 school mu~t in fact br an intrgratrd unit," id.,
at '2:27, and rmpha,;i:wd that tllC' Equal l'rot<'rtion Clau~P "doe~ not require
the school authoritie~ to undertakE> widespread ,;tudrnt transportation
,;olrl~· for thr ,;akc> of maximizing integration." !d., at 24:2. When challrng;rcl, the school anthoritirs mn~t ~how that in fart thr~· arc oprrating an
intr{.!:rat<'d RY::<trm in tlw forr{.!:oiug sen~r. Thi~ i~ qnitP clilfrrrnt from the
h mdrn imp~,;rd on th<' ::<C'hool HIIlhoritirs b~· the @QHrt~ btJio"'rtiT provmg,
by a prrponder:mrr of thr rvidrnc<', that they have mrt an af-lirmntivr
1 <!uty in rxistrnrc ."inrc 1954 to rliminate c,·ery racially idcntifinble ~chao!
D ot and branc·h ."
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of rclucation , will follow today's decisions as surely as
it has in other cities subjected to similar sweeping decrees.
The orders affirmed today typify intrusions on local and , ..f
professional authorities that affect adversely the quality(eC_d..,..u----o~.__...._
cation. They require an extensive reorganization of both
school systems. includi1Jg the reassignment of almost half of.
the 96,000 students in the Columbus system and the busing
of some 15,000 students in Dayton. They also require reassignrnents of teachers and other staff personnel. reorganization of grade structures, and the closing of certain schools.
'l'he orders substantially dismantle and displace 11eighborhood
schools in the face of compelling economic and educational
reasons for preserving them. This wholesale substitution of
judicial legislation for the judgments of elected officials and
professional educators derogates the entire process of public
education. 3 Moreover, it constitutes a serious interference
with the private decisions of parents as to how their children
will be educated. These harmful consequences are the inevitable byproducts of a judicial approach that ignores other
relevant factors in favor of an exclusive focus on racial balance
in every school.
These harmful consequences, moreover, in all likelihood
will provoke responses that will defeat the integrative purpose
of the courts' order. Parents, unlike school officials, are not
bound by these decrees and may frustrate them through the
simple expedient of withdrawing their children from a public
school system in which they have lost confidence. In spite of
tlw ~uh~tantinl ro~t~ oftl'n involvPcl in relocation of the family
or in l'l'Sort to private rducation,' experience demonstrates that

·VISIOn

-

-3 ~

~uit:-;

)·ear~

compl~·ing

;fending
that remain active for
and
with elaboratr court clrcrpe:-; aiHo divert the time, attention, and re~ources
of school authorities from education.
4 A third alternativr i~ availablr to parents moving for thr first timr into
<l metropolitan area wherr n Fchool di~t rict is opPntting under a "system-
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many parents view these alternatives as preferable to submitting their children to court-run school systems. In the
words of a leading authority:
"An implication that should have been seen all along
but can no longer be ignored is that a child's enrollment
in a given public school is not determined by a governmental decision alone. It is a joint result of a goverumental decision (the making of school assignments) and
parental decisions. whether to remain in the same residential location, whether to send their child to a private
school. or which school district to move into when moving
into a metropolitan area. The fact that the child's enrollment is a result of two decisions operating jointly
means that government policies must, to be effective,
anticipate parental decisions and obtain the parents' active cooperation in implementing school policies." Coleman, New Incentives for Desegregation, 7 Human Rights
10, 13 (1978).
At least where inner-city populations comprise a large proportion of racial minorities and surrounding suburbs remain
white, conditions that exist in most large American cities, the
demonstrated effect of compulsory integration is a substantial
exodus of whites from the system. See J. Coleman, S. Kelly,
and J. Moore, Trends in School Segregation, 1968-1973, at 66,
76-77 ( 1975). It would be unfair and misleading to attribute
this phenomenon to a racist response to integration per se.
It is at least as likely that the exodus is in substantial part
a natural reaction to the displacement of professional and
local control that occurs when courts go into the business of
restructuring and operating school systems.
Nor will this resegregation be the only negative effect~
wide rrmecl~·" clrcrec•. To avoid the probabilit~· of thrir chilcln·n being
away from nrighborhuod ~chou!~, and in virw of tlw widelr hrld
""'6..~
belief that thr ~chool~ under a court decree arr likdy to be infrrior, the~c
~scek~idrncc::; beyond the urban school district .
bu~ed

~
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of court-coerced integration on minority children. Public
schools depend on community support for their effectiveness.
When substantial elements of the community are driven to
abandon these schools. their quality tends to declin~
times markedly. Members of minority groups. wh3' have >
relied especially on education as a means of advancing themselves, also are likely to react to this decline in quality by removing their children from public schools." As a result,
public school ellfollment increasingly will become limited to
children from families that either lack the resources to choose
alternatives or arP indifferent to the quality of education. The
net effect is an overall deterioration in public educatioll, the
one national resource that traditionally has made this country
a land of opportunity for diverse ethnic and racial groups.
See Keyes, supra, at 250 (opinion of PowELL, J.).

III
If public education is not to suffer further, we must "return
to a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests of
our society in achieving desegregation with other educational
and societal interests a community may legitimately assert." ____!d., at 253. The ultimate goal is to have quality school sys/"
tems in which racial discrimination is neither practiced nor
tolerated. It has been thought that ethnic and racial diverAcadrmir drbai r ha~ intrnsified :1~ io tlw degrrr of educational benefit
realized by children due io intcgraiim1. Sec R. Crain & H. ::VIahard, The
Influence of High School Hacial Compo::;ition on Black College Attendance
and Test Performaucr (197R); Colrmau, New IncentiveR for De;:;egregaiion, 7 Hunwn Rights 10 (1978); Wrinbcrg, The Helation~hip Between
School DrsPgrPgai ion and Academic Achicvl'l11cnt: A Hevie\\' of the Research, 39 L. & Contrmp. Proh~. 2.J-0 (1975). :\Iurh of thr dispute ::;eems
bc·sicl<' thr poiut. ¥ffirtewr rduC'ational bl'nclit. affordcod mlnOrif~· c 1 ren
irough a <'II( anre at romi-intpgratf'd ,.;choob-and at ka:<t sumP evidence
indicHir~ thr:<<' hl'ncfit:< can hP >'llh~tantial-will lw compromi:>rd if the
actual mP1hod used to em
·
' i.QILiS. :;Q jntrm;iw
(g l.lP Si'fltmcCl'. St. John, School Dc,.rgrq~ation Ouirom<'" for
5

•]>·
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sity in the classroom is a desirable component of sound education in our country of diverse populations. a view to which
T subscribe. The question that courts in their single-minded
pursuit of racial balance seem to ignore is how best to move
toward this goal.
For a decade or more after Brown, the courts properly
focused on dismantling segregated school systems as a means
of eliminating state-imposed discrimination and furthering
wholesome diversity in the schools.n Experience in recent
years, however, has cast serious doubt upon the efficacy of
far-reaching judicial remedies directed not against specific
constitutional violations, but rather imposed on an entire
school system on the fictional assumption that the existence
of identifiable black or white schools is caused entirely by
intentional segregative conduct, and is evidence of systemwide discrimination. In my view. some federal courts-now
led by this Court- a.re pursuing a path away from rather than
toward the desired goal.
While these courts conscientiously view their judgments as
-----mandated by the Constitution (a view that would have aston,.....-ished constitutional scholars throughout most of our history) ,
the fact is that restructuring and overseeing the operation of
a Dming this prriod Ow i8::>1l<'S confronted b~· the court ~ by and lnrge
involved combatting thr drvicP~ by which State8 clPiibrratrly perpetuated
dual school ~ ~· ~trm ~ and di ~mantling spgrrgatrd ~~·strm~ in ~mall , rural
areas. E . g., Green Y. Co·unty School Board. 391 U.S. 430 (1968) : G1ij]in
v. School Board, 377 P . S. 21R (1964) ; Goss "· Board of Education, 373
U.S. 6il~ (196:{); Coope1· v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) . Ser WilkinHon,
The Supremr Court and Southrrn Sc·hool DeHPgn>gation, 1955-1970: A
History and Anal~· HiR , 64 Va . L. RPv. 485 (1978). This Court did not
begin to facr thr difficult adminiRtrativr and sorial problem;; as,;ociated
with de facto srgrrgation in largr urban "chool ~y"tem~ until Swann \'.
Char/otte-.11 erklenburg Board of Education. 402 lT. S. 1 ( 1971). I1 i:o
e:;peciall~· unfortunat<' t ha ( the Co11rt t oc!ay rpfu;;e:< to acknowledge 1hese
problrm>' aud rhoosr::: imt end to ~anction method" thHt, although often
appropriatr and ~ alutary in thr carlirr rout ext, are di:<ruptivr aud coHnterj>Wdueti" io .ohool 'Y'''m' like thO<e in CoL,.mb"' ond Dnyto~
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major public school systems-as ordered in these cases-fairly
can be viewed as social engineering that hardly is appropriate
for the federal judiciary.
The time has come for a thoughtful re-examination of the
proper limits of the role of courts in confronting the intractable problems of public education in our complex society.
Proved discrimination by state or local authorities should
never be tolerated. and it is a first responsibility of the judiCJary
it where it has been proved. But many J...t
courts have continued also to impose wide-ranging jq1dicial/
c.~s,
tQI+IPEiies, and to retain c~mtinuinw··supervision over school
"""--ocn..·"-1
systems. Local and state legislative and administrative authorities have been supplanted or relegated to initiative;;stiIn ro .e
of the courts. Indeed, there is reason
to believe t at legislative bodies~ have welcomed judicial
activism with respect to a subject so inherently difficult and
so politically sensitive. that the prospect of others confronting
it seems inviting. Federal courts no longer should encourage
this deference by the appropriate authorities-no matter how
willing they may be to defer. Courts are the bra11ch least
competent to provide long-range solutions acceptable to the
public and most conducive to achieving both diversity in the
classroom and quality education.
School boards need not wait, and many have not waited,
for innovative legislative guidance. The
· opm~
ion of the Court in Swa.-nn, though often cited (as in this
case) for views 1 think were never intended, identified some
constructive actions always open to school authorties:
"An optional majority-to-minority transfer provision
has long been recognized as a useful part of every desegregation plan. Provision for optional transfer of those
in the majority racial group of a particular school to
other schools where they will be in the minority [or less - in the majority] is an indispensable remedy for those
students willing to transfer to other schools in order to •
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lessen the impact on them of the state-imposed stigma
of segregation. In order to be eft'ective, such a transfer
arrangement must grant that transferring student free
transportation and space must be made available in the
school to which he desires to move." 402 U. S., at 26-27.
See also Keyes, supra, at 240-241 (opinion of PowELL, J.).
Incentives can bP employed to encourage these transfers, such
as creation of magnet schools providing special educational
benefits and state subsidization of those schools that expand
their minority enrollments. See. e. g., Willie, Racial Balance
or Quality Education?, in School Desegregatiou, Shadow and
, ubstance (Levinsohn and Wright, eels. 1976). These and
like plans. if adopted voluntarily by States. also could help
counter the effects of racial imbalances between school districts that are beyond the reach of judicial correction. See
Milliken v. Bradley, supra; cf. Coleman, 7 Human Rights 10,
supra, at 48-49. 7
After all, and in spite of what many view as excessive government re ·ulation , we arc a free society-perhaps the most
free of any in the world. Our people · instinctively resent
coercion. and perhaps most of all when it aft'ects their children
and the opportunities that only education aft'ords them. It is
now reasonably clear that the goal of diversity that we call
integration. if it is to be lasting and conducive to qualitv - - - education. must have the support of parents who so frequently
have the option to choose where their children will attend
voW<Vf~
7 Wi~con~in hn~ implemrnfrd a ~y~frm of suh~idize(b~ntrll- and iuter-

distriC't majority-to-minorit)' tranHfers. 1975 Laws of 'WiHcon~in ch. 220,
codifird at Wis. Stat. Ann:J 121.85. Gtw> no,,d uQt emlePt>e thid l'?fJlf'FiRH'Rf
~ .i. t i,.; too early to df'ter~inr whf'ther 1t s objf'ctive of rncomaging substantial infegrntion~\'HH he ttRinea sacctxsfull_~"~ But it is thr ,;ort of
effort that :;honld br considerrd br ~tatr and local officials and rlrctrd
bodir~. The contrn"t brtwrrn the undf'rlying philo:;oph)' of thf' Wiscon:;in
plnn :md the mns~ivr cot'rcion undrrtaken b)· f hr courts bf'low iR ~triking.
Src Meadow~, Oprn Enrollmrnt and Fiseal Incrntivf':;, in School Df':<f'grr9

g,tion, Slwdow nnd Boi><l"'" (Loyin.,hn nml W'ight ed>. 1976/
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school. Courts, of course. should confront discrimination
wherrver it is found to exist. But they should recogniz:e limitatio11s on judicial action inherent in our system aud also the
limits of effective .i udicial power. The primary and con tiu uing responsibility for public education, including the bringiug
about and maintaining of desired diversity, must be left with
schoolsancl
public authorities.
,..

..
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peals for the Sixth Circuit,
et al., P etitioners,
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v.
Mark Brinkman et al.
[June - , 1979]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
I join the dissenting opinions of MR. JusTICE REHl-fQUI~'R
and write separately to emphasize several points. The
Court's opinions in these two cases are profoundly disturbing:
rrhey appear to endorse a wholly new constitutional concepi;
applicable to school cases. The opinions also seem remarkably insensitive to the now widely accepted view that a quar.,
ter of a century after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S.
483 ( 1954) , the federal judicia.ry should be limiting rather
than expanding the extent to which courts are operating the
public school systems of our country. In expressing thes
views, I recogniz:e, of course, that my Brothers who have
joined the Court's opinions are motivated by purposes and
ideals that few would question. My dissent is based on a
conviction that th e Court's opinions condone the creation of
bad constitutional Jaw and will be even worse for public education- an element of American life that is essential, especially
for minority children.

I
I

1
MR. J usTICE REHNQUIST's dissents demonstrate that the \
Court's decisions mark a break with both prececlen t and t)rin ..
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ciple. The Court indulges the courts below in their stringing
together of a chain of "prPsumptions," not one of which is
close enough to reality to be rpasonable. Ree ante, at 4 ( opin- \
ion of STEWAR'l', J.). This claitn !Pads inexorably to the remarkable cunclusiotl that the absence of integration found to
exist in a high percentage of the 241 schools in Columbus and
Dayton was caused entirely by intentional violations of the
Fourteenth Am.endment by thr school boards of these two
cities. Although this conclusion is tainted 011 its face, is not
supported by C'vidence in eithrr case. and as a general matter
scrms incredible. the courts below accepted it as the necessary
premise for requiring as a matter of constitutional law a sys- \
te1mvide remedy prescribing racial balance in each and every
school.
There are unintegrated schools in every major urban area
in the country that contains a substantial minority population. This condition results primarily from familiar segregated housing patterns, which-in tum-are caused by social,
economic, and demographic forces for which no school board
is responsible. These causes of the greater part of the school
segregation problem are not 11ewly discovered. Nearly a
decade ago, Professor Bickel wrote:
"In most of thE' larger urban areas, demographic conditions are such that 110 policy that a court can order, and
a school board, a city or Pven a state has the capability
to put into effect. will i11 fact result in the foreseeable
future in racially balanced public schools. Only a reordering of the environmPnt involviug economic and social
policy on the broadest conceivable front might have au
appreciable impact." A. Bickel. The Supreme Court and
the Idea of Progress 132 n. 7 (1979). 1

1

Sec abo Furle~·, Residential Segregation and Tt~ Implication~ for School
Int('gration, :~9 L. t\: C.:onternp. Prob~. Hi-t (1!175): K. Taeul)('r & A. Ttt('llber, Xegror~ in CitiP::- (19!-i5). Th" Comt. of Appeal~ b"low trrntrd the
re~id(•ntinl ~rgrrgation in Da~·ton and Colmnlm:-; a~ irrele\'nnt. Sec post,
a t - , and n. 24 (H IHJXQUI:-1'1', J ., di~:-;(•Jlting).
1

\
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Federal courts, including this Court today, continue to ignore
these i11disputable facts. Relying upon fictions and presump·
tions in school cases that are irreconcilable with principles of
equal protection law applied in all other cases, see. e. g., Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,- U.S.-- (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252 ( Hl77); Washington Y. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
federal courts prescribe systPmwide remedies without relation
to the causes of the segregation found to exist. ami implement
their decrees by requiring extensive transportation of children
of all school ages.
The type of state-enforced segregation that Brown properly
condemned no longer exists in this country. This is not to
say that school boards-particularly in the great cities of the
North, Midwest, and West-are taking all reasonable measures to provide integrated educational opportunities. As I
indicated in my separate opinion in Keyes v. School District
No.1, 413 U.S. 189,223-236 (1973). de facto segregation has
existed on a large scale in many of these cities. and often it
is indistinguishable in effect from the type of de jure segregation outlawed by Brown. Where there is proof of intentional
segregative action or inaction. the federal courts must act, but
their remedies should not exceed the scope of the constitutional violation. Dayton v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 ( 1977);
Austin Independent School District v. United States, 429 U. S.
990, 991 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring); Pasadena City
Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976); Milliken Y. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-'
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971).
Systemwide remedies such as were ordered by the courts below, and today are approved by this Court. lack any principled \
basis when the absence of integration in all schools cannot
reasonably be attributed to discriminatory conduct. 2
2

As I :suggested in my

~eparate

opinion in Ke.lfeS, 1t i:s

tify tbc ro11:stit 111tionaJ nght that i:-;

~~~Kertrd

in

es~ential

to iden-·

~chool dP~Pgrega1 ia.11

casr;; ..
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST has dealt devastatingly with the
way in which the Court of Appeals endowed prior prf'ccclents
with new and wondNous meani11gs. I can add little to what
he has said. I therefore move to more general but, in my
view, important considerations that the Court simply ignores.

I

II
Holding the school boards of these two cities responsible
for all of the segregation in the Dayton and Columbus sysstems and prescribing fixed racial ratios in every school as
the constitutionally required remedy necessarily implies a
belief that the same school boards-under court supervisionwill be capable of bringing about and maintaining the desired
racial balance in each of these schools. The experience in
city after city demonstrates that this is an illusion. The
process of resegregation, stimulated by resentment against
judicial coercion and concern as to the effect of court superThe Court's deri~ion~ hardly havf' bPen lucid on I his point. In Brown II,
348 U. S. 294 (1955), the Court idmtifiPd thr "fundamental principle"
enunriatrd in Brown 1, as bring thr unron~titutionalit~· "of racial di<;crimination in public rducation." /d .. at 298. In Keyes I undertook to define
the right , derived from thr Equal Protection Clau~e, as one to attend an
"integrated ~rhool sy~trm," a ~y~<tcm in which Hchool authorities, when
confronted with substantial and perva;;ivr racial imbalance, take into consideration the cnhanremrnt of intrgrated school opportuJJitiP::; in addition
to thf' goal of qualit~· education in mnking and implementing their customary df'cision:-:. 41:3 1T. S., at 226. I abo noted that an integrated system '
doe~:< not mf'an that "eve1·y school muHt in fact be an integrat(•d unit," id.,
~tt 227, and rmphasi~Pd that thr Equal Protection Clausr "dors not require
the school authorities to undPrtakP wid(•::;prcad student transportation
solrly for thr sakr of maximizing integration." Id., at 242. When challenged, the school authoritirR must show that in fact they arr opPrating an
intrgrated ~ystem in thr foregoing srn~<P. This is quite diffE'rrnt from the
bnrdf'n impo~f'd on tlw ~rhool authoritif'~ b~· the Court of Apprab and t hf' \
Distri<·t Conrt in Xo. 78-610 of proving, b~· n prcpondE'rance of the PYidrmf', that the~· hav<' met an affirmativf' dut~· in rxi,.;tencf' ~incf' 1954 to
eliminate every racially idf'ntifiablc ~chool ·'root and branch. "

•.
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v1s10n of education, will follow today's decisions as surely as
it has in other cities subjected to similar sweeping decrees.
The orders affirmed today typify intrusions on local and
professional authorities that affect adversely the quality of
education. They require an extensive reorganization of both
school systems, including the reassignment of almost half of
the 96,000 students in the Columbus system and the busing
of some 15,000 students in Dayton. They also require reassignments of teachers and other staff personnel, reorganization of grade structures, and the closing of certain schools.
The orders substantially dismantle and displace neighborhood
schools .in the face of compelling economic and educational
reasons for preserving them. This wholesale substitution of
judicial legislation for the judgments of elected officials and
professional educators derogates the entire process of public
education. 3 Moreover, it constitutes a serious interference
with the priva.te decisions of parents as to how their children
will be educated. These harmful consequences are the inevitable byproducts of a judicial approach that ignores other
relevant factors in favor of an exclusive focus on racial balance
in every school.
These harmful consequences, moreover, .in all likelihood
will provoke responses that will defeat the integrative purpose
of the courts' order. Parents, unlike school officials, are not
bound by these decrees and may frustrate them through the
simple expedient of withdrawing their children from a public
school system in which they have lost confidence. In spite of
the substantial costs often involved in relocation of the family
or in resort to private education/ experience demonstrates that

1

Drfending lawsuit,; that rrmain active for )'Par::; and compl~·ing with \
elaborate conrt decrrr,; also divrrt the timr, attention, and rr,;onrces of
school authoritie~ frcm educatiOn.
4 A third alternative is available to parrnts moving for the first time into
a mf'tropolitan area where a school di,;trict i:s operating under a ":sy>'tem8

...
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many parents view these alternatives as preferable to submitting their children to court-run school systems. In
words of a leading authority:
"An implication that should have been seen all along
but can no longer be ignored is that a child~s enrollment
in a given public school is not determined ·by a govern~
mental decision alone. It is a joint result of a governmental decision (the making of school assignments) and
parental decisions, whether to remain in the same residential location , whether to send their child to a private
school, or which school district to move into when ~oving
into a mPtropolitan area. The fact that the chiid's en~
rollment is a result of two decisions operating jointly
means that government policies must, to be effective,
anticipate parental decisions and obtain the parents' ac..:
tive cooperation in implementing school policies." Coleman, New Incentives for Desegregation, !- Hun~an Right§
10, 13 (1978).
.

the

I

At least where illner-city populations con:tprise 11 large prq~
portion of racial minorities and surrounding suburbs remain
white, conditions that exist iu most large American cities, the
~emonstrated effect of compulsory integration is a substantial
exodus of whites from the system. See J. Coleman. S. Kellyl
and J. Moore, Trends in School Segregation, 1968-1973, at 66,
'/(6-77 (1975). It would be unfair and misleading to attribute
this phenomenon to a racist response to integration per se.
It is at least as likely that the exodus is in substantial part
a natural reaction to the displacement of professional and
local control that occurs when courts go into the business of
restructuring and operating school systems.
Nor will this resegregation be the only negative effect
wide remedy" deereC'. To avoid the probability of their children being
bused away from nPighborhood ~rhool8, and in view of the widely held
belief that the school:; under a rourt decree arC' likely to be inferior, these
parent;; may seek retiidenres beyond the urban l;rhool di::;t rirt.
J

.,
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of court-coerced integration on minority children. Public
schools depend on community support for their effectiveness,
When substantial elements of the community are driven to
abandon these schools, their quality tends to decline, sometimes markedly. Members of minority groups, who have
relied especially on education as a means of advancing themselves, also are likely to react to this decline in quality by removing their children from public schools. 5 As a result,
public school enrollment increasingly will become limited to
children from families that either lack the resources to choose
alternatives or are indifferent to the quality of education. The
net effect is an overall deterioration in public education, the
one national resource that traditionally has made this country
a land of opportunity for diverse ethnic and racial groups.
See Keyes, supra, at 250 (opinion of PowELL, J.).

III
If public education is not to suffer further, we must 11return
to a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests of
our society in achieving desegregation with other educational
and societal interests a community may legitimately assert."
/d., at 253. The ultimate goal is to have quality school syss Academic dE'bate has intensified as to the degree of educational benefit
realized by children due to integrntion. Src R. Crain & R. Mahard, The
Influence of High School Racial Composition on Black Collegr Attendance
and Test Performance (1978); Coleman, New Incentivrs for Desegregation, 7 Human Eights 10 (1978); Weinberg, The Relationship Between
School Desrgregation and Academic Achievement: A Heview of the Research, 39 L. & Contemp. Probs. 240 (1975). Much of the dispute seems
hrside the point. It iK rs~ential that thr divrrse proplr~ of our country
lf'arn to livr in harmony and mutual rr~)lf'Ct. Thi~ end j,; furthrrrd wlwn
young proplr nttrnd srhoob with divrrHe Htudent bodie~. But tlw brnt>fitR thAt rna~· lw nrhi<'ved through thi~ experiE'ncr often will be cornJlrorniHNl whrrr thr mrthod~ rmplo~·rd to promot(• integration includP rorn·ivc
mea:sure,; ~urh as fmwd tran:sportation to achievp ~omP theorE'tirally dC'sirablo racial balance. Cf. St. John, School De~egrrgation Outcome~> for
Children (1975) ,

l

'·

...
,.
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tRms in which fariial di~~rimination is neither practiced nor
tol<'ratPd. Tt has hN•n thought that ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom is a rlesirable component of sound education in our country of divrrse populations. a view to which
I subscribe. Tlw question that courts in their single-minded
pursuit of racial balance serm to ignore is how best to move
toward this goal.
For a decade or more ~JjRr Brown, the courts properly
focused on dismantling segregated school systems as a means
of Pliminating state-imposed discriminatiou and furthering
wholesomr c!iwrsity in · the schools.u Experience in recent
years. however, has cast SE'rious doubt upon the efficacy of
far-reaching judicial renwdies directed not against specific
~onstitutional violations, but rather imposed on an entire
school systE'm on tlw fictional assumption that the existence
of identifiable black or white schools is caused entirely by
intentional segregative conduct, and is evidence of systemwide cliscriminatiou. In my view, some federal courts-now
led by this Court-are pursuing a path away from rather than
toward the desired goal.
While these courts conscientiously view their judgments as
mandated by the Constitution (a view that would have astonDuring this period the is;;ues confronted by the court~ by and large
involved combatting the clcYices by which States deliberately perpetuated
dual school system~ and dismantling segre~~:ated systems in ~ma ll , rural
areas. E. g., Green v. County &huol Board, 691 U. S. 430 (1968); Griffin
v. School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Board of Eduration, 373
U. S. 683 (1963); Couper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958). See Wilkinson,
The Supreme Court :mel Southern School De~egregation, 1955-1970: A
History and Analy;:;is, 64 Va. L. Rev. -185 (1978). This Court did not
begin to face the diflicult admini trative and ~ocia l problems as~ociated
with de facto ~egrcgation in large urban Hchool ~y~tem~ until Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 ( 1971). It is
c~perially unfortunate that the Court today rrfu~e~ to acknowledge these
problems nnd choosP~ in~tead to Hauction mpthocl~ that, although often
appropriate and salutary in the earlier context, are di~n1ptivc and cou nterproductive in ~chool ·y~tem,; like tho::>e in Columbu~ and Dayton.
0

f
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ished constitutional scholars throughout most of our history),
the fact is that restructuring and overseeing the operation of
major public school systems-as ordered in these cases-fairly
can be viewed as social engineering that h.a rply is appropriate
for the federal judiciary.
The time has come for a thoughtful re.=exa.mination of the
proper limits of the role of courts in confronting the intractable problems of public education in our complex society.
Proved discrimination by state or local authorities should
never be tolerated. and it is a first respousibility of the judiciary put an end to it v.·here it has been proved. But many
courts have continued also to impose wide-rauging decrees,
Ji.Dd to retain ongoing supervision over school systems. Local
and state legislative and administrative authorities have been
supplauted or relegated to initiative-stifling roles as minions
of the courts. Indeed, there is reason to believe that some
legislative bodies have welcomed judicial activism with respect
to a subject so inherently difficult and so politically sensitive,
that the prospect of others confronting it seems inviting.
Federal courts no longer should encourage this deference by
the appropriate authorities-no matter how willing they may
be to defer. Courts are the branch least competent to provide
long-range solutions acceptable to the public and most conducive to achieving both diversity in the classroom and quality
education.
School boards need not wait, and many have not waited,
for innovative legislative guidance. The opinion of the Court \
in Swarm, though often cited (as in this case) for views I
think were never intended, identified some constructive actions
always open to school authorities:
11
An optional majority-to-minority transfer provision
has long been recognized as a useful part of every desegregation plan. Provision for optional transfer of those
in the majority racial group of a particular school to
other schools where they will be in the minority [or less

I

..
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in the majority l is an indispensable remedy for thos~
students willing to transfer to other schools in order to
lessen the impact on them of the state-imposed stigma
of segregation. In order to be effective, such a transfer
!l<rrangement must grant that transferring student free
transportation and space must be made available in the
school to which he desires to move." 402 U. S., at 26-27:
See also Keyes, supra, at 240-241 (opinion of PowELL, J.),
Incentives can be employed to encourage these transfers, such
as creation of magnet schools providing special educational
benefits and state subsidization of those schools that expanq
their minority enrollments. See, e. g., Willie, Racial Balance
or Quality Education'?, in School Desegregation, Shadow and
Substance (Leviusohn and Wright, eds. 1976). These and
like plans. if adopted voluntarily by States, also could hel1~
counter the effects of racial imbalances between school dis..,
tricts that are beyond the reach of judicial correction. See
Milliken v. Bradley, supra; cf. Coleman, 7 Human Rights 10l
supra, at 48- 49. 7
After all, and in spite of what many view as excessive gov..,
ernment regulation, we are a free society-perhaps the most \
free of any in the world. Our people instinctiwly resent
coercion, and perhaps most of all when it affects their children
and the opportunities that only education affords them. It is
now reasonably clear that the goal of diversity that we call
integration, if it is to be lasting and conducive to quality
'Wi~eonsin ha~ implrnwnted a ~~·~trm of ~ub~idiz<'d, vohmtar~· intra- and
intrr-di~trict majority-to-minorit~· tnlll~frr;;.

1975 Law~ of WiHcon~in ch.
220, codified at Wi~. Stat. Ann. § 121.1\5. It i~ too Pari~· to dPtPTminc
whrther thi~ experiment will attain it:,; objectivr of rncouragi11g ~ubotantial
intrgration. But it is t.hr ~o rt of effort that should be rou~idrred l>~· ~!atr
and Joc·al official,; and rkcted bodie,;. The contra,;t betwee11 thr underlying
phil osophy of tlw Wi~eon~in ]1lan and thr mas,;ive roPrcion undertakrn b~·
the comt:-< below j,; ~triking. Srr "\feadow,;, Oprn Enrollm!'nt and Fi,;cal
Incentivl'~, in School DP~Pgrrgation, Shadow and Sub~t<lli<'C (Levin~olm aud
Wright eds·. 1976).

I
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education, must have the support of parents who so frequently
have the option to choose where their children will attend
school. Courts, of course, should confront discrimination
wherever it is found to exist. But they should recognize limitations on judicial action inherent in our system and also the
limits of effective judicial power. The primary and continuing responsibility for public education, including the bringing
about and maintaining of desired diversity, must be left with
schools and public authorities.
J
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Mn. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
I join the dissenting opinions of MR. JusTICE REHl'fQUI~'ll
ttnd write separately to emphasize several points. The
Court's opinions in these two cases are profoundly disturbin~:
They appear to endorse a wholly new constitutional concep~
applicable to school cases. The opinions also seem remarkably insensitive to the now widely accepted view that a quar..,
ter of a century after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), the federal judiciary should be limiting rather
than expanding the extent to which courts are operating the
public school systems of our country. In expressing these
views, I recognize, of course, that my Brothers who have
joined the Court's opinions are motivated by purposes and
ideals that few would question. My dissent is based on a
conviction that the Court's opinions condone the creation of
bad constitutional law and will be even worse for public education-an element of American life that is essential, especially
for minority children.
I
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST's dissents demonstrate that the
Court's decisions mark a break with both precedent and prin ..
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ciple. The Court indulges the courts below in their stringing
together of a chain of "presumptions," not one of which is
close enough to reality to be reasonable. See ante, at 4 (opinion of STEWART, J.). This claim leads inexorably to the remarkable conclusion that the absence of integration found to
exist in a high percentage of the 241 schools in Columbus and
Dayton was caused entirely by intentional violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment by the school boards of these two
cities. Although this conclusion is tainted on its face, is not
supported by evidence in either case, and as a general matter
seem1:1 incredible, the courts below accepted it as the necessary
premise for requiring as a matter of constitutional law a systemwide remedy prescribing racial balance in each and every
school.
There are unintegrated schools in every major urban area
in the country that contains a substantial minority population. This condition results primarily from familiar segregated housing patterns, which-in turn-are caused by social,
economic, and demographic forces for which no school board
is responsible. These causes of the greater part of the school
segregation problem are not newly discovered. Nearly a
decade ago, Professor Bickel wrote:
"In most of the larger urban areas, demographic conditions a.re such that no policy that a court can order, and
a school board, a city or even a state has the capability
to put into effect, will in fact result in the foreseeable
future in racially balanced public schools. Only a reordering of the environment involving economic and social
policy on the broadest conceivable front might have an
appreciable impact." A. Bickel. The Supreme Court and
the Idea of Progress 132 n. 7 (1979) .1
1 Sec abo Farley, Residential Segregation and Its Implirations for School
Int,egration, 39 L. & Contemp. Prob~. 164 (1975); K. Tarubrr & A. Tneuber, Negroes in Cities (1965). The Court. of Aweal~ below tre11ted the
re:;idential ~egregation in Da~· ton ami Columbu::; a.~ irrelevant,. See post,
at-, and n. 24 (HEHNQUJ!:i'l'1 J. , cli~::;enting) .

I
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Federal courts, including this Court today, continue to ignore
:these indisputablefacts. Relying upon fictions and presump~
tions in school cases that are irreconcilable with principles of
equal protection law applied in all other cases, see, e. g., Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,- U.S.- (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
federal courts prescribe systemwide remedies without relation
to the causes of the segregation found to exist, and implement
their decrees by requiring extensive transportation of children
of all school ages.
The type of state-enforced segregation that Brown properly
condemned no longer exists in this country. This is not to
say that school board&--particularly in the great cities of the
North, Midwest, and West--are taking all reasonable measures to provide integrated educational opportunities. As I
indicated in my separate opinion in Keyes v. School District
No. 1, 413 U. S. 189, 223-236 ( 1973), de facto segregation has
existed on a large scale in many of these cities, and often it
is indistinguishable in effect from the type of de jure segregation outlawed by Brown. Where there is proof of intentional
segregative action or inaction, the federal courts must act, but
their remedies should not exceed the scope of the constitutional violation. Dayton v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 ( 1977) ;
Austin Independent School District v. United States, 429 U. S.
990, 991 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring); Pasadena City
Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971).
Systemwide remedies such as were ordered by the courts below, and today are approved by this Court, lack any principled
basis when the absence of integration in all schools cannot
reasonably be attributed to discriminatory conduct. 2
2 As I suggested in my separate opimon m Keyes, 1t i~ e~sential to iden-·
tify the constitutional nght that is asr;erted in ~chool de»rgrrgatio.n casrs...
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST has dealt devastatingly with the
way in which the Court of Appeals endowed prior precedents
with uew and wonderous meanings. I can add little to what
he has said. I therefore move to more general but, in my
view, important considerations that the Court simply ignores.
II
Holding the school boards of these two cities responsible
for all of the segregation in the Dayton and Columbus sysstems and prescribing fixed racial ratios in every school as
the constitutionally required remedy necessarily implies a
belief that the same school boards-under court supervisionwill be capable of bringing about and maintaining the desired
racial balance in each of these schools. The experience in
city after city demonstrates that this is an illusion. The
process of resegregation, stimulated by resentment against
judicial coercion and concern as to the effect of court superThe Court's deci~;ions hardly havr been lucid on this point. In Brown II,
348 U. S. 294 (1955), the Court identified the "fundamental principle"
enunciated in Brown I, as being the uncon~Stitutionality "of racial discrimination in public education." hi., at 298. In Keyes I undertook to define
the right, derived from the Equal Protection Clause, as one to attend an
"integrated school system," a system in which school authorities, when
confronted with substantial and pervasive racial imbalance, take into consideration the enhancement of integrated school opportunities in addition
to the goal of qualit)· education in making and implementing their customary decisions. 413 U. S., at 226. I also noted that an integrated ~;ystem
oes not mran that "every school must in fact be an integrated unit," id.,
t 227, and emphasized that the Equal Protection Clause "docs not require
he school authorities to undertake widrspread student transportation
plely for the sake of maximizing integration." ld., at 242. When chalnged, the school authorities must show that in fact they arE' operating an
integmted system in the foregoing sen~e. This is quite different from the
burden imposed on thr school authoritic;; by the Court of Appeals and the
District Court. in No. 78-610 of proving, by a preponderance of thr evifenre, that they have met an affirmative duty in existence since 1954 t()
.liminato every racially identifiable school "root and branch."

·.
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'Vision of education, will follow today's decisions as surely as
it has in other cities subjected to similar sweeping decrees.
The orders affirmed today typify intrusions on local and
professional authorities that affect adversely the quality of
education. They require an extensive reorganization of both
school systems, including the reassignment of almost half of
the 96,000 students in the Columbus system and the busing
of some 15,000 students in Dayton. They also require reassignments of teachers and other staff personnel, reorganization of grade structures, and the closing of certain schools.
The orders substantially dismantle and displace neighborhood
schools in the face of compelling economic and educational
reasons for preserving them. This wholesale substitution of
judicial legislation for the judgments of elected officials and
professional educators derogates the entire process of public
education. 8 Moreover, it constitutes a serious interference
with the private decisions of parents as to how their children
will be educated. These harmful consequences are the inevitable byproducts of a judicial approach that ignores other
relevant factors in favor of an exclusive focus on racial balance
in every school.
These harmful consequences. moreover, in all likelihood
will provoke responses that will defeat the integrative purpose
of the courts' order. Parents, unlike school officials, are not
bound by these decrees and may frustrate them through the
simple expedient of withdrawing their children from a public
school system in which they have lost confidence. In spite of
the substantial costs often involved in relocation of the family
or in resort to private education/ experience demonstrates that
Defendiug law::mit:s that remain active for year:; and complying with
elaborate court decree~ also diver1 thr tune, attention, and re::;ources of
school authoritie:; from educatiOn.
4 A third alternative is available to parents moving for the first time into
a metropolitan area where a school diHtrict IS operating under a ":system8

·.

78-610 & 78-627-DISSENT (A)

8

,.

COLU:l\IBUS BOARD OF EDUCATION v. P.ENICK

many parents view these alternatives as preferable to submitting their children to court-run school" systems. In
words of a leading authority:
"An implication that should have been seen all along
but can no longer be ignored is that a child~s enrollment
in a given public school is not determined ·by a govern.i.
mental decision alone. It is a joint result of a governmental decision (the making of school assignments) and
parental decisions, whether to remain in the same resi.;.
dential location, whether to send their child to a private
school, or which school district to move into when ~oving
into a metropolitan area. The fact that the chiid's en~
rollment is a result of two decisions operating jointly
means that government policies must, to be effective,
anticipate parental decisions and obtain the parents' ac..:
tive cooperation in implementing school policies." Coleman, New Incentives for Desegregation, 7. Human Rights
10, 13 (1978).
!
'
'

the

I

:I

At least where inner-city populations comprise ;t large prq~
portion of racial minorities and surrounding suburbs remain
fhite, conditions that exist in most large American cities, thf:l
~emonstrated effect of compulsory integration is a substantial
~xodus of whites from the system. See J. Coleman, S. Kelly 1
and J. Moore, Trends in School Segregation, 1968-1973, at 66,
f&--77 (1975). It would be unfair and misleading to attribute
~is phenomenon to a racist response to integration per se.
tt is at least as likely that the exodus is in substantial part
t natural reaction to the displacement of professional and
local control that occurs when courts go into the business of
lestructuring and operating school systems.
Nor will this resegregation be the only negative effect
wide remt'dy" dccrt'e. To avoid the probability of tht'ir children being
away from neighborhood ~chools, and in view of the widely held
~elief that thl' schools under a rourt decree arr likely to be inferior, tlwse
parent:;; may ·Pek rrsidenres beyond the urban :;rhool district
~used

'.
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of court-coerced integration on minority children. Public
schools depend on community support for their effectiveness,
When substantial elements of the community are driven to
abandon these schools, their quality tends to decline, sometimes markedly. Members of minority groups, who have
relied especially on education as a means of advancing themselves, also are likely to react to this decline in quality by removing their children from public schools. 5 As a result,
public school enrollment increasingly will become limited to
children from families that either lack the resources to choose
alternatives or are indift'erent to the quality of education. The
net effect is an overall deteriora.tion in public educa.tion, the
one national resource that traditionally has made this country
a land of opportunity for diverse ethnic and racial groups.
See Keyes, supra, at 250 (opinion of PowELL, J.).

III
If public education is not to suffer further, we must "return
to a more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests of
our society in achieving desegregation with other educational
and societal interests a community may legitimately assert."
I d., at 253. The ultimate goal is to have quality school sys8 Academic debate has intensified as to the degree of educational benefit
:realized by children due to integration. See R. Crain & R. Mahard, The
Influence of High School Racial Composition on Black College Attendance
and Test Performance (1978); Coleman, New Incentives for Desegregation, 7 Human Rights 10 (1978); Weinberg, The Relationship Between
flchool Desegregation and Academic Achievement: A Review of the Rellearch, 39 L. & Contemp. Probs. 240 (1975). Much of the dispute seems
beside the point. It is essential that the diverse peoples of our country
lParn to live in harmony and mut.ual rcsrwct. This end i:o furthered when
young JWOplr attmd school~ with diverHe student bodieti. But thE' benefits that may bE' achirvE'd through this experiE'nCE' oftpn will be compromisE'd where thE' method~ E'mplo~· cd to promote intPgration includE' coPrcivc
mea::;ures such as forced transportation to achievr ~orne thE'oretically desirable racial balance. Cf. St.. •lolm , School DE'~E'grPgation Out.comes for
Children (1975 ),
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terns in which faci;al di;~rimination is- neither practiced nor
toleratrd. Tt has bern thought that ethnic and racial diver-sity in the classroom is a desirable component of sound education in our country of diverse populations, a view to which
I subscribe. The question that courts in their single-minded
pursuit of racial balance se~m to ignore is how best to move
toward this goal.
For a decade or more 1'\'fyr Brown, the courts properly
focused on dismantling segregated school systems as a means
of eliminating state-imposed discrimination and furthering
wholesome diversity in -the schools. 6 Experience in recent
years, however, has cast ·serious doubt upon the efficacy of
far-reaching judicial remecFes directed not against specific
~onstitutional violations, but rather imposed on an entire
school system on the fictional assumption that the existence
of identifiable black or white schools is caused entirely by
intentional segregative conduct, and is evidence of systemwide discrimination. Iu my view, some federal courts-now
led by this Court-are pursuing a path away from rather than
toward the desired goal.
While these courts conscientiously view their judgments as
mandated by the Constitution (a view that would have aston-

·.

During this period the issues confronted by the courts by and large
involved combatting the devices by which States deliberately perpetuated
dual school sy~tems and dismantling segregated systems in small, rural
areas. E. g., Green v. County School Boa1·d, 391 U. S. 430 (1968); G1-iffin
v. School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Bom:d of Education, 373
U. S. 683 (1963); Cooper· v. Aaron, 35 U. S. 1 (1958). See Wilkinson,
The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955-1970: A
History and Analy:sis, 64 Va . L. Rev. 4-85 (1978). This Court did not
begin to face the difficult administrative and social problems as~ociated
with de facto segregation in large urban school systems until Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971). It is
especially unfortunate that the Court today refuses to acknowledge these
problems and chooses in~tead to sanction method::; that, although often
appropriate and salutary in the earlier conte:>.--t, are disruptive and counterproductive in school y:;tems like tho::;e in Columbus and Dayton.
6

•'
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:ished constitutional scholars throughout most of our history),
the fact is that restructuring and overseeing the operation of
major public school systems-as ordered in these cases-fairly
can be viewed as social engineering that h~rply is appropriate
for the federal judiciary.
The time has come for a thoughtful re.=examination of the
proper limits of the role of courts in confronting the intractable problems of public education in our complex society.
Proved discrimination by state or local authorities should
never be tolerated, and it is a first responsibility of the judiciary put an end to it where it has been proved. But many
courts have continued also to impose wide-ranging decrees,
ttnd to retain ougoing supervision over school systems. Local
and state legislative and administrative authorities have been
supplanted or relegated to initiative-stifling roles as minions
of the courts. Indeed, there is reason to believe that some
legislative bodies have welcomed judicial activism with respect
to a subject so inherently difficult and so politically sensitive,
that the prospect of others confronting it seems inviting.
Federal courts no longer should encourage this deference by
the appropriate authorities-no matter how willing they may
be to defer. Courts are the branch least competent to provide
long-range solutions acceptable to the public and most conducive to achieving both diversity in the classroom and quality
education.
School boards need not wait, and many have not waited,
for innovative legislative guidance. The opinion of the Court \
in Swann, though often cited (as in this case) for views I
think were never intended, identified some constructive actions
always open to school authorities:
11
An optional majority-to-minority transfer provision
has long been recognized as a useful part of every desegregation plan. Provision for optional transfer of those
in the majority racial group of a particular school to
other schools where they will be in the minority [or less

1

I
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in the majority] is an indispensable remedy for thos~
students willing to transfer to other schools in order to
lessen the impact on them of the state-imposed stigma
of segregation. In order to be effective, such a transfer
!1-rrangement must grant that transferring student free
transportation and space must be made available in the
school to which he desires to move." 402 U. S., at 26-27 1
See also Keyes, supra, at 240-241 (opinion of PowELL, J.) 1
Incentives can be employed to encourage these transfers, such
as creation of magnet schools providing special educational
benefits and state subsidization of those schools that expanq
their minority enrollments. See, e. g., Willie, Racial Balance
or Quality Education?, in School Desegregation, Shadow and
Substance (Levinsohn and Wright, eds. 1976). These and
like plans, if adopted voluntarily by States, also could hel):l
counter the effects of racial imbalances between school dis-:
tricts that are beyond the reach of judicial correction. See
Milliken v. Bradley, supra; cf. Coleman, 7 Humau Rights 101
supra, at 48-49. 7
After all, and in spite of what many view as excessive gov.,
ernment regulation, we are a free society-perhaps the most
free of any in the world. Our people instinctively resent
coercion, and perhaps most of all when it affects their children
and the opportunities that only education affords them. It is
now reasonably clear that the goal of diversity that we call
integration, if it is to be lasting and conducive to quality
'Wi~consin ha:s imp!Pmrntrd a ;.;~·;.;trm of ~ub:-;idizPd, voluntar~· intra- and
intrr-di::;trict majority-to-minorit~· tran::;fpr::;. 1975 Law::; of Wi ·con~iu ch.
220, codifiPd at Wis. Stat. Ann. § 121.85. It. i::; too rarly to detPrminc
whether thiR pxperiment will attain it::; objPctive of encouraging ~ubstantial
intrgration. But. it is thP sort of rffort that should be con::~iderrd by state
and local official~ and elrctcd bodies. The contra::;t between thr underlying
philosophy of thE1 Wi::;con~in plan and thr ma::;::;ive coercion undertaken b~·
the court;.; hdow i;.; ~triking. Srr Meadow:::, Oprn Enrollmrnt and Fi:;cal
Incentive~, in School De~:;egrrgation, Shadow tmd Substance (Levin ohn and
Wright ed:s. 1976).

\
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education, must have the support of parents who so frequently
have the option to choose where their children will attend
school. Courts, of course, should confront discrimination
wherever it is found to exist. But they should recognize limitations on judicial action inherent in our system and also the
limits of effective judicial power. The primary and continuing responsibility for public education, including the bringing
about and maintaining of desired diversity, must be left with
schools and public authorities.
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LA; Parents Up in Arms .Over Mandatory Busing Plar
By Joseph Kane .'•·:

.

Egly was charged with implementing a plan.
·
.
In the first two years, the proLOS ANGELES - The deceptive
gram was limited to four grades, but
tranquili _ty and minimal disturbEgly this past summer expanded it'
~nces 1hat_ acco;npani"ed the opento cover 70,000 students in grades
Ing of public schools in Los Angeles
one through nine in 153 elementary
last week did little to mask the failand junior high schools and will
ing grade the city's white parents
add the senior high school grades
--... have been giving their schools for
next year. The Egly plan, completed
t~e past three year·s. .
·
on Aug. 26, overcame the scarcity of
White flight, triggered by a
white students by linking one pre- .
mandatory busing program to intedominantly minority school witb~
grate ~orne of the system's 540,000
two to four predominantly white·
students, has ·combined with
teacher layoffs, budget squeezes, · schools in "groupings" that chose
individual children to be bused in
cancellation of classes and a school
alternate years by the first letter of
board caught in racial antaoonisms
the family name or month of their
to bring the school syste~ to the
birth.
'
edge of confusion and chaos.
Still, the logistics of the sprawlIn the last three years, says
ing, 710-square mile district forced
School Superintendent William J.
Egly to leave 60 percent of the total
Johnston. about 50,000 white stuenrollment in the "racially isodents.have disappeared into pri\'ate
lated" category and outside the busand ~arochial schools, self-styled
ing decree.
.
tutonng programs, neighboring
The plan was challenged by all
count1es or JUSt stayed home.
parties. The anti-busing Board of
The problem, Johnston feels is
Education appealed the Egly deci- .that "every time we lose a white kid
sion to the state court of appeals
we lose the involvement of the parand to U.S. Supreme Court Justice
ents but we also lose the Sl 780 the
William Rehnquist. The American
kids take with them in per p~pil exCivil Liberties Union appealed to
pense. Inflation is driving our inthe same court on behalf of the
come and revenues down but we
blacks and Hispanics as did the Nastill must keep up our overhead."
tiona! Association for the AdvanceMandatory busing has been the
ment of Colored People.
cause:
The court of appeals raised false
Just 10 years ago, the 638 300 stuhopes among white ~ parents and
dents in the nation's second largest
seriously gutted the Egly plan by
system had a 'white majority of 50
allowing the school board to reduce
:percent The remainder was dithe number of bused schools from
vided between blacks (24.1 percent)
153 to only 57 as the eve of the first
and Hispanics (21.8 percent). At the
day of school arrived. ·
close of school last year, there were
Chaos reigned.
542,583 students and 27 percent
Parents were not certain where
were white. Black enrollement held
their children were supposed to go
steady at 24.1 percent but Hispanic
or whether their local school was in
_enrollment leaped to 41.6 percent.
or out of the plan. An inner city
When a final count is made later
school, linked with tw.o schools in
m the month, the white enrollment
affluent West Los Angeles was
Will be below 25 percent and says'
swamped with an additional 400
Johnston, "by 1987, we expect our
children who had no place to be
whJte enrollment to be down to 14
bused to.
percent."
·
·
At mostly white Sunny Brae
The quiet but determined exodus
school in Canoga Park in the San
of whites began in earnest three
Fernando Valley, where opposition
years ago after a court-ordered
to busing is furious, mothers stood
?esegregation ruling handed down
next to the bus with tears in their
m 1963 had not produced results
eyes as their children climbed
through a voluntary' plan and LA.aboard for the trip to Montague
County Superior Court Judge Paul
school.
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One father told principal Floyd
Cottam,
I -had it to do over again,
I would never have any children."
Housewife Joan Mazer said, "I am
speechless. See how we are just 1letting our children go quietly. It is
like the early stages of the bolocaust where our people walked
quietly to their death." Her daugh- ,
ter had just climbed aboard the
sixth grade bus for a 30-minute ride_
to Montague, which in turn sent 200
of its Hispanic students to racially
balance Sunny Brae.
Whites all over the district are
beating the system in their own
way. But those Who used private
schools last year are embittered at
schools that raised tuition from
$1,800 to as much as $2,400 this year.
The scho()l board knows of only
600 requests for exemptions for
home tutoring, but parents insist
that. dining rooms all through the
-San Fernando Valley are being used
as ersatz Classrooms.
Dr.· Richard Kritzer, director of
. three-year-old Calabas?S A,cademy
with a ~uition of $160 a month, plus
'fees and books, says "in the last cou'pJ.e of days we have been overwhelmed.".
·
··
The flood- of new phone calls
stems from a late state suprem'e
court decision overruling the lower
court of appeals and reinstating 96
schools in to Egly's original plan.
Parents who thought the appellate
decision had rescued their neighborhood school on the eve of the
opening are back into the plan and .
the expanded busing of their children~ though delayed, will begin
this week.
· .:,,
While enrollment ·of whites is
down, in part due to fewer births,
the flight of those remaining has
damaged the school's budgetary ,·
plans. Enrollment in private
schools has jumped from 86,000 ·in.···
1975-to 100,000 last June. The number of private schools has risen
from 312 a decade ago to 557 today,
and "that does not include the
schools affiliated with churches
that have expanded their facilities," .
says a beleaguered superintendent
Johnston.
Johnston is confronted daily with .
parents who give "phony addresses" for children to avoid the
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bus, \\•ith parents who thr
change the child's last n
qualify for attendance at t
school and with parents t
ing to buy property in the n
area in order to be bused
school near the legitimatE
School officials further not
ous increase in "gifted" c
and a decline in student
aUow.ing them to go to a
closer to home.
While their anger over
and deteriorating school
nated the latter days of s1
some parents were directi1
fury at the Los Angeles
Board.
"They are playing on the
white parents" said house
dith Chapman in the San·F
Valley, "They had no cont
plan and put the burden c
schools. They are showing
ership or responsibility tm
the children they are sup]
represent."
.The second week that
tomorr.ow may not have the
cial 'tranquility of the firs
leaders are planning a de1
tion at scboolboard headq
Frustrated parents are awa
tices on the ne,YJ school
children ~ill attend. Supe
ent Johnston is calling for :
legislative seSsion for an o
appropriation and 2,000 of
tern ·s teachers are hoping t
to lay them off will be allay~
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Parents Up in· Arms Over Mandatory Busing Plan
y Joseph Kane

'• •

Egly was charged with implementing a plan.
In the first two years, the pro:ELES - The deceptive
gram wes limited to four grades, but,
and minimal disturbEgly this past summer expanded i!
accompanied the opento cover 70,000 students in grades
c sclfools in Los Angeles
one through nine in 153 elementary
id little to mask the failand junior high schools and will
the city's white parents
udd the se nior high school grades
giving_their schools for
next year. The Egly plan, completed
ee years.
·
on Aug. 26, overcame the scarcity of
light, triggered by a
white students by linking one prebusing program to intedominantly minority school wifh ~
~ of the system's 540,000
two to four predominantly white·
has ·combined with
yoffs, budget squeezes, · schools in "groupings" that chose
individual children to be bused in
n of clu sse~ and a school
alternate years by the first letter of
,ht in racial antagonisms
the family name or month of their
he school system to the
birth.
1fusion and chaos.
Still, the logistics of the sprawlI ast three years, says
ing, 710-square mile district forced
perintendent William J.
Egly to leave 60 percent of the total
about 50,000 white stuenrollment in the "racially iso! disappeared into pri\·ate
lated" category and outside the bus:hial schools, self-styled
ing decree.
programs, neighboring
The plan was challenged by all
r just stayed home.
parties. Th,e anti-busing Board of
1blem, Johnston feels, is
Education appealed the Egly deci- y time we lose a white kid
sion to the state court of appeals
e involvement of the parand to U.S. Supreme Court Justice
ve also lose the $1,780 the
\\."illiam Rehnquist. The American
~· ith them in per pupil exCivil Liberties Union appealed to
lation is driving our inthe same court on behalf of the
revenues down but we
blacks and Hispanics as did the Naeep up our overhead."
tiona! Association for the Advancery busing bas been the
ment of Colored People.
The court of appeals raised false
ears ago, the 638,300 stuhopes among white parents and
e nation ·s second largest
seriously gutted the Egly plan by
d a white majority of SO
allowing the school board to reduce
The remainder was dithe number of bused schools from
een blacks (24.1 percent)
153 to only 57 as the eve of the first
ics (21.8 percent). At the
day of school arrived.
ool last year, there were
Chaos reigned.
udents and 27 percent
Parents were not certain where
Black enrollernent held
the1r children were supposed to go
4 .1 percent but Hispanic
or whether their local school was in
leaped to 41.6 percent.
or out of the plan. An inner city
final count is ma·de later
school, linked with tw.o schools in
th, the white enrollment
affluent West Los Angeles was
ow 25 percent and, says·
swamped with an additional 400
by 1987, we expect our
children who had no place to be
llment to be down to 14
bused to.
At mostly white Sunny Brae
but determined exodus
school in Canoga Park in the San
began in earnest tllree
Fernando Valley, where opposition
after a court-ordered
to busing is furious, mothers stood
on ruling banded down
next to the bus with tears in their
not pro.duced results
eyes as their children climbed
voluntary plan and L.A.aboard for the trip to Montague
erior Court Judge Paul
school.
ne·L•fe
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bus, with parents who threaten to
One father told principal Floyd
change the child's last name to
Cottam,
I -bad it to do over again,
qualify for attendance at the local
I would never have any children."
school and with parents threatenHousewife Joan Mazer said, "I am
ing to buy property in the minority
speechless. See how we are just,letarea in order to be bused to the
ting our children go quietly. It is
school near the legitimate home.
like the early stages of the boloSchool officials further note a curicaust where our people walked
ous increase in "gifted" children
quietly to their death." Her daughand a decline in student health
ter had just climbed aboard the
aUowing them to go to a school
sixth grade bus for a 30-minute ride.
closer to home.
·
to Montague, which in turn sent 200
While their anger over busing
of its Hispanic students to racially
and deteriorating schools domibalance Sunny Brae.
nated the latter days of summer,
Whites all over the district are
some parents were directing their
beating the system in their own
fury at the Los Angeles School
way. But those who used private
Board.
schools last year are embittered at
"They are playing on the fears of
schools that raised tuition from
white parents" said housewife Ju$1,800 to as much as $2,400 this year.
dith Chapman in the San· Fernando
The school board knows of only
Valley, "They had no contingency
600 requests for exemptions for
plan and put the burden on local
borne tutoring, but parents insist
schools. They are showing no leadthat . dining rooms all through the
ership or responsibility toward all ,
. San Fernando \'alley are being used
the children they are supposed to
as ersatz classrooms.
represent."
Dr. Richard Kritzer, director of
The second week that begins
. three-year-old Calabasas Academy
tomorrow may not have the superfiwith a tuition of S160 a month, plus
cial tranquility of the first. Black
fees and books, says "in the last couleaders are planning a demonstrapi-e of days we have been over- tion at school board headquarters.whelmed."
·
·
Frustrated parents are awaiting noThe flood of new phone calls
tices on the ne>"' schools their
stems from a late state supreme
children will attend. Superintendcourt decision overruling the lower
ent Johnston is calling for a special
court of appeals and reinstating 96
legislative session for an operating
schools into Egly's original plan.
appropriation and 2,000 of the sys- .
Parents who thought the appellate
tern's teachers are hoping the plans
decision had rescued their neighto Jay them ~off will be ~llayed.
borhood school on the eve of the
opening are back into the plan and
the expanded busing of their children, though delayed, will begin
this week.
While enrollment of whites is
down, in part due to fewer births,
the flight of those remaining has
damaged the school's budgetary
plans. Enrollment in private
schools has jumped from 86,000 in
1975-to 100,000 last June. The number of private schools has risen
from 312 a decade ago to 557 today,
and "that does not include the
schools affiliated with churches
that have expanded their facilities,"
says a beleaguered superintendent
Johnston.
Johnston is confronted daily with
parents who give "phony addresses" for children to avoid the
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